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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1973, states have effectively been prohibited from regulating most
abortions. As every lawyer, law student, and almost every other American
adult knows, the United States Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade' that a
woman has a constitutional right to have an abortion. It is also common knowl-
edge that in recent years the Supreme Court has been slowly restricting, or
refusing to extend, that right.2
The future of Roe v. Wade is uncertain, particularly after the Supreme
Court's most recent abortion decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey.3 The
actual restrictions on abortion upheld in Casey4 are less important than the
positions of the various justices. Four justices in Casey voted to overrule Roe
and eliminate entirely the constitutional right to obtain an abortion.5 Three jus-
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld
state requirements that women give written consent to abortions and that hospitals and clinics
maintain records of the abortions they perform. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the
Court held that neither the federal government nor the states were required to provide Medicaid
funding for non-therapeutic abortions. In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the Court
upheld the exclusion of Medicaid funding for abortions even when those abortions are medically
necessary to protect the woman's health. In Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
476 (1983), the Court upheld state requirements that a second physician be present during
abortions performed after viability, that a pathology report be prepared for all abortions, and that
minors obtain parental or court consent before obtaining an abortion. In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), the Court upheld the parts of a state law that
prohibited public employees from performing abortions and prohibited public facilities from
being used for abortions. In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), the Court upheld a
48-hour waiting period for abortions for minors and a state requirement that, subject to a judicial
bypass, both parents of minors seeking abortions be notified prior to the abortion. In Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990), the Court upheld a state statute
requiring a doctor to notify one of the parents before performing an abortion on a minor, subject
to judicial bypass procedures. And, in Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), the Court
upheld federal regulations prohibiting projects receiving funds pursuant to Title X of the Public
Health Service Act from engaging in abortion counseling or referral, or activities advocating
abortion as a method of family planning.
3. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
4. The Court upheld a requirement that the physician inform the woman of the nature of
the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, the probable gestational age of
the unborn child, and the availability of certain printed materials published by the state. Id. at
2822-23 (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.). The Court also upheld a 24-hour waiting period
for the abortion, subject to an exception for medical emergencies, iaI at 2825-26 (O'Connor,
Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.), a requirement of parental consent for abortions on minors, subject to a
judicial bypass, id. at 2832 (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.), and certain recordkeeping and
reporting requirements, jat at 2832-33 (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.). The only part of
the Pennsylvania abortion law held unconstitutional was a requirement that married women
notify their husbands prior to having the abortion. Id. at 2826-31 (O'Connor, Kennedy, &
Souter, JJ.).
5. Id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); idl at 2873-74 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Prior
to this time, only Justice Scalia had clearly and consistently expressed his desire to overrule Roe.
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tices reaffirmed the constitutional interest underlying the right to abortion, but
modified the standard for reviewing restrictions on abortion. 6 Their plurality
opinion indicated that a state still may not constitutionally prohibit abortion
altogether,7 but adopted an "undue burden" standard to evaluate restrictions on
the abortion of a nonviable fetus.8 Only two justices completely endorsed Roe.9
It may be only a matter of time before a majority of the Court votes to
overrule Roe, or Roe may never be overruled. As Chief Justice Rehnquist rec-
ognized, the Casey decision "leaves the Court no less divided than before-
hand." 0 Justice Blackmun also recognized that the battle is far from over. "In
one sense," he wrote, "the Court's approach is worlds apart from that of the
Chief Justice and Justice Scalia. And yet, in another sense, the distance between
the two approaches is short-the distance is but a single vote. "' "I am 83 years
old," he warned. "I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step
down, the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue
before us today. That, I regret, may be exactly where the choice between the
two worlds will be made."' 2
The uncertainty surrounding Roe makes this a propitious time to examine
what might happen if Roe were overruled. What if states were free to prohibit
abortion? Proponents of abortion rights have argued that the elimination of a
constitutional right to abortion will penalize only the poor. Some states would
continue to allow abortions, and pregnant women with sufficient resources
could still obtain abortions by traveling to those states. According to this argu-
to this time, only Justice Scalia had clearly and consistently expressed his desire to overrule Roe.
See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 532-537 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
6. The plurality, consisting of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, stated that "the
essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed." Casey, 112
S. Ct. at 2803. According to the plurality, that essential holding has three parts:
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before
viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's effective right
to elect the procedure. Second is a confirmation of the State's power to restrict
abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which
endanger a woman's life or health. And third is the principle that the State has
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the
woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.
Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.).
7. The Court held that a state regulation that "has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus" is invalid.
Id. at 2820 (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.). "Understood another way, we answer the
question, left open in previous opinions .... whether a law designed to further the State's interest
in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman's decision before fetal viability could
be constitutional .... The answer is no." Id at 2820-21.
8. Id. at 2819-21 (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.). This standard is clearly
different from the strict scrutiny standard employed under Roe. Id. at 2862 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
9. Id at 2839-41 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 2844-
45 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
10. Id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
11. Id. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
12. Id. at 2854-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
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ment, only poor women who live in states prohibiting abortion will suffer, as
they could not afford to travel elsewhere.
But is that vision necessarily correct? It is premised on a belief that states
can regulate only abortions performed within their territorial boundaries-if
women go elsewhere for abortions, their home state is powerless. This article
examines the validity of that assumption: Could a state prohibit its residents
from leaving the state to obtain a legal abortion elsewhere and subject them to
criminal penalties for doing so? Could a state criminally punish a doctor who
performs an abortion, legal where performed, on a woman whose domicile
prohibits such abortions?
Given the continuing controversy surrounding Roe, it is surprising that
the question of extraterritoriality has received so little attention. One Supreme
Court case states flatly, in dictum, that a state could not regulate extraterritorial
abortions, but no real justification is offered for that view.13 On the other hand,
two prominent constitutional scholars, William Van Alstyne and Donald Regan,
have tentatively concluded that an extraterritorial abortion statute would be
constitutional.14 However, Van Alstyne devotes less than a page to the question,
and Regan, although spending a little more time on the subject, describes his
conclusion as tentative speculation. 15 In short, no one has given extraterritori-
ality the attention it deserves.' 6
The purpose of this article is not to debate whether Roe v. Wade should
be overruled or to discuss my views about whether state statutes restricting
abortion are desirable. I assume the demise of Roe.17 I further assume that
Congress does not regulate abortion or give women a federal statutory right to
abortion. The effect of these assumptions is that a state would be constitution-
ally free to allow, disallow, or restrict abortions within the state's territory.18
But could a state go beyond that and criminalize abortions performed outside of
the state?
13. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822-24 (1975). Bigelow is discussed in greater
detail infra text accompanying notes 531-40.
14. William Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Constitutional Review from Griswold v.
Conhecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.
1677, 1684; Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (1) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1865, 1906-08, 1912-13 (1987).
15. Regan, supra note 14, at 1913.
16. Other scholars are just now beginning to focus on this issue. See Seth Kreimer, The
Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Regulation
in Anericai Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992); Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption:
The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
March 1993).
17. I also assume that the Supreme Court does not hold that the fetus is a person itself
entitled to full constitutional protection. Such a holding, although unlikely, could force all of the
states to prohibit abortion and eliminate the diversity in state law on which this article is
premised.
18. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might arguably require that
the state allow abortions if the mother's life is at risk, particularly if the Court decides that the
fetus is not a constitutional "person." That issue is beyond the scope of this article. I assume that
the statute is tailored to meet any such constitutional challenge. For example, if there is a
constitutional requirement that life-saving abortions be allowed, the hypothetical statute
examined would have such an exception. In other words, I assume that the state tries to prohibit
extraterritorially whatever it would have clear constitutional power to prohibit within its territory.
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Potential state statutes making abortion illegal fall into four categories
depending on the domicile of the pregnant woman 19 and the site of the abortion.
In descending order of the strength of the state's regulatory interest, these four
categories are: (1) a state's attempt to make criminal a resident's abortion
within the state; (2) a state's attempt to make criminal a non-resident's abortion
within the state; (3) a state's attempt to make criminal a resident's abortion
obtained in another state; and (4) a state's attempt to make criminal a non-resi-
dent's abortion obtained in another state.
The first category is easy. A state clearly can apply its criminal statutes to
its own residents when they are acting within its territorial boundaries.20 This is
so self-evident that it is impossible to find an argument to the contrary. The
second category is only slightly more difficult. The Supreme Court has permit-
ted the states broad authority to govern conduct occurring within their terri-
tory; it is clear that a non-resident cannot enter a state and violate its criminal
law with impunity. The fourth category is also easy, although the result is con-
trary to the first two. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a state may
not apply its law when it has no significant contacts with a dispute.21 The only
difficult category is the third. Does a state's connection to a resident pregnant
woman (and to the resident fetus) give it sufficient constitutional power to pre-
vent that woman from having an abortion in another state?
Such an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a state presents at least
five possible constitutional problems.22 First, it might run afoul of the choice-
of-law restrictions in the Full Faith and Credit Clause 23 and in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 This possibility is discussed in Part IV
and, less directly, in Part V. Second, extraterritorial regulation of abortion
might result in a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury
"of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed," 25 if
that right is applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 26 The Sixth Amendment right is discussed in Part VI.
Third, it might violate the dormant commerce limitation on state regulation
19. I shall assume that the pregnant woman's domicile is not merely a technical domicile,
but a state with which she has significant contacts. She resides in the state of domicile, works
there, spends most of her time there, and has no significant connections to any other state. This
obviates the need to define domicile and allows me to avoid the few cases where a domiciliary
might have stronger residential connections with another state. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281
U.S. 397 (1930) (mere domicile is insufficient to justify the application of Texas law).
20. This assumes, of course, that federal law has not preempted state regulation.
21. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (Kansas may not
apply its substantive law to oil leases involving land and royalty owners outside of Kansas). See
also Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (Texas may not apply its contract law to an insurance contract issued
by a Mexican company covering a boat only in Mexican waters, even though the plaintiff is a
Texas domiciliary); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573 (1986) (striking down New York's controls on liquor prices in New York because their
practical effect is to control liquor prices in other states). -
22. Two other possible constitutional sources of limitation on the extraterritorial
application of state law are the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2,
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Neither is discussed because, in this context, each would require some sort of discrimination
against nonresidents, and an extraterritorial abortion statute would not discriminate. See infra
part VII.
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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arising out of the Commerce Clause.27 This is discussed in Part VII. Fourth, it
might constitute an unconstitutional restriction of the woman's constitutional
right to travel, an issue discussed in Part VIII. Finally, even if such an
extraterritorial application of criminal law is not contrary to any particular
provision of the United States Constitution, it might unconstitutionally infringe
upon general principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution but not
attributable to any particular provision. This possibility is discussed in Part IX.
In the final section of the article, Part X, I relax the assumption that Roe has
been overruled and ask whether restrictions that are acceptable under Casey's
undue burden standard could be applied extraterritorially.
I offer two other topics as a prelude to the constitutional discussion. In
Part II, I discuss the opinions of the Irish courts in a recent, highly publicized
case, Attorney General v. X,28 where Ireland attempted to bar an Irish woman
from obtaining an abortion in England. And, in Part III, I discuss common law
and state views on the extraterritoriality of criminal law.
II. THE IRISH ABORTION DECISION
The Irish abortion case29 is, in some ways, a bad example to use in dis-
cussing the power of one state to regulate abortions in other states. Obviously,
it involved the application of Irish, rather than American, constitutional law,
and nothing the Irish Supreme Court said bears directly on the issue examined
in this article. Also, the Irish case involved travel from one independent coun-
try to another, rather than travel within a federal system. The need for har-
mony in a federal system, underlying constitutional prohibitions such as the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, presents a greater obstacle to extraterritoriality in
a federal setting than in an international setting.
But the effect of these differences should not be exaggerated; the Irish
case presents many issues relevant to the discussion in this article. Ireland, like
the United States, recognizes a constitutional right of its citizens to travel,30 and
all of the Irish Supreme Court justices expressly dealt with the interaction
between that right to travel and the prohibition on traveling to another juris-
diction to obtain an abortion.31 The geographical proximity of Ireland and
Britain and the relatively free travel between the two countries also make the
Irish case a good vehicle for illustrating what might happen in the United States
if Roe is overruled. And, unless Roe is actually overruled, one is unlikely to
find any recent domestic examples of state extraterritorial regulation of abor-
tion.
In the Irish case, a fourteen-year-old Irish girl was raped by her friend's
father, after more than a year of molestation. 32 She eventually told her parents,
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
28. Attorney General v. X, [1992] I.L.R.M. 401 (Ir. Mar. 5) (LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
Irecas File), rev'g Attorney General v. X, [1992] I.L.R.M. 401 (Ir. H. Ct. Feb. 17) (LEXIS,
Intlaw Library, Irecas File).
29. Id.
30. Id. at *13 (Finlay, CJ.).
31. Id. at *13-14 (Finlay, C.J.); id. at *27-28 (Hederman, J.); id. at *37-38(McCarthy, J.); id. at *41 (Egan, J.); id. at *44 (O'Flaherty, J.).
32. Except where otherwise indicated, the facts stated in the next two paragraphs are
taken from Judge Costello's High Court opinion. Attorney General v. X, [1992] I.L.R.M. 401(fr. H. Ct. Feb. 17) (LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Irecas File).
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and a medical exam revealed that she was pregnant. The girl and her parents
decided that she should get an abortion, but a 1983 amendment to the Irish
Constitution prohibits abortion,33 and abortions are generally unavailable in
Ireland. Therefore, like thousands of Irish women before her,34 she traveled to
England to obtain an abortion.
Before leaving, her parents notified the Garda Siochana, the Irish police,
of the crime, told them that the family was considering an abortion, and asked
about the appropriate procedure for scientifically testing the fetus to determine
the father's identity. On February 7, 1992, the day after the child and her par-
ents went to England, the Irish Attorney General obtained an ex parte interim
injunction from the Irish High Court restraining the girl and her parents from
leaving the country or terminating the pregnancy. 35 Upon learning of the
injunction, the parents returned with the girl to Ireland, having never obtained
the abortion. A hearing was held and, on February 17, Judge Costello of the
High Court entered an order restraining the girl from leaving Ireland for nine
months and "from procuring or arranging a termination of pregnancy or abor-
tion either within or without the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court."36
The girl and her parents appealed the High Court's order to the Irish
Supreme Court. A majority of the Irish Supreme Court justices voted to set
aside the High Court's order, but for reasons unrelated to its extraterritoriality.
Four of the five Supreme Court justices decided that the constitutional provi-
sion, with its reference to the equal right to life of the mother and its guarantee
33. The Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution provides: "The State acknowledges
the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother,
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate
that right." IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3 (1983), quoted in Attorney General v. X, [1992] I.L.R.M.
401 (Ir. Mar. 5) (LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Irecas File), at *24 (Hederman, J.).
34. Statistics compiled by Britain's Office of Population Censuses and Surveys indicate
that 4,064 Irish women had abortions in England and Wales in 1990. Teen Can't Leave Ireland
for Abortion, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 1992, at 6. However, some counseling services believe that
Irish women often conceal their national origin by using the addresses of friends or relatives in
Britain and that the actual number is much higher. Paul Majendie, Fourteen-Year-Old Raped by
Friend's Father Refused Abortion, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 17, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File; Chris Ryder, Irish Torn Over Abortion Ban on Rape Girl,
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 14, 1992, at 4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Telegr File.
35. This apparently was the first time Irish authorities had tried to prevent a woman from
having an abortion elsewhere. Irish to Discuss Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1992, at
A10; Irish Teen's Rape Case Stlirs Abortion Debate, CHI. TRB., Feb. 19, 1992, at 5.
3 6. The full order provided as follows:
IT IS ORDERED
(a) that the defendants, their servants or agents or anyone having
knowledge of the order be restrained from interfering with the right to life of the
unborn as contained in Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland
(b) that the first named defendant [the girl] be restrained from leaving the
jurisdiction of this Honourable Court or the second and third named defendants
[her parents] their servants or agents or anyone having knowledge of the said
order from assisting the first named defendant to leave the aforesaid jurisdiction
for a period of nine months from the date hereof
(c) that the first named defendant her servants or agents or anyone having
knowledge of the said order be restrained from procuring or arranging a
termination of pregnancy or abortion either within or without the jurisdiction of
the Honourable Court.
Attorney General v. X, [1992] I.L.R.M. 401 (Ir. Mar. 5) (LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Irecas File)
at *2 (Finlay, CJ.). In a humorous sidelight to what is certainly not a humorous incident, note
that paragraph (c), as worded, would technically prohibit anyone anywhere with notice of the
Order from obtaining an abortion.
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of the unborn's right to life only "as far as practicable," allows termination of a
pregnancy if its continuation involves a real and substantial risk to the life of
the mother.37 They concluded that evidence concerning the girl's suicidal ten-
dencies was sufficient to show such a risk.38
All five justices went on to discuss in dicta the extraterritorial effect of
the order and its relationship to the girl's constitutional right to travel. The
High Court's order barred the girl from leaving the jurisdiction for any pur-
pose for nine months, 39 but the Attorney General conceded that the order
should be weakened to restrain the girl from leaving the jurisdiction only for
the purpose of having an abortion 0
Justice McCarthy took the strongest position against the order's
extraterritoriality. He argued that the girl's constitutional right to travel could
not be curtailed because of an intent to commit a particular action in anotherjurisdiction, even if that action was also unlawful in the other jurisdiction.4 1
Thus, Justice McCarthy would have held that even the weakened order without
the absolute restriction on travel violated the girl's constitutional rights. Justice
O'Flaherty stated that the High Court should not "interfere to this extraordinary
degree with the individual's freedom of movement," but did not say whether his
objection was only to the absolute bar on the girl's travel or also to the more
limited bar on travel to obtain an abortion.4 2 Justice Hederman, for reasons not
entirely clear from his opinion, would have refused to grant an order generally
restricting the right to travel, but he would have upheld the parts of the order
prohibiting travel outside of the jurisdiction to obtain an abortion.4 3 He pointed
out that prior cases had upheld the power of the Oireachtas (the Irish parlia-
ment) to make Irish criminal law applicable to acts committed outside of
Ireland 44 and argued that the woman's right to travel is necessarily a lesser
right than the unborn's right to life.45 Thus, the right to travel could be
restricted to protect the right to life. The remaining two justices of the Supreme
Court also accepted the argument that the right to travel, as a less important and
37. Id. at *10 (Finlay, CJ.); id. at *34 (McCarthy, J.); id. at *41 (Egan, J.); id. at *43(O'Flaherty, J.). Judge Hederman argued that a pregnancy could be terminated only if the
evidence would "leave open no other conclusion but that the consequences of the continuance of
the pregnancy will, to an extremely high degree of probability cost the mother her life." Id. at
*29 (Hederman, J.). He concluded that this tougher standard had not been met.
38. For a detailed discussion of the testimony concerning the girl's mental state, see id. at
*19-24 (Hederman, J.).
39. Id at *2 (Finlay, CJ.). See supra note 36.
40. Id. at *14 (Finlay, C.J.); id. at *38-39 (Egan, J.). The Attorney General
nevertheless took an extremely broad view of the High Court's extraterritorial power:
Counsel for the Attorney General expressly conceded that, if such a power
existed, it could not be confined to a girl under age, as here, a citizen, as here, or
in any way to restrict the ambit of its application from any pregnant woman then
in the State, irrespective of her nationality, citizenship, or indeed, where the
conception had taken place. If, as in this case is quite a reasonable possibility, the
girl was living with her parents in London and had come to Ireland on holiday, aholiday perhaps as part of the treatment for her ordeal, she not merely could but
should be prevented from returning to her home if her objective in doing so,
partly or otherwise, was to have an abortion.
Id. at *36 (McCarthy, J.).
41. Ia at *37 (McCarthy, J.).
42. Id at *44 (O'Flaherty, J.).
43. Id. at *31 (Hederman, J.).
44. Id at *28 (Hederman, J.).
45. Id. at *27 (Hederman, J.).
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fundamental right than the right to life, could be restricted to prevent an
extraterritorial abortion 4 6 Thus, a majority of the Irish Supreme Court justices
found no problem with the order's extraterritoriality.
HI. STATE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW
For some reason, an extraterritorial abortion statute and the general idea
of extraterritorial application of criminal law seem almost intuitively improper.
However, a close examination of state criminal cases reveals that the extraterri-
torial application of criminal law is not as uncommon as one might think. There
are several accepted theories of criminal jurisdiction not based on territoriality,
and many courts, both past and present, have upheld convictions where the
defendant's relevant conduct occurred outside the prosecuting jurisdiction. I
shall begin with these cases as an introduction to the issue of extraterritoriality;
only after that introduction will I turn to the constitutionality of such prosecu-
tions.
A. Criminal Jurisdiction Generally
At least five distinct theories of criminal jurisdiction are recognized in
international law: (1) territorial jurisdiction, (2) Roman jurisdiction, based on
the citizenship of the offender, (3) passive personality jurisdiction, based on the
citizenship of the victim, (4) protective or injured forum jurisdiction, based on
injuries to protected interests within the forum, and (5) cosmopolitan, or uni-
versal, jurisdiction.47 Under the territorial theory, a state or nation has the
power to apply its law to a crime only if the crime occurred within its terri-
tory.48 The Roman theory, sometimes termed the "personal" theory of criminal
jurisdiction, rests on the citizenship of the perpetrator of the crime. A state or
nation has jurisdiction over its citizens wherever they may be and can apply its
criminal law to them for actions committed anywhere.49 The passive personal-
ity theory is based on the citizenship, not of the perpetrator, but of the victim: a
state has jurisdiction whenever its citizens are the victims of criminal activity
elsewhere.5 0 The protective, or injured forum, theory allows the state or nation
to apply its criminal law to any action that harms state-protected interests, even
if the harmful action occurs outside of the state's territorial limits.5 1 The cos-
46. Id. at *13 (Finlay, CJ.); id. at *41 (Egan, J.).
47. See Christopher L. Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and
Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crimes, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 685; BJ. George, Jr.,
Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REV. 609, 613-614 (1966);
Harvard Research in Int'l Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435(Supp. 1935). Professor George adds a sixth type of jurisdiction: the floating territory principle
applying to acts on ships or aircraft under the flag of the nation. This seems to me to be just a
variant of the territorial theory and, in any event, is not particularly relevant to this article. See
also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 180, 190-
92 (1986) (discussing all five theories, but rejecting jurisdiction based on the citizenship of the
victim); ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 39-40 (3d ed. 1982)(omitting the passive personality principle); Rollin M. Perkins, The Territorial Principle in
Criminal Law, 22 HASTINGS LJ. 1155, 1155-56 (1971) (same as Perkins and Boyce).
48. PERKINs & BOYCE, supra note 47, at 39.
49. Id.
50. George, supra note 47, at 614. See also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 191(recognizing, but rejecting, this theory of jurisdiction).
51. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 47, at 39.
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mopolitan theory has no limits-it grants a state or nation criminal jurisdiction
over an action committed anywhere by anyone.52
The common law adopted the territorial theory of criminal jurisdiction:
state criminal law applied only to crimes- committed within the state.53 The
common law also initially took the view that a crime occurred in only one state;
for each crime, one particular act was deemed vital, and only the state where
that vital act occurred had territorial jurisdiction.54 However, state courts
developed various legal fictions and other devices to stretch the strict territorial
principle,55 and state legislation often eliminated the common law's single-situs
rules to allow the exercise of criminal jurisdiction when any part of the crime
occurred within the state.56 Some state legislation rejected the limits of territo-
rialism entirely and expanded criminal jurisdiction based on other principles.5 7
Given the prevalence of territorialism in common law doctrine, early
examples of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction are surprisingly common. A
nineteenth century English statute provided for the punishment of any English
subject for murder or manslaughter "whether [committed] within the King's
Dominions or without."58 As early as 1670, the Colony of New Plymouth pro-
vided for the punishment of extraterritorial crime:
It is enacted by the Court that whosoever having comitted uncleanes in
another Collonie and shall come hither and have not satisfyed the law
where the fact was comitted they shalbe sent backe or heer punished
according to the nature of the crime as if the acte had bine heer done.59
This is, in part, an extradition provision, but it also allows punishment within
New Plymouth for crimes committed elsewhere. It is unclear whether the
application of New Plymouth criminal law was intended ("as if the acte had
bine heer done") or whether this is merely a venue provision allowing prosecu-
tion in New Plymouth pursuant to the criminal law of the other jurisdiction
("have not satisfyed the law where the fact was comitted"). In a time of pre-
dominantly common law crimes, it probably made little difference.
Cases applying state criminal law extraterritorially are also not uncom-
mon.60 Many of these cases arose when territorialism was at its zenith. Some of
these cases do not even mention potential federal constitutional problems. There
are surprisingly few state cases holding state extraterritorial criminal statutes
52. Id.
53. LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 47, at 180; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 47, at 40.
54. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 180-86; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 47, at
40-41. The similarity to the vested rights theory for choice of civil law is obvious. The vested
rights theory also focused on a single event in a cause of action and also said that the law of the
state where that event occurred should apply to the cause of action. LEA BRILMAYER,
CONFLICrf OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECrIONS 18-22 (1991); ROBERT ALLEN
LEFLAR Er AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 255-61 (4th ed. 1986).
55. Paul D. Empson, The Application of Criminal Law to Acts Committed Outside the
Jurisdiction, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 32, 36-37 (1967); George, supra note 47, at 622-23.
56. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 186-90; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 47, at
41.
57. See, e.g., George, supra note 47, at 623-24.
58. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 47, at 42 (citing 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31, § 7 (1828)). This
statute was upheld in Regina v. Azzopardi, 174 Eng. Rep. 776 (1843).
59. Daniel L. Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State Criminal
Law, 38 TEx. L. REV. 763, 770 n.38 (1960) (quoting BRIGHAM, CHARTER AND LAWS OF
NEW PLYMOUTH 162 (1836)).
60. See infra parts III.C.-III.F.
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invalid; the more common tact in the state courts is to read a territorial limit
into the statute.61
At least four of the bases of jurisdiction listed above could support the
extraterritorial regulation of abortion. First, the cosmopolitan theory obviously
would support such extraterritorial regulation, since it imposes no restrictions
whatsoever. No country has ever attempted to exercise criminal jurisdiction to
the full extent of the cosmopolitan theory, but there are limited examples of the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction, particularly with respect to piracy, that would
fit within no other theory. 62 However, no American state has ever purported to
exercise such broad criminal jurisdiction,63 so this is an unlikely basis for an
extraterritorial abortion law.
A second possible jurisdictional basis for an extraterritorial abortion law
is, surprisingly, the territorial theory itself. At least one authority has argued
that a prohibition on leaving the state to commit a particular act is within the
territorial principle, even if the act is lawful in the state where it is commit-
ted.64 This is because the prohibited act itself is not the crime, but merely leav-
ing the state with a particular intent.65 Thus, if a statute barred women from
leaving the state for the purpose of obtaining an abortion, instead of outlawing
the abortion itself, the statute arguably would not violate the territorial princi-
ple.
A third possible basis of jurisdiction for an extraterritorial abortion
statute is the citizenship of both the pregnant woman and, to the extent the fetus
is treated as a person, the fetus. This would support jurisdiction under both
domicile-based theories of criminal jurisdiction, since the woman would be the
offender and the fetus would be the injured "person." 66
The right of a nation or state to exercise criminal jurisdiction on the basis
of domicile is "quite freely conceded" 67 and is a generally accepted theory of
international law.68 It is clearly an accepted basis for federal criminal jurisdic-
tion, 69 and assertions of such criminal jurisdiction by the states date back to at
least the early nineteenth century. In Commonwealth v. Gaines,70 the defendant
was convicted of stealing a horse, the theft having been committed in the
District of Columbia, after which the horse was brought to Virginia. A
Virginia statute, first passed in 1786, provided for trial in Virginia of, among
other things, "all felonies committed by citizen against citizen" "in any place out
61. Rotenberg, supra note 59, at 773-780. See, e.g., People v. Werblow, 148 N.E.
786, 789 (N.Y. 1925); People v. Costa, 469 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1983); Wilson v. State,
184 P. 603, 604 (Okla. Crim. App. 1919).
62. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 47, at 39-40.
63. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 192 (referring to the theory as universal
jurisdiction).
64. Perkins, supra note 47, at 1165-66.
65. Id.
66. My references to the fetus as a "person," "citizen," or "resident" are intended for
editorial convenience only. I do not intend to express a position on the moral and philosophical
question of when a fetus becomes a human being.
67. Wendell Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 MICH. L.
REV. 238, 265 (1931).
68. Blakesley, supra note 47, at 706.
69. E.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922).
70. 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172 (1819).
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of the jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Law in this Commonwealth." 7 1
The court rejected the defendant's territorial challenge to this statute. It pointed
out that English law punished English citizens for crimes committed in foreign
countries72 and concluded that the statute was constitutional 3 Three judges dis-
sented, but even they conceded that the legislature had the power "to legislate
rules of conduct for its citizens while resident beyond its territorial limits. '74'
Commonwealth v. Gaines should be compared to another, roughly con-
temporaneous case, State v. Knight,75 decided in 1799. In Knight, the defendant
was convicted of violating a statute prohibiting the counterfeiting of North
Carolina bills of credit by persons resident in other states.76 According to the
court, the North Carolina legislature was empowered to punish crimes commit-
ted within North Carolina by North Carolina citizens because they "are sup-
posed to have consented to all laws made by the Legislature. '77 The legislature
could also punish crimes committed wvithin North Carolina by non-citizens
because they, by their temporary presence, "do impliedly agree to yield obedi-
ence to all such laws as long as they remain in the State." 78 However, "the right
of punishing, being founded upon the consent of the citizens, express or
implied, can not be directed against those who never were citizens, and who
likewise committed the offence beyond the territorial limits of the State claim-
ing jurisdiction." 79 Note, however, that this reasoning does not completely
reject extraterritorial jurisdiction. It leaves open the possibility of punishing
North Carolina citizens for their extraterritorial conduct, based on their
implied consent to such laws enacted by their legislature.80
A fourth possible basis for jurisdiction is under the protective theory.81
Jurisdiction under this theory would be based on the state's interest in protect-
ing the fetus and the argument that, since the fetus "resides" within the prose-
cuting state, the effect of any injury to the fetus is felt in that state.
Assertions of state legislative jurisdiction, even criminal jurisdiction,
based upon effects within the prosecuting state, are also not modem. The most
well-known early application of state criminal law to purely extraterritorial
actions is an 1882 case, Hanks v. State.82 In Hanks, the defendant was indicted in
Texas for forging a land title certificate for Texas land; the indictment alleged
71. Id at 174.
72. Id at 176.
73. Id. at 177. The opinion seems to be referring to the state constitution, although it
does not say so.
74. Id at 183 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
75. 1 N.C. (Tay.) 65 (1799).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The dictum of the court, however, is broader: "Crimes and misdemeanors committed
within the limits of each [state] are punishable only by the jurisdiction of that State where they
arise." Id. at 66. This broader language is obviously contrary to Commonwealth v. Gaines.
81. Professor Blakesley classifies jurisdiction based on effects in the forum within the
territorial principle- and limits the protective theory to offenses posing a threat to security,
sovereignty, or important governmental functions. Blakesley, supra note 47, at 701. Other
authorities do not appear to be so limiting in their application of the protective principle. See
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 190-91; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 47, at 39;
George, supra note 47, at 613-14.
82. 13 Tex. App. 289 (1882).
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that the forgery occurred in Louisiana.83 The court held that, since the forgery
affected the title to Texas lands, there was an injury to Texas at the time of the
forgery,84 "no matter whether the perpetrator of the crime was at the time of
its consummation within or without her territorial limits."8 5 The court specifi-
cally held that the Texas legislature had constitutional authority to pass the
statute at issue.8 6 A number of other cases also approve the application of
criminal law to extraterritorial actions on the basis of effects within the prose-
cuting jurisdiction.87
B. Abortion
At least two criminal cases decided prior to Roe dealt with the extraterri-
torial application of state criminal laws to out-of-state abortions, but both cases
were resolved on issues of statutory construction.
In People v. Buffum, 88 four women separately went to a doctor's office
in Long Beach, California, and asked him to perform abortions. The doctor
refused, but gave the women the telephone number of another person. This per-
son drove the women to Mexico, where they received abortions. The doctor
and his confederate were indicted and convicted in California state court for
conspiring to violate the California criminal statute prohibiting abortions.8 9 The
California Supreme Court reversed those convictions. The Court held that,
because neither the criminal abortion statute nor the criminal conspiracy statute
referred to the place of the violation, "we must assume that the Legislature did
not intend to regulate conduct taking place outside the borders of the state." 90
The state relied on two California statutes that attempted to broaden the
criminal jurisdiction of the state beyond the strict common law territorial
principle. One allowed conviction if a crime was committed "in whole or in
part" within the state.91 The other allowed conviction if "a person, with intent
to commit a crime, does any act within this state in execution or part execution
of such intent, which culminates in the commission of a crime, either within or
83. Id. at 305.
84. Id at 309.
85. Id at 308.
86. Id at 306.
87. See, e.g., Turquette v. State, 298 S.W. 15 (Ark. 1927) (extraterritorial assault as
contempt of court); Pennington v. State, 521 A.2d 1216 (Md. 1987) (extraterritorial stabbing as
obstruction of justice); Commonwealth v. Welch, 187 N.E.2d 813 (Mass. 1963) (extraterritorial
acceptance of money as bribery); People v. Corsino, 397 N.Y.S.2d 342 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct.
1977) (extraterritorial assault on an airplane approaching New York City as misdemeanor
assault).
88. 256 P.2d 317 (Cal. 1953).
89. The California law provided:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any woman, or procures
any woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance, or uses or employs any
instrument or other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the
miscarriage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life, is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than two nor more than
five years.
Id. at 319 n.2.
The prosecution proved that abortion was also illegal in Mexico, but the court said that
this evidence should not have been admitted because "the charge was not conspiracy to violate
Mexican law, but, rather conspiracy to violate the law of California." Id at 322.
90. Id at 320 (citations omitted).
91. Id.
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without this state."92 The Court held that these provisions applied only where
the acts done within the state were sufficient to amount to an attempt to commit
a crime;93 merely transporting the women from California to Mexico for an
abortion was insufficient to constitute an attempt within California.94
A similar disposition was reached in Edge v. State,95 a Tennessee case
that did not involve a direct prohibition on abortion. In Edge, the defendant
allegedly hired a physician in Tennessee to perform an abortion on a woman
named Lilah Johnson. The abortion occurred in North Carolina, after which
Johnson returned to Tennessee. When Johnson died in Tennessee as a result of
the abortion, the defendant was indicted and convicted in Tennessee as an acces-
sory before the fact to second degree murder (of the mother, not the fetus).
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Tennessee statute did
not confer criminal jurisdiction in the absence of more activities within
Tennessee. 96
C. Child Custody Cases
Some child custody cases have raised jurisdictional issues analogous to
those raised by the extraterritorial regulation of abortion. These cases involve a
non-custodial parent who unlawfully detains his children in a state other than
the prosecuting state; the prosecuting state is usually the state in which the cus-
todial parent and the children reside. In some cases, the non-custodial parent
unlawfully kidnapped the children from within the custodial parent's state; in
other cases, he took them pursuant to a lawful visitation, then unlawfully
refused to return them; in at least one case, the defendant was never within the
prosecuting state and initially received the children outside the state. The issue
raised in these cases is whether the custodial parent's state may prosecute the
non-custodial parent, even though the unlawful detention, and sometimes the
taking as well, is extraterritorial. The results of these cases are fairly evenly
split.97 However, the result sometimes rests on the language of the particular
92. Id.
93. Id. For a strong criticism of this argument, see George, supra note 47, at 625-26.
Professor George argues that the California Supreme Court's decision "stands as an excellent
example of the triumph of the rote of the territorial principle over the pragmatic needs of law
enforcement." L According to Professor George, the case "succeeded only in creating a haven
for criminals whose acts chiefly circumvented the public policy embodied in the California Penal
Code that abortions should not be freely available." Id at 625.
94. Buffuiw, 256 P.2d at 321. The Court argued that decisions upholding convictions
under statutes making transportation for certain purposes a crime were not helpful because no
such statute was at issue. Id at 321-22.
95. 99 S.W. 1098 (Tenn. 1907).
96. According to the court,
A careful scrutiny of this statute will show a definition of what is meant by the
consummation of the crime in this state. It is not sufficient merely to show that the
death ensued in this state as the result of a criminal act performed in another state,
but there must be some further intervention in this state proceeding directly from
the principal, through an innocent or guilty agent, or by any other means. No
such facts appear on the face of this indictment, and hence this section of the
Code is wholly inapplicable.
Id at 1099.
97. Trindle v. State, 602 A.2d 1232 (Md. 1992); People v. Harvey, 435 N.W.2d 456(Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Rios v. State,
733 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1987); People v. Gerchberg, 181 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Ct. App. 1982); Roberts
v. State, 619 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Addis v. State, 404 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct.
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state statute. In those cases that discuss non-statutory limitations on the state's
criminal jurisdiction, the analysis is often sketchy or confused. Sometimes, the
court discusses the defendant's challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion without even indicating whether the source of that challenge is the state
constitution or the federal Constitution, much less the particular constitutional
provision involved.98
Rios v. State99 is typical of the doctrinal confusion of the courts when
dealing with such cases. In Rios, neither the child nor the defendant father had
ever been in Wyoming, the prosecuting state.' 00 The father had temporary
custody of his children for the summer of 1984. During that summer, the
mother moved to Wyoming. When, at the end of the summer, the father did not
return the children, he was apprehended, extradited to Wyoming, and convicted
of interference with child custody. He argued that his conviction violated the
Sixth Amendment. The majority opinion discussed the common law territorial
principle, common law and statutory expansions of that principle, and cases
construing both common law and statutory jurisdictional limitations, but it
offered no explanation of how those cases and concepts relate to the Sixth
Amendment. The court simply affirmed the conviction on the basis of the
mother's presence in the state, arguing that her presence resulted in the effects
of the unlawful detention being felt in Wyoming.'01
Another case applying child kidnapping laws to a defendant with only
limited connections to the forum is Trindle v. State,0 2 a recent Maryland deci-
sion. In that case, the defendant Trindle and his wife were divorced in
Maryland, with the wife receiving custody of the children. After the divorce,
Trindle married the defendant Marcus and moved to Pennsylvania. Trindle's
ex-wife customarily drove her children to Delaware, where Trindle would
meet her and take the kids back to Pennsylvania for weekend visits. After one
such visit, Trindle and Marcus refused to return the kids, and Marcus took the
children out of the country. In a criminal prosecution in Maryland, Marcus
challenged the court's criminal jurisdiction over her. 0 3 The court recognized
the view that "generally a state may only punish those crimes committed within
its territorial limits,"' 04 but held that "a crime will also be considered as
App. 1980); State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1978); State v. Cochran, 538 P.2d
791 (Idaho 1975).
98. Trindle, 602 A.2d 1232; Harvey, 435 N.W.2d 456; Roberts, 619 S.W.2d 161. The
dissent in Trindle relies on the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. Trindle, 602 A.2d at 1246 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
99. 733 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1987).
100. Id at 243.
101. Id. at 250. The dissent is no more clear. Although focusing on the lack of a
Wyoming statute extending subject matter jurisdiction beyond the common law territorial limit,
the dissent, without expansion, states that "[t]he majority opinion effectively circumvents
established, constitutionally mandated limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction." Id. at 251
(Brown, C.J., dissenting). The source of those "constitutionally mandated limitations" is not
identified.
102. 602 A.2d 1232 (Md. 1992).
103. The exact source of that challenge is unclear from the majority opinion. The dissent
focuses on the Sixth Amendment and a section of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at
1246 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Trindle made a similar challenge,
but he died before the case was argued, and the court therefore vacated his convictions. Id. at
1234.
104. i at 1235.
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committed in a state where its intended result occurs if the definition of the
crime includes such a result."' 0 5 Since an element of the crime was an intent to
deprive the custodial parent of custody, and the custodial parent resided in
Maryland, the court concluded that the crime took place in Maryland. Thus,
Marcus' conviction was affirmed even though she never set foot in Maryland or
had any contact with Maryland. 106
The other child custody cases approving jurisdiction involve some contact
with the forum state-the defendant took the children from that state and thus
was at least within the state at one time.10 7 However, these cases are still analo-
gous to the case of a woman taking a fetus to another state for the purpose of
having an abortion.
Of the four cases overturning a conviction for kidnapping or unlawfully
detaining a child outside the state, two were decided on purely statutory
grounds. The courts held that such extraterritorial conduct was not covered by
the criminal statute at issue.1 08 One of these two cases indicated, in dictum, that
the defendant could have been properly convicted under another statutory pro-
vision. 109 The other two cases disapproving convictions for extraterritorial
conduct say that states lack jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes, but neither
case identifies the specific source of such restrictions.' 1 0
The child kidnapping cases differ in at least two important respects from
the extraterritorial regulation of abortion. First, the custodial parent in the
child custody cases resides in the prosecuting jurisdiction, making it easier to
argue that the effects of the unlawful detention of the child are felt there. In the
extraterritorial abortion case, the effect with which the state is concerned is felt
by the fetus itself, which is not in the state at the time of the abortion. A less
direct "effects" argument is necessary, focusing on the state's interest in
protecting the unborn "domiciled" fetus,"' much as interest analysis focuses on
a state's interest in protecting its domiciliaries, wherever they go. On the other
hand, the "effects" analysis is artificial to begin with, so if the courts can artifi-
cially assume effects on the resident mother, it seems equally valid to assume
that the effects on the fetus are constructively felt in the state of domicile of the
mother and the fetus.
The second distinction between the child custody cases and the abortion
issue relates to the legality of the conduct where the conduct occurred. The
child custody cases generally involve conduct that is unlawful not only in the
state asserting jurisdiction, but also in the state where the children were unlaw-
fully detained. All states prohibit the detention of minor children contrary to a
valid custody order. Thus, the conduct is illegal in both states. At least one
105. Id.
106. See also Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (similar facts,
although it is unclear whether the defendant originally picked up the children within thejurisdiction or they were sent to him).
107. See People v. Harvey, 435 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Roberts v. State,
619 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
108. People v. Gerchberg, 181 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Ct. App. 1982); Addis v. State, 404
N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
109. Addis, 404 N.E.2d at 64.
110. State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1978); State v. Cochran, 538 P.2d
791 (Idaho 1975).
111. Obviously, a fetus is incapable of forming the intent necessary to establish a domicile
of its own. As with minor children, I am assigning the domicile of the mother to the fetus.
[VOL. 35102
REGULATION OF ABORTION
court has focused on this fact to justify its conclusion that prosecution for
extraterritorial detention of minor children is not fundamentally unfair to the
defendant. 112 An extraterritorial abortion statute, on the other hand, is neces-
sary only if the abortion is legal in the state where it is performed. To
criminalize conduct that is legal where performed involves a greater intrusion
upon the sovereignty of the other state and probably poses more of a due
process problem in terms of violating the justified expectations of the
defendant.
On the other hand, the child custody cases are, in one sense, constitu-
tionally weaker than the extraterritorial regulation of abortion, at least insofar
as prosecution of the pregnant woman is concerned. The hypothetical abortion
statute would apply only to pregnant women residing in the enacting state who
left the state to obtain an abortion. The child custody cases typically involve
prosecutions of defendants who do not reside in the state of prosecution and, in
some cases, have no connection whatsoever with' that state. Everything else
being equal, a state arguably has a greater interest in controlling the activities
of its own residents than it does in controlling the activities of nonresidents.
D. Child Support Cases
Closely related to the child kidnapping cases are criminal prosecutions of
nonresident parents for failure to support their children. 1 3 Several cases have
upheld convictions where the defendant had apparently never before been to the
prosecuting state 1 4 or had been there only infrequently.'15 In fact, there are
few cases to the contrary. 1 6 People v. Jones"7 is representative of such cases.
The defendant had never been in California until extradited for the prosecution.
He, the mother of the child, and the child resided in Florida until he and the
mother were divorced. After the divorce, the mother and child moved to
California, and the defendant father moved to Ohio. The only child support
112. "[B]ecause Arizona'sstatute governing custodial interference is substantially similar
to Alaska's, Wheat is foreclosed from asserting that his conduct was privileged under the laws
of the state in which it occurred." Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007, 1012 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
113. E.g., People v. Jones, 64 Cal. Rptr. 622, 623 (Ct. App. 1967); State v. Shaw, 539
P.2d 250, 253 (Idaho 1975); State v. Wellman, 170 P. 1052, 1056 (Kan. 1918); In re Fowles,
131 P. 598, 602 (Kan. 1913); Commonwealth v. Donovan, 220 S.W. 1081, 1082 (Ky. 1920);
Ex parte Heath, 287 P. 636, 638 (Mont. 1930); State ex rel. Brito v. Warrick, 125 N.W.2d
545, 548 (Neb. 1964); State v. Carr, 225 A.2d 178 (N.H. 1966); State v. Tickle, 77 S.E.2d
632 (N.C. 1953); State v. Sanner, 90 N.E. 1007, 1008 (Ohio 1910); Boetscher v. State, 782
S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 812 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); State v. Paiz, 777 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), modified on other
grounds, 817 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Osborn v. Harris, 203 P.2d 917, 921 (Utah
1949); State v. Klein, 484 P.2d 455, 457 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971); Poole v. State, 208 N.W.2d
328, 331 (Wis. 1973).
114. E.g., In re Fowles, 131 P. 598, 599 (Kan. 1913); Brito, 125 N.W.2d at 547; Paiz,
777 S.W.2d at 575; Klein, 484 P.2d at 456.
115. State v. Wellman, 170 P. 1052, 1053, 1055 (Kan. 1918); Donovan, 220 S.W. at
1081; Heath, 287 P. at 636; Tickle, 77 S.E.2d at 633; Osborn, 203 P.2d at 917-18.
116. E.g., State v. Hopkins, 132 So. 501 (La. 1931) (state has no jurisdiction over
portion of affidavit alleging nonsupport while defendant was domiciled and resident out of state,
even though wife and child then resided in state); Ex parte Kuhns, 137 P. 83 (Nev. 1913)
(refusing to extradite father to Pennsylvania where alleged nonsupport occurred after defendant
moved to Nevada, even though wife and children still lived in Pennsylvania).
117. 64 Cal. Rptr. 622 (Ct. App. 1967).
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order was issued by an Ohio court. The California court held that California
had criminal jurisdiction.
Some of these cases premise criminal jurisdiction on the prosecuting
state's "vital interest in the welfare of its children, who, if not provided for by
the parents, must become charges upon the state."n 8 Other cases focus less on
the prosecuting state's policy interest and more on territoriality, holding that
the failure to support the children occurs where the children reside.' 9 At least
two of these cases invoke a weak causal argument that the defendant's non-sup-
port effectively forced the children into the prosecuting state, much as if he
took them there personally: "The husband may be charged with the offense of
failure to provide in the state in which he has permitted his wife or children to
live, or in which his misconduct has induced them to seek refuge."'120 Some of
these cases offer almost no rationale at all.121
As with the child kidnapping cases, these cases could be distinguished
from an extraterritorial abortion prosecution on the ground that the defendant's
conduct in the non-support cases was probably also unlawful in his home juris-
diction. He was not being penalized for conduct legal in his home state. In fact,
in a couple of these cases, the defendant was subject to a support order issued
by a court of his home state.122 For example, in Ex parte Boetscher,123 the
court summarily rejected the defendant's argument that he could not have rea-
sonably anticipated being subjected to Texas' criminal jurisdiction:
Failure to support one's minor children is a criminal offense in
Michigan, just as it is in Texas, and Michigan's criminal non-support
statute on its face does not limit its reach to resident offenders. And we
must presume appellant was aware of Michigan law. Therefore, if
appellant, as alleged in the indictment, intentionally or knowingly failed
to support his minor children, whom he knew lived in Texas, then he
should have reasonably anticipated that Texas law regarding nonsupport
might be similar to Michigan law and that it (i.e., Texas law) might
reach his conduct.124
118. Donovan, 220 S.W. at 1082. Accord Boetscher v. State, 782 S.W.2d 954, 957(Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 812 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Paiz,
777 S.W.2d at 577; Klein, 484 P.2d at 457; Brito, 125 N.W.2d at 548.
119. E.g., Poole v. State, 208 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Wis. 1973); People v. Jones, 64 Cal.Rptr. 622, 623 (Ct. App. 1967); State v. Carr, 225 A.2d 178 (N.H. 1966); Brito, 125 N.W.2d
at 548; Donovan, 220 S.W. at 1082; Wellman, 170 P. at 1056.
120. Osborn v. Harris, 203 P.2d 917, 921 (Utah 1949). See also In re Fowles, 131 P.598, 602 (Kan. 1913) (if the father permitted the mother to bring the child to the state without
support, "his conduct was as reprehensible and as punishable as it would have been had hebrought the child here and abandoned him on purpose."). For an extremely loose causal
argument, see State v. Tickle, 77 S.E.2d 632 (N.C. 1953), where the court stated:
There is a constructive presence of the defendant in this jurisdiction for by his lust
in Virginia he begot a bastard child upon the body of Ruby Elizabeth Hamlett, and
thereby put into operation a force which produced the result of his bastard child
and her mother being domiciled in this state from the date of the child's birth until
now, and further produced the result of his wilful failure to support his bastard
child in North Carolina.
Id at 637.
121. E.g., State v. Shaw, 539 P.2d 250, 253 (Idaho 1975); Exparte Heath, 287 P. 636,
638 (Mont. 1930); State v. Sanner, 90 N.E. 1007, 1008 (Ohio 1910).
122. Jones, 64 Cal. Rptr. 622; Klein, 484 P.2d at 456.
123. 812 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
124. Id. at 603.
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In the abortion case, on the other hand, the abortion would be illegal in only
one of the two states and legal where obtained. However, at least one child sup-
port case imposed a state's criminal law in a situation where the defendant
would have had no support obligation under his home state law.2 5
E. Cases Involving Kidnapping, Followed by an Assault in Another
State
Several relatively recent state court cases have held that a state may pun-
ish an assault or robbery in another state where that assault or robbery fol-
lowed a kidnapping from the prosecuting state.126 Smith v. State'27 is typical of
such cases. In Smith, the defendant kidnapped the victim from her home in
Nevada, drove her across the state line into California, and, in California, sex-
ually assaulted her and attempted to murder her.128 The court held that Nevada
had jurisdiction to prosecute the defendant not only for the kidnapping, but also
for the extraterritorial assault and attempted murder.
Two different rationales are offered to support jurisdiction in such cases.
Some of these cases focus on the elements of the crime and hold that the state
may prosecute because, although the actual assault was committed outside of the
state, one or more of the other elements of the crime occurred within the
state. 129 For example, in State v. Jones,130 the defendant abducted the victim in
Maryland and drove her to the District of Columbia, where he raped her. The
court pointed out that first degree rape had five elements: (1) intercourse, (2)
force, (3) lack of consent, (4) display of a dangerous article, and (5) placement
of the victim in imminent fear of kidnapping.13' Of these five elements, force
was applied in the initial abduction in Maryland, consent was withheld in
Maryland, and the victim was placed in fear of kidnapping in Maryland. It was
unclear from the evidence where the display of the dangerous article-an ice
scraper-occurred, so only one of the elements-the intercourse-clearly
occurred outside of Maryland. Accepting the rule that "[o]ne state cannot punish
125. State v. Tickle, 77 S.E.2d 632 (N.C. 1953), upheld the conviction under North
Carolina law of a Virginia man for nonsupport of his illegitimate North Carolina child. The court
recognized that the general common law rule, modified in North Carolina, was that a father had
no legal obligation to support an illegitimate child. Id. at 634. The court held that the Virginia
rule was irrelevant: "The prosecution in this action is based on our statute. Whether under the
Virginia law a father is required or not required to support his bastard child is not involved." Id.
at 635. At the time, Virginia imposed no such obligation. See Brown v. Brown, 32 S.E.2d 79(Va. 1944) (accepting the common law rule and refusing to impose an obligation on the father to
support an illegitimate child). Thus, North Carolina was holding a non-resident responsible for
failure to perform a duty that did not exist in the state where he resided.
126. E.g., Heath v. State, 536 So: 2d 142 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); Thomas v. State, 553
S.W.2d 32 (Ark. 1977); Smith v. State, 697 P.2d 113 (Nev. 1985); Bright v. State, 490 A.2d
564 (Del. 1985); State v. Jones, 443 A.2d 967 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); Adair v. United
States, 391 A.2d 288 (D.C. App. 1978); Conrad v. State, 317 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. 1974). Contra
State v. Harvey, 730 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). See generally Larry Kramer,
Jurisdiction over Interstate Felony Murder, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1431 (1983) (arguing that only
the state in which the underlying felony was committed has an interest in prosecuting an
interstate felony murder).
127. 697 P.2d 113 (Nev. 1985).
128. 1& at 114.
129. Bright, 490 A.2d at 567-68; Jones, 443 A.2d at 972-73.
130. 443 A.2d 967 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
131. Id. at 972. The court actually held that either element number four or element number
five would support the conviction and that it was not necessary to prove both. Id.
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a defendant for a crime committed in another state," 132 the court nevertheless
held that Maryland had common law jurisdiction to prosecute the rape.133
Other cases focus less on the individual elements of the crime and simply
find it sufficient that the extraterritorial crime arose from a continuing course
of conduct that began within the prosecuting state.134 An example of a case fol-
lowing this theory is Conrad v. State. 35 In Conrad, the defendant assaulted the
victim in Indiana, placed her in the trunk of his car,.drove the car into Ohio,
and there murdered her.136 The Indiana Supreme Court held that the assault and
abduction in Indiana provided a sufficient jurisdictional base for the murder
conviction because "[t]here was substantial evidence presented from which the
jury could find that the assault and abduction ... were integrally related to the
victim's murder." 37 Some courts use both theories interchangeably1 38
Not all of the cases involving kidnapping and an extraterritorial assault
hold that the state has criminal jurisdiction. In State v. Harvey,139 for example,
the defendant kidnapped the victim in Missouri and took her to Illinois, where
he murdered her.14O The court noted that capital murder requires proof of
three elements: (1) intent to kill, (2) a knowing killing, and (3) premedita-
tion.141 Conceding that the evidence supported a finding that the intent and the
premeditation existed at the time of the kidnapping in Missouri, 42 the court
nevertheless held that the defendant could not be tried in Missouri, because "the
essential element of the charge, the killing[,] did not occur in the State of
Missouri."
14 3
These extraterritorial kidnapping/assault cases are similar, in some ways,
to possible prosecutions for extraterritorial abortions, but there are also obvi-
ous differences. Both types of cases involve a defendant taking a resident of the
state outside the state to perform some act that the state of origin considers
wrongful. In the assault cases, the resident is the victim of the assault; in the
abortion case, the "resident" victim is the fetus. In neither case does the
"person" whom the state is trying to protect consent to the defendant's actions-
in the assault case because the transportation is coerced, in the abortion case be-
cause the fetus is incapable of giving such consent. In each case, the intent to do
the wrongful act is formed before the defendant leaves the state. Thus, the
extraterritorial assault cases might support jurisdiction in the extraterritorial
abortion case.
132. Id. at 971.
133. For a similar approach under the Sixth Amendment, see infra part VI.
134. E.g., Adair v. United States, 391 A.2d 288, 290 (D.C. App. 1978); Conrad v.
State, 317 N.E.2d 789, 791-92 (Ind. 1974).
135. 317 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. 1974).
136. Id. at 790, 791.
137. Id at 792. The trial court had instructed the jury to acquit the defendant if they found
that the intent to kill the victim originated in Ohio after the kidnapping and "was not part of one
continuous plan, design and intent, and not the result of one continuous course of action by the
defendant, but was a separate and independent set of acts occurring outside of the State of
Indiana." Id at 791.
138. E.g., Heath v. State, 536 So. 2d 142, 143-44 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); Smith V.
State, 697 P.2d 113, 114-15 (Nev. 1985).
139. 730 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. App. 1987).
140. Id at 276-77.
141. Id at 277.
142. Id.
143. Id at 278.
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However, there are important differences between the two cases. Most
importantly, none of the extraterritorial assault cases involve an out-of-state
defendant who merely assisted the misconduct and had no connection at all to
the originating state. Thus, these cases provide no support at all for the prose-
cution of the doctor performing the abortion. There are also differences impor-
tant to the possible prosecution of a woman for obtaining an extraterritorial
abortion. In the extraterritorial assault cases, the assault is wrongful not only in
the state where the kidnapping originates, but also in the state where the con-
duct occurs. Rape and murder are universally prohibited in the United States.
The defendant therefore has no argument that he was privileged to do what he
did in the other state or that his reasonable expectation was that his conduct
would not be punished. In the extraterritorial abortion case, the conduct is law-
ful where the pregnant woman acts. She might argue that her reasonable expec-
tation was that her conduct was lawful and would not be punished. Also, in the
extraterritorial assault cases, the taking itself (the kidnapping) is wrongful.
Thus, the defendant's course of conduct is wrongful from its inception. In the
abortion case, the taking itself (traveling interstate with the fetus) is not wrong-
ful. In fact, absolutely prohibiting a pregnant woman from traveling interstate
for any purpose would undoubtedly be an unlawful interference with her con-
stitutional right to travel.'" State jurisdiction over a course of conduct is easier
to defend when that course of conduct is wrongful from its inception than when
the course of conduct becomes wrongful only when a particular action occurs
outside the state.
F. Other Criminal Cases
There are many other state cases involving the extraterritorial application
of state criminal law. These cases involve a variety of offenses, from bigamy to
bribery, from stealing a horse to attempting to blow up an airplane. These cases
vary in their willingness to allow extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. No
consistent pattern or rule emerges from these cases, but one thing is clear:
although almost all of these cases pay lip service to territorialism, the notion
that American state courts have consistently and strictly adhered to the territo-
rial theory of criminal jurisdiction is simply wrong.
Many of the cases approving the extraterritorial application of state
criminal law involve actions, such as larceny, theft, or murder, that clearly
would be illegal in the state where the action was performed, as well as in the
prosecuting state. As argued above, the illegality in the state of the action could
be used to distinguish the extraterritorial assault, child kidnapping, and child
support cases from the extraterritorial application of an abortion law. In the
abortion case, the abortion would be legal where performed. However, this
distinction should not be overstated. It clearly has not made a difference in the
civil choice-of-law cases, where the defendant's conduct often would not result
in liability where the defendant acted.145
Also, not all of the cases upholding criminal convictions for extraterri-
torial conduct involve conduct illegal where it occurred. In a few cases, defen-
dants have been convicted under state criminal law even though their action was
legal where performed. For example, the defendant in Commonwealth v.
144. See infra part VIII.
145. See infra part IV.
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Crass'4 was convicted in Kentucky of betting on an election. He argued that the
bet was not made in Kentucky-that the parties travelled across the state line to
Tennessee and there made the bet.X47 Apparently, such gambling was then legal
in Tennessee.1 48 The court noted that "[i]f the statute can be evaded by so simple
a device as that here attempted, it means nothing." 49 Although there was no
evidence of any communication in Kentucky concerning the bet, the court held
that the bet was made in Kentucky and therefore could be prosecuted in
Kentucky.50
Another similar Kentucky case is Lemore v. Commonwealth,151 uphold-
ing a conviction for unlawfully selling liquor. The defendant picked up cus-
tomers in a boat on the Kentucky side of the Mississippi River, ferried them to
the Missouri side of the river, sold them liquor, and then brought them back to
Kentucky.' 52
In State v. Mueller, 53 the defendant was convicted of violating a
Wisconsin statute that required court permission for a Wisconsin resident to
remarry when subject to a Wisconsin child support order. The defendant's
remarriage occurred outside Wisconsin, where, presumably, it was legal. The
court held that Wisconsin's "legitimate and substantial protectible interest ...
both as to the protection of the welfare of its minors and the marriage relation-
ship of its residents" justified the "inconvenience to the accused and invasion, if
any, upon the sovereignty of sister states" caused by the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the statute.1M
A final example is Jacobson v. Maryland Racing Commission,155 involv-
ing not a criminal conviction, but a monetary fine imposed by the state racing
commission. The defendant had claimed three horses at Maryland claiming
races, subject to a rule prohibiting resale of a claimed horse within sixty
days. 56 Within sixty days, he resold the horses in New York. The court held
that allowing extraterritorial sales would frustrate the purpose behind the
Maryland resale limitation-to keep horses racing in Maryland' 57-and that the
detrimental effect within Maryland was sufficient to justify punishing the
defendant for a New York resale. 58
146. 203 S.W. 708 (Ky. 1918).
147. I at 708.
148. The court does not say so, but one could infer this from the defendant's conduct. The
court also cites another case involving parties traveling from Kentucky to Tennessee to place a
bet. Id at 709.
149. I at 709.
150. Id at 708.
151. 105 S.W. 930 (Ky. 1907).
152. Id. at 931. The court relied in part, but not exclusively, on Kentucky's concurrentjurisdiction over the Mississippi River. Id at 932.
153. 171 N.W.2d 414 (Wis. 1969).
154. Id at 418.
155. 274 A.2d 102 (Md. 1971).
156. Id at 103.
157. According to the court,
A main purpose of the Rule is to keep horses racing at the Maryland meeting at
which they are claimed and this purpose would be frustrated if a horse could be
sold outside of Maryland any minute after it was claimed in Maryland but could
not be sold in Maryland under those circumstances for sixty days.
Id at 105.
158. Id at 106-07.
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IV. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT/DUE PROCESS
A. Application to the Woman Seeking the Abortion
It is clear from the previous section that an extraterritorial abortion
statute would not be a sharp break from other state exercises of extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction. But would it be constitutional? The first potential sources
of constitutional limitation on state criminal jurisdiction I will discuss are the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 59 and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of Article IV of the Constitution. 60 Although these two clauses
were adopted at different times and have different functions, the modem
Supreme Court has generally treated them identically in examining restrictions
on state choice of law.161 Thus, due process and full faith and credit restrictions
on state legislative jurisdiction can be analyzed together.
All of the due process and full faith and credit cases have involved a
state's application of its civil, rather than its criminal, law. Lea Brilimayer and
Charles Norchi have suggested that the absence of criminal cases is due less to
159. "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
160. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, andjudicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
161. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICr OF LAWS 78-79 (2d ed. 1992);
BRILMAYER, supra note 54, at 127; LEFLAR et al., supra note 54, at 165.
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), both the plurality opinion and the
dissent treat the two clauses as imposing the same restrictions on choice of law. Justice Brennan
does not distinguish between the two clauses and states that "[tihis Court has taken a similar
approach in deciding choice-of-law cases under both the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith
and Credit Clause." Id. at 308 n. 10 (Brennan, J.). Justice Powell's dissent also applies the
same test under both clauses, stating that "the Court has recognized that both the Due Process
and the Full Faith and Credit Clauses are satisfied if the forum has such significant contacts with
the litigation that it has a legitimate state interest in applying its own law.' lId at 333 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell applies a two-part test, but there is no indication in his opinion that
one part of the test arises from the due process clause and the other arises from the full faith and
credit clause.
Two later cases have distinguished the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses,
but not in a way that meaningfully affects the analysis. The majority opinion in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), reads Justice Powell's Hague dissent as
distinguishing the two clauses. Shuts states that "The dissent [in Hague] stressed that the Due
Process Clause prohibited the application of law which was only casually or slightly related to
the litigation, while the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the forum to respect the laws and
judgments of other States, subject to the forum's own interests in furthering its public policy."
7d. at 819. However, Shuts then analyzes the choice-of-law problem without distinguishing the
two clauses. Id. at 819-23. See also id at 824 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("The Court's choice-of-law analysis ... treats the two relevant constitutional provisions as
though they imposed the same constraints on the forum court.").
Only in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), does the majority analyze the
two clauses separately, and even then the Court seems to see no substantial difference between
the two. The majority says that
The nub of the present controversy, in other words, is the scope of
constitutionally permissible legislative jurisdiction, and it matters little whether
that is discussed in the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as the litigants
have principally done, or in the context of the Due Process Clause. Since we are
largely traversing ground already covered, our discussion of the due process
claim can be brief.
Id. at 729-30 n.3. The Court recognized that the first of two cases discussed in the due process
part of its opinion involved full faith and credit challenges, but it did not seem to care. 14. at 730.
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the fact that there are differences between criminal and civil jurisdiction than to
the fact that "states themselves have been less inclined to press the limits of the
Constitution than have their individual citizens when they seek monetary judg-
ments."1 62 I will begin by discussing the civil cases and their possible applica-
tion to an extraterritorial abortion statute. In Part V, I will turn specifically to
the question of criminal legislative jurisdiction and whether the criminal con-
text makes a difference.
The Supreme Court has long rejected the view that only one state may
constitutionally apply its law to any particular dispute. Instead, the Court has
said that "a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within a
lawsuit, may justify, in constitutional terms, application of the law of more than
one jurisdiction." 163 Currently, the Court requires that a state, in order to apply
its substantive law, must have "a significant contact or significant aggregation
of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbi-
trary nor fundamentally unfair."'64
1. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague
The starting point for the constitutional analysis must be the Supreme
Court's most expansive choice-of-law opinion, Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague,165 a decision that produced no majority opinion. Justice Brennan wrote
a plurality opinion which three other justices joined, Justice Stevens wrote a
concurrence, and Justice Powell wrote a dissent joined by two justices. Since all
but one of the justices agreed on the applicable standard 166 and only disputed
the application of that standard to the facts, the facts of the case deserve detailed
discussion.
Ralph Hague died when the motorcycle on which he was a passenger was
struck from behind by an automobile. The accident occurred in Wisconsin, both
of the drivers were Wisconsin residents, and Ralph Hague was a Wisconsin
resident. At the time of the accident, he held an insurance policy issued by
Allstate Insurance. The policy covered three automobiles and provided for
uninsured motorist coverage of $15,000 for each car.
After the accident, Ralph Hague's spouse moved to Minnesota. She was
appointed personal representative of her deceased husband's estate and filed a
lawsuit in Minnesota state court seeking a declaration that under Minnesota law
the $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage on each of Mr. Hague's three cars
could be "stacked" to provide total coverage of $45,000. Allstate argued that
Wisconsin, rather than Minnesota, law should apply "since the insurance policy
162. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritorialily and Fifth Anendnent
Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1242 (1992).
163. Hague, 449 U.S. at 307 (Brennan, J.). Accord Wortmnan, 486 U.S. at 727; Shutts,
472 U.S. at 823; Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1954).
164. Hague, 449 U.S. at 313 (Brennan, J.). Accord Shutts, 472 U.S. at 821-22; Hague,
449 U.S. at 332-33 (Powell, J., dissenting) (accepting Justice Brennan's formulation of the
basic principles to use in reviewing state choice-of-law decisions).
The Court has held that a state may apply its own procedural law to actions litigated in its
courts even absent any substantive contacts with the underlying dispute. Wortinan, 486 U.S. at
722.
165. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
166. It might be more correct to say that, while they agree on the phrasing of the standard,
their application of that standard to the facts suggests that they have very different concepts in
mind.
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was delivered in Wisconsin, the accident occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons
involved were Wisconsin residents at the time of the accident"' 167 However, the
Supreme Court upheld the Minnesota court's application of Minnesota law.
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion concluded that the aggregation of three
Minnesota contacts was sufficient to justify the application of Minnesota law:
(1) Mr. Hague worked in Minnesota and commuted dally to his job there; (2)
Allstate did business in Minnesota; and (3) Mrs. Hague became a Minnesota
resident prior to suing.
First, Justice Brennan argued that Minnesota had an interest in the well-
being of its work force and the effect of injured employees on Minnesota
employers. 168 According to Justice Brennan,
If Mr. Hague had only been injured and missed work for a few weeks,
the effect on the Minnesota employer would have been palpable and
Minnesota's interest in having its employee made whole would be evi-
dent. Mr. Hague's death affects Minnesota's interest still more acutely,
even though Mr. Hague will not return to the Minnesota work force. 69
Justice Powell's dissent agreed that employment could be a significant contact
for some purposes, but argued that the place of employment had no connection
to the stacking issue:
Minnesota does not wish its workers to die in automobile accidents, but
permitting stacking will not further this interest. The substantive issue
here is solely one of compensation, and whether the compensation pro-
vided by this policy is increased or not will have no relation to the
State's employment policies or police power.170
The second contact on which Justice Brennan focused was Allstate's busi-
ness presence in Minnesota. He argued, without elaboration, that this gave
Minnesota an interest in regulating Allstate's insurance obligations insofar as
they affected a Minnesota resident, Mrs. Hague, and a Minnesota employee, Mr.
Hague.171 Furthermore, this contact mitigated any claim of unfairness that
Allstate might make: "By virtue of its presence, Allstate can hardly claim
unfamiliarity with the laws of the host jurisdiction and surprise that the state
courts might apply forum law to litigation in which the company is
involved."'172 Justice Powell again demanded a more particularized connection
between the contact and the dispute. 73 He conceded that Minnesota had an
interest in regulating the practices of an insurance company doing business in
Minnesota, but only with respect to the business actually done there. Justice
Powell pointed out that Allstate did business in all fifty states and argued that
"[t]he forum State has no interest in regulating that conduct of the insurer unre-
lated to property, persons, or contracts executed within the forum State."'174
167. Id at 306.
168. Id at 314 (Brennan, J.).
169. Id. at 315 (Brennan, J.).
170. Id at 339 (Powell, J., dissenting).
171. Id at 318 (Brennan, J.).
172. Id at 317-18 (Brennan, J.).
173. Justice Powell's dissent "requires a rather precise identification of the policies the
state law in question reflects and a determination whether those policies would be advanced
within the state by its application." James R. Pielemeier, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of
Law: The Special Case of Multistate Defamation, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 381, 405 (1985).
174. Hague, 449 U.S. at 338 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Third, Justice Brennan argued that Mrs. Hague's post-accident move to
Minnesota gave Minnesota an interest in her recovery-to keep her off the wel-
fare rolls and enable her to meet her financial obligations. 175 Justice Powell,
without denying that domicile was an important connection, argued that post-
occurrence changes of domicile were constitutionally irrelevant. 176
Justice Powell tried to flesh out the "significant contacts" analysis, argu-
ing that the significance of a state's contacts should be evaluated in light of two
constitutional policies.177 The first policy focuses on the "reasonable expecta-
tions" of the parties: "[T]he contacts between the forum State and the litigation
should not be so 'slight and casual' that it would be fundamentally unfair to a
litigant for the forum to apply its own State's law." 178 Justice Powell concluded
that the first part of his test was met:
The risk insured by petitioner was not geographically limited. The close
proximity of Hager City, Wis., to Minnesota, and the fact that Hague
commuted daily to Red Wing, Minn., for many years should have led
the insurer to realize that there was a reasonable probability that the risk
would materialize in Minnesota.179
Justice Powell's second requirement is that the forum have a legitimate
public policy interest in the outcome of the litigation. 80 This requires "some
connection between the facts giving rise to the [claim] and the scope of the
State's lawmaking function."18' A state has a legitimate interest "only if the
facts to which the rule will be applied have created effects within the State,
toward which the State's public policy is directed."' 82 For the reasons discussed
above, Justice Powell concluded that the contacts between Minnesota and the
litigation were not relevant to any public policy of Minnesota, and, therefore,
the second part of his test was not met.
Justice Stevens' concurrence in Hague differed markedly from the other
two opinions. He began by asserting, contrary to what he recognized as the
established view of the Court, that the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith
and Credit Clause require different analyses. 83 Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, a state's application of forum law is valid "unless that choice threatens
the federal interest in national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the legiti-
mate interests of another State."' 84 Justice Stevens concluded that Minnesota's
refusal to apply Wisconsin law did not directly or indirectly threaten
Wisconsin's sovereignty. 185 His analysis of this point is as sketchy as his state-
ment of the rule, but he relied, at least in part, on the "justifiable expectations"
of the parties.'8 6
175. Id at 319 (Brennan, J.).
176. Id at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting).
177. Id at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 336 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
180. Id at 334 (Powell, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id at 320-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
184. Id at 323 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
185. Id at 325 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
186. "Since the policy provided coverage for accidents that might occur in other States, it
was obvious to the parties at the time of contracting that it might give rise to the application of the
law of States other than Wisconsin." Id at 324 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Justice Stevens argued that the issue under the Due Process Clause is
whether a choice-of-law decision is "totally arbitrary" or "fundamentally unfair
to either litigant." 87 After hinting that he would almost never find a judge's
application of his own state's law totally arbitrary,188 Justice Stevens turned to
the fundamental unfairness part of the analysis. Application of a state's law
would be fundamentally unfair if it "favored residents over nonresidents, if it
represented a dramatic departure from the rule that obtains in most American
jurisdictions, or if the rule itself was unfair on its face or as applied." 189 Justice
Stevens concluded that the stacking rule was not unfair on its face because it
was accepted by most jurisdictions when the policy was issued, and it made eco-
nomic sense. 190 Justice Stevens' test for whether a rule was unfair as applied is
whether it frustrates the parties' justifiable expectations, resulting in unfair sur-
prise: 191 "[I]f, in engaging in the activity which is the subject of the litigation,
[the litigants] could not reasonably have anticipated that their actions would
later be judged by this rule of law,"' 192 its application is unconstitutional. Justice
Stevens concluded that the parties could have reasonably anticipated the appli-
cation of Minnesota law. 193 He pointed out that nothing in the contract, such as
a choice-of-law clause, indicated that the parties anticipated the application of a
particular state's law. Further, Allstate was doing business in Minnesota, and it
was therefore aware of Minnesota law and of the possibility that it might be
sued in Minnesota. 94 Because the policy provided nationwide coverage, the
parties could have anticipated an accident in another state and the resulting
application of that state's law. According to Justice Stevens, it is the parties'
expectations at the time of the contract that are important, and it is therefore
irrelevant that the accident actually occurred elsewhere. 195 In fact, it does not
even matter how likely it was at the time of contracting that another state's law
would apply, as long as the parties perceived it as possible. 96
187. Id at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
188. Id.
189. Id at 327 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
190. Id. at 327-28 (Stevens, J., concurring in thejudgment).
191. Id. at 327 (Stevens, J., concurring in thejudgment).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 328-30 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
194. Id. at 328-29 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
195. Id. at 329 n.22 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
196. Id. at 331 n.24 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). That Justice Stevens really
meant this justified expectations test to be as weak as it sounds is made clear in his partial dissent
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutis, where he argues as follows:
Neither Phillips nor the Court contends that Kansas cannot constitutionally apply
its own laws to the claims of Kansas residents, even though the leased land may
lie in other States and no other apparent connection-to Kansas may exist. Phillips
has done business in Kansas throughout the years relevant to this litigation and it
seems unarguable that application of Kansas law, or indeed the law of any of the
50 States where royalty owners reside, to the claims of at least some of the
plaintiff class members was thus "perceived as possible" by Phillips "at the time
of contracting." It was also possible, of course, that any number of royalty
owners might have moved to Kansas in the years Phillips held their suspense
royalties, and that Kansas has a substantial interest in seeing its residents treated
fairly when they invoke the jurisdiction of its courts. Because Phillips must have
anticipated application of Kansas law to some claims, the eventual geographic
distribution of royalty owners' residences goes only to "likelihood" and not to
fairness of the application of Kansas law.
472 U.S. 797, 842 n.24 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
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2. The Application of Hague to an Extraterritorial Abortion Statute
One striking aspect of Hague is its rejection of the territorial view that
only the state of the accident could apply its law. All three opinions concede
that, given sufficient other contacts, Minnesota could constitutionally apply its
law to the Wisconsin accident. 197 Extraterritoriality alone does not violate due
process or full faith and credit. If this is also true for criminal law, an issue to
be discussed further in Part V, Hague would not absolutely bar the extraterri-
torial application of a criminal abortion statute. But would a state have suffi-
cient contacts in the abortion case to justify such extraterritoriality?
The prosecuting state's interest in the extraterritorial abortion case is
both stronger and more direct than the first Hague contact, Mr. Hague's
employment in Minnesota. The purported interest of a state adopting an
extraterritorial abortion law is in protecting the life, or potential life, of the
fetus, which "resides" within the prosecuting state. Even Roe v. Wade conceded
the state's "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of
human life."'198 It merely held that the state's interest in fetal life was not suffi-
ciently compelling in the early stages of pregnancy to overcome the woman's
right to privacy.' 99 The state interest in protecting fetal life is arguably
stronger than Minnesota's interest in protecting the property interests of its in-
state employers. Even if the fetus is treated as "property," the interest in pro-
tecting the fetus is at least equivalent to Minnesota's interest in Hague. The
interest in the abortion case is also more direct. In Hague, the first contact was
significant because Minnesota's protection of the non-resident decedent would
indirectly protect resident employers. In prohibiting extraterritorial abortion,
the state is directly protecting a "resident" from injury.
The pregnant woman's connection to the prosecuting state is also much
stronger than the second contact in Hague-Allstate's business connection to
197. Justice Brennan states that "[ain automobile accident need not occur within a
particular jurisdiction for that jurisdiction to be connected to the occurrence." Hague, 449 U.S.
at 314 (Brennan, J.). "While the place of the accident is a factor to be considered in choice-of-
law analysis, to apply blindly the traditional, but now largely abandoned, doctrine would fail to
distinguish between the relative importance of various legal issues involved in a lawsuit as well
as the relationship of other jurisdictions to the parties and the occurrence or transaction." Id. at
316 n.22 (Brennan, J.) (citations omitted). Justice Brennan argued that, if the accident had
occurred in Minnesota, Wisconsin certainly could have applied its law on the bases of Mr.
Hague's residence and the insurer's presence in Wisconsin, even if the policy had been executed
in Minnesota and covered a Minnesota automobile. Id. at 315-16 (Brennan, 1.).
Justice Powell, focusing on the expectations of the parties, argues that "[t]he fact that the
accident did not, in fact, occur in Minnesota is not controlling because the expectations of the
litigants before the cause of action accrues provide the pertinent perspective." Id. at 336-37
(Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens' opinion does not so expressly reject the territorial, place-of-the-accident
view, but his rejection of that view is inherent in his decision that Minnesota could
constitutionally apply its law.
For a historical view of the Supreme Court's territorial analysis of choice of law under
the due process clause, see Ralph V. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of
Law: Due Process, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 851, 853-59 (1982). Professor Whitten
concludes that the Court had entirely abandoned the territorial approach by 1943. Id. at 859.
198. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). The plurality in Casey also accepted the
state's interest in protecting potential life, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2817
(1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.), but held that, until the fetus became viable, the
state could not fully protect this interest by prohibiting abortion absolutely. Id. at 2811-12
(O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ3.).
199. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64.
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Minnesota. Allstate was doing business in all fifty states; a woman seeking an
abortion has only a single residence, the prosecuting state. To paraphrase
Hague, by virtue of her residence, the pregnant woman can hardly claim
unfamiliarity with the laws of her domicile and surprise that the state courts
might apply forum law to litigation in which she is involved.200
The third contact relied on by the Hague plurality was the plaintiff's
after-acquired domicile. The "plaintiff' in a criminal case is the state, and, in a
simple sense, the plaintiff is thus domiciled in the forum. However, to ground
criminal jurisdiction on this contact is nonsensical, because the state has this
contact in every criminal prosecution. 201 A better approach is to focus on why
the plaintiffs domicile was important in Hague-because it gave the state an
interest in protecting her. Thus, what is important in a criminal prosecution is
the interest the state is trying to protect, the life or potential life of the unborn
fetus. Since the fetus also "resides" within the state, the state has an interest in
protecting it, although that interest might be less than its interest in protecting
Mrs. Hague, a person already born. However, the possibly weaker interest in
protecting the fetus as opposed to a "born" person is more than offset by the
nature of the interest being protected-the life, or potential life, of the fetus,
versus Mrs. Hague's purely economic interest. Thus, the interest in the
extraterritorial abortion case seems at least as strong as the third contact in
Hague.20 2 There is also a difference in this third contact in terms of fairness and
reasonable expectations. Mrs. Hague's after-acquired domicile was'something
Allstate could not have expected when it entered into the contract. A pregnant
woman's domicile is known at the time of the abortion, and surprise to the
defendant in the abortion case is therefore less.
Extraterritorial regulation of abortion also appears constitutional under
the Powell dissent's two-part expansion of the significant contacts idea. Justice
Powell's first test focuses on the reasonable expectations of the parties: There
must be sufficient contacts so that- the application of forum law would not be
fundamentally unfair. Unfortunately, Hague and all of the cases Justice Powell
discusses are contract cases. In contract cases, the issue is whether the parties, at
the time of contracting, could have anticipated an injury in the forum.203 This
analysis is difficult to apply to criminal law without circularity. One might
argue that people expect only the criminal laws of the place where they act to
200. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
201. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v: Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985):
Even if one could say that the plaintiffs "consented" to the application of Kansas
law by not opting out, plaintiffs desire for forum law is rarely, if ever
controlling. In most cases the plaintiff shows his obvious wish for forum law by
filing there. ... Even ifa plaintiff evidences his desire for forum law by moving to
the forum, we have generally accorded such a move little or no significance. In
Allstate the plaintiffs move to the forum was only relevant because it was
unrelated and prior to the litigation. Thus the plaintiffs' desire for Kansas law,
manifested by their participation in this Kansas lawsuit, bears little relevance.
Id. at 820 (citations omitted).
202. Notice, however, that equating the fetus' domicile with the plaintiffs domicile in
Hague transforms what were three contacts in Hague into two in the abortion case. The fetus'
domicile is standing in place of two of the Hague plurality's factors. However, the state's
interest with respect to this factor is stronger than the equivalent interests in Hague, so this
should not matter. It is not important to have an equivalent number of contacts, only an
equivalent state interest.
203. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 333, 336-37 (1981) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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govern, but that expectation, to the extent it is legitimate, is only the result of
prior state practice. If the states aggressively prosecuted extraterritorial crime,
people would expect otherwise, and expectations to the contrary would not be
reasonable or justified.204 Under this view, states could constitutionally do now
only what they have done in the past. What has been done before is constitu-
tional; what has not been done before is unconstitutional. 205 In any event, as I
demonstrated earlier, state practice really is not that consistently and exclu-
sively territorial.206 Thus, any expectations to the contrary with respect to
extraterritorial abortion arguably would not be justified. Further, this expecta-
tions argument must somehow distinguish between civil and criminal cases.
Most lay persons probably expect civil law to be applied on a territorial basis as
well, 207 but extraterritorial applications of civil law to a state's domiciliaries
are commonplace and constitutionally approved. The better view is probably
that a woman could reasonably expect her state of domicile to be interested in
her removal of a fetus from that state for the purpose of abortion. Thus, the
application of her domicile's criminal law should not surprise her.
Justice Powell's second requirement is that the forum state must have a
legitimate interest in the outcome of the litigation, measured by effects within
the state toward which the state's public policy is directed. Justice Powell cites
Professor Brainerd Currie, a strong proponent of domicile-based state interests,
to support this proposition,208 seemingly indicating Powell's acceptance for
constitutional purposes of Currie's domicile-based interest analysis. 209 If so, the
prosecuting state would appear to have a valid interest in protecting the resident
fetus, particularly vis-&-vis another resident. As mentioned earlier, even Roe
concedes the state's legitimate interest in protecting the unborn fetus. Powell
argues in Hague that the insurer's business presence gave Minnesota no interest
in regulating conduct of the insurer "unrelated to property, persons, or con-
204. As the late James Martin aptly stated, "from a strictly logical point of view, surprise
is an irrelevancy in a legal system that charges litigants with knowledge of the law-including
the law of choice of law." James A. Martin, The Constitution and Legislative Jurisdiction, 10
HOFSTRA L. REV. 133, 134 (1981). Professor Martin distinguished this kind of surprise from
what he called "factual surprise"--failure to anticipate subsequent events, such as an after-
acquired domicile, that would connect a dispute with a particular state. The pregnant woman's
residence in the prosecuting state at the time of the abortion would seem to eliminate any factual
surprise argument.
205. The Court has held that consistent prior practice may make a choice of law
constitutional. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988). However, the modern
Supreme Court has rejected the view that there is only one appropriate choice of law, see supra
note 163 and accompanying text, and it has never held that prior state practice makes a contrary
choice of law unconstitutional.
206. See supra part Ill.
207. Aaron D. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The
Pennsylvania Method, 9 DUQ. L. REv. 373, 381-82 (1971).
208. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 334-35 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(citing BRAINERD CURRIE, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, 189
(1963)).
209. Professor Weintraub argues that "Hague places the imprimatur of the United States
Supreme Court on the new choice-of-law methodology .... The three dissenters would go so far
as to raise interest analysis, d la Brainerd Currie, to a constitutional requirement." Russel J.
Weintraub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law?, 10 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 17, 33-34 (1981). Robert Sedler agrees. Robert Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on
Choice of Law: The Perspective of Constitutional Generalismn, 10 HOESTRA L. REV. 59, 71
(1981).
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tracts executed within the forum State." 210 The connection to the defendant in
the abortion case-domicile-is stronger than mere business presence, so this
language might not apply. More importantly, although the conduct occurs else-
where, it is not unrelated to property or persons within the forum. Whether
treated as property or as a person, the fetus "resides" in the forum, and this
gives the regulated abortion a connection to the forum. To argue that the state
of domicile may not regulate the abortion is to do precisely what Justice Powell
accuses the majority in Hague of doing: "[focusing] only on physical contacts
vel non, and in doing so [paying] scant attention to the more fundamental rea-
sons why our precedents require reasonable policy-related contacts in choice-
of-law cases."2 11
It is difficult to determine whether an extraterritorial abortion statute
would pass constitutional muster under Justice Stevens' Hague opinion. His full
faith and credit analysis is simply too vague to apply, primarily because he does
not explain when application of a state's law unjustifiably infringes upon the
legitimate interests of another state. He hints that a forum state would never
violate this standard in applying its law, even without any contacts.212 Justice
Stevens expounds a little on his full faith and credit test in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 213 writing that, "[w]hen a suit involves claims connected to States
other than the forum State, the Constitution requires only that the relevant laws
of other States that are brought to the attention of the forum court be examined
fairly prior to making a choice of law." 214 Without a definition of fair exami-
nation, it is impossible to tell when this standard has been violated.
One could argue that application of one state's criminal law to conduct in
another state where that conduct is not criminal unjustifiably infringes on the
legitimate interests of the state of conduct. However, that argument, like Justice
Stevens' test, is without content unless one explains why the particular
infringement is "unjustifiable." As explained earlier, the prosecuting state
clearly has a policy interest, so it is not unjustifiable in that sense. And why, is a
state's application of criminal law more of an unjustifiable infringement on the
legitimate interests of the state of conduct than its application of civil law, as in
Hague? Criminal law historically had a territorial basis, but so did civil law,
and Hague refused to constitutionalize civil law territorialism.
210. Hague, 449 U.S. at 338 (Powell, J., dissenting).
211. Id at 339-40 (Powell, J., dissenting).
212. "I question whether a judge's decision to apply the law of his own State could ever
be described as wholly irrational. For judges are presumably familiar with their own state law
and may find it difficult and time consuming to discover and apply correctly the law of another
State. The forum State's interest in fair and efficient administration of justice is therefore
sufficient, in my judgment, to attach a presumption of validity to a forum State's decision to
apply its own law to a dispute over which it has jurisdiction." Id at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 843 n. 25 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting the same language); Arthur T.
von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Constitutional Control of Choice of Law.: Some Reflections
on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35, 46 (1981) (Stevens' view in Hague is that "the Court
should abdicate responsibility for controlling choice of law except in cases so egregious as to be
almost unthinkable.").
Of course, Justice Stevens' argument is weaker with respect to criminal cases, where the
state itself has brought the claim. In that context, the state could more easily solve its concern for
efficient administration by not bringing the case in the first place and leaving prosecution to the
other jurisdiction.
213. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
214. Id. at 843 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Justice Stevens' due process analysis looks not only at the conflicts issue,
but also at the substance of the law being applied. One must ask if the law being
applied favors residents over nonresidents, represents a dramatic departure
from the rule that obtains in most American jurisdictions, or is unfair on its
face or as applied.215 A statute criminalizing abortions by residents does not
favor residents over nonresidents; in fact, it penalizes residents for doing
something that nonresidents could lawfully do. Depending on one's view of
abortion, one could argue that statutes criminalizing abortion are unfair, but, if
the Court overrules Roe, the substantive due process claim is foreclosed.
One could also argue that the extraterritorial application of a criminal
abortion statute is a dramatic departure from the rule in most American juris-
dictions, but this portion of the Stevens test appears to be limited to the sub-
stance of the rule being applied (the prohibition of abortion), not the territorial
extent of its application. For the latter question, Justice Stevens turns to a rea-
sonable expectations analysis. That portion of the due process analysis has
already been dealt with in discussing Justice Powell's dissent,216 so no further
exposition is necessary.
3. Other Due Process/Full Faith and Credit Cases
Hague is obviously not the only Supreme Court choice-of-law case.
However, other modem full faith and credit and due process cases have little to
say about the constitutionality of an extraterritorial abortion statute.
Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,217 for example, is fur-
ther support for the proposition that a state may apply its law to a defendant
that has had little contact with the state relative to the particular matter being
litigated. In Watson, the plaintiff, a resident of Louisiana, was injured while
using a home permanent product. She brought a direct action against the manu-
facturer's liability insurance company. The insurance policy prohibited direct
actions; that prohibition was enforceable where the policy was made, but not in
Louisiana. Recognizing that the policy was "bought, issued and delivered out-
side of Louisiana,"218 the Court nevertheless held that Louisiana could apply its
law. According to the Court, Louisiana had an interest in "safeguarding the
rights of persons injured there;" 219 Louisiana's interest in these people was
premised in part on their residence in Louisiana. 220 However, because the acci-
dent occurred in Louisiana and the Court states that Louisiana's interest also
extends to nonresidents injured in Louisiana,221 Watson represents less of a
break from territorialism than Hague and only weakly supports the constitu-
tionality of an extraterritorial abortion statute.
The two choice-of-law cases decided by the Supreme Court after Hague
also provide little assistance. One of the post-Hague decisions, Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,222 involved the issue of whether interest was due on
215. Hague, 449 U.S. at 326-27 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 203-07. Justice Stevens' reasonable expectations
analysis is weaker than Justice Powell's. See supra text accompanying notes 191-96.
217. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
218. Id. at 70.
219. Id. at 73.
220. Id. at 72.
221. Id.
222. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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gas royalty payments that were withheld from royalty owners pending Federal
Power Commission approval of rate increases. In a class action, the Kansas
Supreme Court applied Kansas substantive law to all such claims, including
claims involving both non-Kansas royalty owners and gas leases in other states.
The Court held that, if all of the relevant conduct occurred elsewhere, a state
could not apply its law to a corporation merely because the corporation was
doing business in that state2 23 However, as pointed out earlier, the residence of
the defendant woman in the abortion case is a stronger contact than a corpora-
tion's mere business presence in a state. More importantly, most of the gas
leases and most of the plaintiffs in Shutts had no connection to the forum. 224
Kansas was applying its law not only to out-of-state activities, but also to out-
of-state plaintiffs, and the Court has subsequently read Shutts as reversing "that
part of [the Kansas Supreme Court opinion] which held that Kansas could apply
its substantive law to claims by residents of other states concerning properties
located in those States." 225 Thus, the Shutts Court was not rejecting the princi-
ple that a state has an interest in protecting either its residents or its property; it
was merely saying that a state cannot apply its law when neither interest is pre-
sent. Thus, whether the fetus is treated as a person or as property, Shutts does
not reject the state's interest in protecting it extraterritorially.
The other leading choice-of-law case decided by the Supreme Court since
Hague is Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman.226 In that case, the Court held that a forum
can apply its own "procedural" law, including its statute of limitations, even if
the forum has no substantive connection to the dispute and the substantive law
of another state therefore applies. The narrow holding of Wortman is unimpor-
tant for present purposes because an abortion statute is decidedly not procedu-
ral, no matter how that term is defined. What is important is the analysis the
Court used to reach its decision.
Wortman sets forth two important propositions of constitutional analy-
sis.227 First, the Court holds that the restrictions imposed by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause (and presumably those imposed by the Due Process Clause as
we1 228) must be read in light of principles of international conflicts law.
According to the Court:
[T]he most pertinent comment at the Constitutional Convention, made by
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, displays an expectation that [the Full
Faith and Credit Clause] would be interpreted against the background of
principles developed in international conflicts law. Moreover, this
expectation was practically inevitable, since there was no other devel-
223. The Court noted that "Petitioner owns property and conducts substantial business in
the State, so Kansas certainly has an interest in regulating petitioner's conduct in Kansas." Id at
819. However, the Court held that this contact was insufficient to justify applying Kansas law
where the claim arose out of claims otherwise unrelated to Kansas.
224. "[O]ver 99% of the gas leases and some 97% of the plaintiffs in the case had no
apparent connection to the State of Kansas except for this lawsuit." Id at 815.
225. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 721 (1988). See also Shutts, 472 U.S. at
822 ("There is no indication that when the leases involving land and royalty owners outside of
Kansas were executed, the parties had any idea that Kansas law would control.").
226. 486 U.S. 717 (1988). This case arose from the same underlying dispute as Shutts.
227. Three justices reject both of the principles discussed in the text. Id. at 740-42
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Whether or not a majority of
the Court will follow these principles in future cases remains to be seen.
228. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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oped body of conflicts law to which courts in our new Union could turn
for guidance.229
The Court's apparent view is that, insofar as the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is concerned, states are free to apply their law to the same extent as
independent sovereigns under international law. The Court expressly states that
the famous statement in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co. that "[t]he very
purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was to alter the status of the several
states as independent foreign sovereignties 230 was not meant to be to the con-
trary. 231 This reliance on international conflicts law is not absolute; it is subject
to subsequent common law development, although the Court never makes clear
exactly how that process of common law development works. 232
The second important principle arising from Wortman is its focus on
historical analysis. To determine whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause pre-
cludes an uninterested forum's application of its statute of limitations, the Court
looks to "reported state cases in the decades immediately following ratification
of the Constitution."233 The Court holds that the "implicit understanding" of
"judges writing in the era when the Constitution was framed and ratified" car-
ries "great weight" in interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause.234
Wortman rejects the argument that the opinions of modern choice-of-law schol-
ars could make those "long established and still subsisting" theories unconstitu-
tional.235
Wortman's effect, if any, on the constitutionality of a state statute
restricting extraterritorial abortions is expansive, rather than restrictive. The
majority was apparently not saying that a state is required to apply the law
consistent with international conflicts law or historical practice, only that it
may.236 If supported by principles of international law or historical application,
229. Wortman, 486 U.S. at 723 (citation omitted).
230. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268,276-77 (1935).
231. The Court argues that the Milwaukee County statement
is true, as the context of the statement in Milwaukee County makes clear, not
because the Clause itself radically changed the principles of conflicts law but
because it made conflicts principles enforceable as a matter of constitutional
command rather than leaving enforcement to the vagaries of the forum's view of
comity.
Wortman, 486 U.S. at 723 n.l. Justice Brennan strongly disagrees with this interpretation of
Milwaukee County. Id. at 740 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
232. The Court says:
It is not our point that the content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is governed
by international conflicts law, but only ... that its original content was properly
derived from that source. The conflicts law embodied in the Full Faith and Credit
Clause allows room for common-law development, just as did the international
conflicts law that it originally embodied. But the concurrence points to no such
common-law development.
Id. at 724 n.1.
233. Id. at 724.
234. Id. at 725.
235. Id. at 728-29. See also id. at 727-28 ("If we abandon the currently applied,
traditional notions of such entitlement we would embark upon the enterprise of
constitutionalizing choice-of-law rules, with no compass to guide us beyond our own
perceptions of what seems desirable.").
236. The Court indicates that the Full Faith and Credit Clause "allows room for common-
law development." Id. at 724 n.1. The Court makes it clear that Kansas is free to apply another
state's statute of limitations if it chooses to do so:
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a choice of law is allowed even if it does not meet the Hague "sufficient con-
tacts" test. Thus, if a state has significant contacts, Wortman would not preclude
the extraterritorial application of criminal law even if both early principles of
international law and state practice were strictly territorial. Wortman would,
however, allow the extraterritorial application of criminal law if it was consis-
tent with international conflicts principles and early state practice, even if the
state did not have significant contacts. This is important, particularly with
respect to application of such a criminal statute to a woman seeking an
extraterritorial abortion, because it is a clear principle of international law that
a nation may regulate the extraterritorial activities of its own citizens.2 37
B. Application to the Doctor Performing the Abortion
To this point, I have been focusing on the application of an extraterrito-
rial abortion statute to the woman seeking the abortion. But what about the
application of such a statute to the doctor and others performing the abortion?
The case for such a statute is weaker, but, given the uncertainty of the Supreme
Court analyses, one cannot say for certain that it would violate full faith and
credit or due process.
With respect to the Hague plurality's analysis, the analysis of two of the
three contacts would be the same as for prosecution of the woman seeking the
[S]ince the legislative jurisdictions of the States overlap, it is frequently the case
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause that a court can lawfully apply either the
law of one State or the contrary law of another .... Today, for example, we do
not hold that Kansas must apply its own statute of limitations to a claim governed
in its substance by another State's law, but only that it may.
i at 727. This in itself is inconsistent with the historical view that a cause of action could arise
in only one jurisdiction. At another point, the Court notes that "[i]f current conditions render it
desirable that forum States no longer treat a particular issue as procedural for conflict of laws
purposes, those States can themselves adopt a rule to that effect." Id at 729.
However, the Court also indicates that the Full Faith and Credit Clause "made conflicts
principles enforceable as a matter of constitutional command rather than leaving enforcement to
the vagaries of the forum's view of comity." Id. at 723 n.l. This statement is difficult to
reconcile with the Court's expressly stated view that states need not follow the long-standing and
well-settled principle that applies the forum's statute of limitations.
The Court's response to a criticism in Justice Brennan's concurrence also raises
questions about the Court's meaning. Justice Brennan cites a passage in the Hague plurality
opinion that criticizes a 1934 case for giving controlling constitutional significance to the old
place-of-contracting conflicts rule. Id. at 740 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). The majority in Wortnan responds to Brennan's criticism as follows:
That criticism [in Hague] merely rejected the view that the Constitution enshrines
the rule that the law of the place of contracting governs validity of all provisions
of the contract. By the time of Allstate, of course, such a rule could not have been
characterized as a subsisting tradition, if it ever could have been, in light of escape
devices such as the doctrine of public policy, characterization of an issue as
procedural, and the rule that the law of the place of performance governs matters
of performance.
Id. at 728 n.2. If, as the Court says, states are not required to follow the historical rule, the
second part of the majority's response is irrelevant. The Court could simply have said that the
1934 case was wrong because it required the application of the law of the state of contracting;
Wortman would allow a state with significant contacts to apply its law even if historical
principles would look to another state. The quote above does not do that, however. It seems to
accept the view that states are bound by tradition, but argues that traditions change. Rather than
assume that the Court in this one sentence in a footnote meant to take back what it stated
expressly in the text, it is probably better to assume that the Court simply did not appreciate the
stronger argument it could have made.
237. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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abortion. The state's interest in protecting the fetus, which, as I indicated above,
is analogous to both the employment connection and the after-acquired domicile
in Hague, would be identical whether the defendant is the mother or the doctor.
The analogy to the second Hague contact would, however, be substantially dif-
ferent because this contact focuses on the connections between the defendant and
the state whose law is applied. The physician performing an extraterritorial
abortion would not necessarily have any contact at all with the prosecuting
state. Abortion is illegal within the prosecuting state, so it is unlikely that the
doctor is performing other abortions within that state. It is possible that the
abortionist also practices medicine in the prosecuting state, but only performs
abortions elsewhere. If so, his connection is similar to the business presence of
the defendant in Hague; the contact would be even stronger if he simply took
his patients across the state line for abortions. However, it is more likely that
the doctor only practices medicine in the state where he performs abortions and
does no business in the prosecuting state. In the absence of this second contact,
it is not clear that the prosecuting state could exercise legislative jurisdiction
over him. Of course, the more the doctor solicits patients from within the pros-
ecuting state, the stronger the state's case would be. This helps to establish that
the doctor "does business" in the state, and that, unlike Hague, the particular
litigation would arise out of that business contact. At best, however, the appli-
cation of the plurality's analysis leaves the constitutionality of prosecuting the
doctor indeterminate.
Justice Powell's dissent in Hague, as mentioned earlier, splits the analysis
into parts: (1) whether application of the state's law frustrates the reasonable
expectations of the parties, and (2) whether the forum has a legitimate public
policy interest in the outcome of the litigation. The second part of the analysis
does not depend on whether the pregnant woman or the doctor is being prose-
cuted; the state's policy interest in protecting the fetus is the same in both cases.
The analysis is different with respect to the first factor, however, because the
defendant is different and the reasonable expectations of that defendant might
also differ.
Analysis of the doctor's expectations presents the same problem of circu-
larity that analysis of the pregnant woman's expectations did. People's expecta-
tions are, at least in part, dependent on what states constitutionally may do.
However, unlike the pregnant woman, the doctor is not domiciled in the prose-
cuting state and therefore is not to be expected to have knowledge of that state's
law. As Peter Hay has argued, "a resident of another state, doing business in his
home state, ordinarily has no reason to suspect that disabilities under foreign
law might attach to a local transaction and thus is unlikely to inquire into such
matters."238 But this response hardly seems sufficient. People who contract with
those in other states or are involved in a tort with those domiciled in other
states are often equally unaware of that other state's law, but it is often applied
to them. A doctor operating on a patient domiciled in another state might
expect the application of that other state's law to the same extent that an insur-
ance company might expect Minnesota law to apply when it insures a Minnesota
employee. That expectation would be even stronger if the doctor solicited the
patient to come from the other state to obtain the abortion. Thus, at least
238. Peter Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Constitutional Limitations, 59
U. COLO. L. REV. 9, 30 (1988).
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arguably, if the doctor is aware of the woman's domicile, it might not frustrate
his reasonable expectations to apply that state's law to him, particularly if the
statute and its extraterritorial effect are well-publicized (as they almost cer-
tainly would be). It would be easier to decide this issue if the Court articulated
a standard for deciding when reasonable expectations are frustrated, but, unfor-
tunately, it has not.
As for Justice Stevens' Hague analysis, the expectations portion of his due
process analysis would be similar to that under Justice Powell's test, but his due
process analysis would not otherwise differ appreciably from that applicable to
the woman. This might be the rare case where his full faith and credit analysis
has teeth, but the vagueness of his test makes certainty impossible. Justice
Stevens, it will be recalled, said that a state's application of its law is invAlid
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause only if the application of that law unjus-
tifiably infringes upon the legitimate interests of another state, threatening that
state's sovereignty.239 The infringement on the other state's sovereignty is
arguably greater when, not only do the events occur in that other state, but the
defendant to whom the extraterritorial law is applied is a citizen of that other
state. However, the prosecuting state still has a legitimate interest in its resident
woman and the fetus she carries that would be furthered by prosecuting the
non-resident doctor, so the answer ultimately hinges on what Justice Stevens
means by "unjustifiable." We can say only that the case for prosecuting the
doctor is weaker than the case for prosecuting the woman seeking the abortion.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick24O also is
relevant to the case against those performing the abortion. Dick was an action
to recover on a fire insurance policy for the loss of a tug. The insurance com-
pany was a Mexican company, the policy was entered into in Mexico, and it
only covered the vessel in certain Mexican waters. The plaintiff, Dick, was a
Texas domiciliary, but, at the times of the contract and of the loss, he was liv-
ing in Mexico.241 The Court held that the application of a Texas statute abrogat-
ing a one-year statute of limitations in the policy was an unconstitutional denial
of due process:
A State may, of course, prohibit and declare invalid the making of cer-
tain contracts within its borders. Ordinarily, it may prohibit perfor-
mance within its borders, even of contracts validly made elsewhere, if
they are required to be performed within the State and their perfor-
mance would violate its laws. But, in the case at bar, nothing in any way
relating to the policy sued on, or to the contracts of reinsurance, was
ever done or required to be done in Texas. All acts relating to the mak-
ing of the policy were done in Mexico. All in relation to the making of
the contracts of re-insurance were done there or in New York. And,
likewise, all things in regard to performance were to be done outside of
Texas. Neither the Texas laws nor the Texas courts were invoked for
any purpose, except by Dick in the bringing of this suit. The fact that
Dick's permanent residence was in Texas is without significance. At all
times here material, he was physically present and acting in Mexico.
239. See supra text accompanying note 184.
240. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
241. Id. at 404.
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Texas was, therefore, without power to affect the terms of contracts so
made.2 42
Similarly, all actions by the doctor performing an extraterritorial abortion
would be performed outside of the state. If Dick's Texas domicile is insufficient
to apply Texas law to the insurance company, the pregnant woman's domicile
might be insufficient to apply the state of domicile's criminal law to the doc-
tor.243
However, Dick is distinguishable from the extraterritorial abortion case.
First, Dick's connection to Texas was weak; he lived in Mexico at the time of
the contract and only returned to Texas after the loss. The Court was careful to
point out that Dick had no existing residence in Texas at the time of the events
in question. The woman seeking an extraterritorial abortion would have an
existing residence in the regulating state. Justice Powell's dissent in Hague cites
Dick as holding that a post-occurrence change of residence is insignificant.244
This is consistent with other Supreme Court cases dismissing the relevance of
post-occurrence changes of residence 24 5 and would not automatically prevent a
state from regulating extraterritorially a transaction involving its current resi-
dent. Second, the application of Texas law in Dick would have upset a contrac-
tual expectation as to the applicable rule. At least one member of the Court has
expressed the view that a contractual choice-of-law provision is entitled to great
weight in determining whether the application of some other law would upset
the parties' expectations.246 In the abortion case, there presumably would be no
such contractual limitation on choice of law, and, even if there were, the dis-
pute involves the interests of parties foreign to the contract-the state and the
fetus.
The application of a state's criminal law to one who has never entered the
state is not as farfetched as it might seem. As discussed earlier, some of the
criminal child custody and child support cases have done exactly that.247 And
there are certainly analogues in the civil choice-of-law cases.
The civil case most analogous to the criminal prosecution of a non-resi-
dent doctor is Rosenthal v. Warren,248 a 1973 Second Circuit decision.
Rosenthal was a wrongful death action. The decedent, Rosenthal, was a citizen
of New York who traveled to Boston for an operation performed by Dr.
Warren, a Massachusetts surgeon. Eight days after the operation, Rosenthal
died. His executrix sued Dr. Warren and the Massachusetts hospital where the
operation was performed.
The Massachusetts wrongful death statute limited recovery to no more
than $50,000; New York law contained no such limitation. 249 Applying New
242. It at 407-08.
243. Although Dick might affect the case against the nonresident doctor and others
performing the abortion, it is reasonably clear that it would not affect the case against the woman
seeking the abortion. The Court made it clear that Dick was not concerned with the potential
application of Texas law to Dick himself: "We need not consider how far the state may go in
imposing restrictions on the conduct of its own residents." Id. at 410.
244. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 337 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
245. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
246. Hague, 449 U.S. at 328-29 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
247. See supra parts III.C. and III.D.
248. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
249. Id. at 439.
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York choice-of-law rules, 250 the court noted that New York had rejected "the
wooden rule that the law of the place of the tort inevitably governed." 251
Instead, the court held that New York's interest in the decedent and his wife and
children justified the application of New York's wrongful death law to the
Massachusetts operation.252
Judge Lumbard, dissenting, argued that the application of New York law
violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause.2 53 "I cannot see," he wrote, "how the
alleged malpractice and subsequent death of plaintiff's decedent can be classified
as anything other than a local incident." 254 The majority disagreed, finding that
New York's domiciliary connection to the decedent and his next of kin and the
fact that "the defendant hospital is a national one in terms of its patients, its
staff, its reputation and its efforts to obtain out-of-state contributions" were
sufficient for constitutional purposes. 255 The majority's constitutional analysis,
written before the Supreme Court's decision in Hague, did not focus on the
expectations of the parties,256 but the court did consider expectations in its
choice-of-law analysis. The court held that the application of New York law did-
not violate any reasonable expectations of the defendants because the conduct of
the hospital and the doctor was not patterned upon the Massachusetts wrongful
death limitation: "Quite probably it never o6curred to Dr. Rosenthal, Dr.
Warren or to the New England Baptist Hospital that a choice-of-law problem
would arise; at least one does not ordinarily think of wrongful death limitations
even when undertaking surgery." 257 Thus, it was not unfair to apply New York
law to them.
Rosenthal might be distinguished from the extraterritorial abortion case
on the ground that Rosenthal did not involve a liability/no-liability distinction.
The defendants in Rosenthal were liable under the laws of both states; the only
question was the amount of their liability. For this reason, the court argued, the
choice-of-law decision would not affect their behavior, since the same non-neg-
ligent conduct was expected under the laws of both states. This argument is, of
course, naive in its assumption that the amount of liability does not affect
250. L at 440.
251. 111 at 441.
252. Iaat 446.
253. Id. at 448-49 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 449 (Lumbard, J., dissenting). Judge Lumbard expanded on this earlier in his
opinion:
Here the decedent made a deliberate choice to undergo the operation in
Massachusetts at defendant hospital. Hence, he journeyed into Massachusetts and
registered in defendant hospital where he was under the care of defendant, Dr.
Warren. The alleged negligence that resulted in decedent's death, the operation by
Dr. Warren, occurred wholly within Massachusetts under the care of
Massachusetts residents and in a Massachusetts institution. New York's only
connection with this occurrence was the patient's permanent residence in New
York. I do not see that New York's interest in this occurrence is enhanced by the
fact that this Massachusetts physician and Massachusetts institution have such an
eminent reputation that a substantial number of their patients, many from New
York, are not Massachusetts residents and choose to come into Massachusetts and
undergo treatment there; for there is no evidence that either defendant solicited
patients from outside Massachusetts-their popularity is due solely to their
reputation and the choice of the individual patients.
Id. at 447-48 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 446.
256. The court termed the expectations of the parties "legally irrelevant." Id. at 444.
257. Id.
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behavior. The defendants in Rosenthal could have decided that the possibility of
paying $50,000 justified risks that they would not have taken had they realized
that they might lose more under New York law. The amount of liability clearly
can affect behavior and thus differences in the amount of liability can frustrate
expectations as easily as differences between liability and no liability.
An even stronger response to this proposed distinction is another case
decided by the same court five years later. In O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving
Corp.,258 the court faced the liability/no-liability case and reached the same
result. O'Connor was also a wrongful death case. The decedent, O'Connor, a
New York resident, was working for his New York employer at a construction
site in Virginia when he was killed in an industrial accident.259 The administra-
trix of O'Connor's estate sued the paving subcontractor, a Virginia corporation
that transacted no business in New York,260 and an employee of the paving sub-
contractor, a resident of Virginia also with no connection to New York.261 A
fellow servant provision of the Virginia workers' compensation statute would
have barred damage actions against the defendants; New York law would not
apply such a bar.262 The court held that New York choice-of-law rules dictated
that the New York law apply.263 Thus, even where the choice is one between
liability or no liability, some courts have not hesitated to apply their civil law to
extraterritorial activities involving an injured resident.
The Supreme Court might find these cases difficult,264 but nothing in
Hague or other constitutional choice-of-law cases makes such an extraterritorial
application of civil law obviously unconstitutional. Thus, if an extraterritorial
abortion statute is unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit or Due
Process Clauses, the rationale must lie in an inherent difference between civil
and criminal law-a view that crimes are simply more territorial than civil
law. In the next section, I turn to the few Supreme Court statements on
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction to see if this dichotomy between criminal
and civil cases is justified or if it is just a remnant of the old common law,
territorial view that criminal law, like civil law, is local.
258. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978).
259. Id. at 196-97.
260. Id. at 197.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 203.
263. Surprisingly, the defendants raised no constitutional challenge to the application of
New York law. Id.
264. See Hay, supra note 238, at 30-31 (arguing that the application of local law in
Rosenthal was constitutionally impermissible); Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman,
Choice of Lav and the Supreme Court: A Dialogue hspired by Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,
14 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 841, 845 (1981) (Lowenfeld arguing that both Rosenthal and
O'Connor "come dangerously close to the constitutional fairness line."). But see Louise
Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 483 (arguing that the
application of local law in Rosenthal was constitutionally permissible); Alfred Hill, Choice of
Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 960, 972-73 (1981) (arguing
that Rosenthal is constitutional under Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Hague).
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V. SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS OF THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF STATE CRIMINAL
LAW
The federal courts have been relatively lenient in allowing the extraterri-
torial application of federal criminal law. Several federal cases, including two
Supreme Court cases, approve the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction over
extraterritorial acts when the defendant is a United States citizen.2 65 These cases
obviously do not resolve the present issue because the federal government does
not face the same constitutional restrictions as the states. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not apply, the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply,
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment has not been applied as
aggressively to the extraterritorial application of federal law as has the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extraterritorial application
of state law.M6 As Professor Rotenberg argued,
the realities of social existence within the United States, the fact that
each state is part of a larger nation, and the fact that the Constitution is a
superimposed authority over the "sovereignty" of the states-and all that
these connote-mean that the differences between interstate and interna-
tional criminal jurisdictional problems are as significant, if not more so,
than the similarities.267
Some scholars argue strongly that the extraterritorial application of state
criminal law, even to a state's own residents, is unconstitutional. For example,
Rollin Perkins and Ronald Boyce argue that "the territorial theory has such a
dominant position that no state may punish its citizen for what he does in the
exclusive territorial jurisdiction of another state where what was done was law-
ful."268 Similarly, a leading conflict-of-laws treatise states that "[t]here is no
likelihood that application of state criminal law against a state citizen, for con-
duct altogether located at another place where a modern legal system currently
prevails, would be upheld."269 However, there is little authority to support these
broad statements. Professors Perkins and Boyce cite only the Full Faith and
Credit Clause itself.270 No authority is cited in the conflicts treatise.271
265. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932); United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981); United States v. Daniszewski, 380 F. Supp.
113, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). See also The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) ("The
laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own
citizens.").
266. For an argument that the Fifth Amendment due process clause limits federal
extraterritoriality in much the same manner that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause
limits state extraterritoriality, see Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 162.
267. Rotenberg, supra note 59, at 768 n.20.
268. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 47, at 42. They even provide an example: "California
could not validly make it a crime for its citizens to 'play the slot machines' in Las Vegas,
Nevada, where this is lawful." Id.
269. LEFLAR Er AL., supra note 54, at 316-17. Contra George, supra note 47, at 634-
35, 637.
270. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 47, at 42 n.27. The lack of authority for their broad
condemnation of extraterritorial criminal law is especially difficult to understand, because they
discuss Skiriotes in the preceding paragraph.
271. The authors continue with a statement that "[s]ome punishable impact within the
prosecuting state would be required." LEFLAR Er AL., supra note 54, at 317. They do not say
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The few Supreme Court cases to touch on the extraterritorial application
of state criminal law certainly do not support such broad generalizations. At
best, these cases are mixed. There is language in Supreme Court cases rejecting
extraterritoriality, but there is also language allowing it.
The strongest Supreme Court case against the extraterritorial application
of state criminal law, Nielsen v. Oregon,272 is over eighty years old. In Nielsen,
an Oregon statute prohibited the use of purse nets or seines to take fish from
the Columbia River. The Columbia River forms the boundary between
Washington and Oregon, and a federal statute gave Washington and Oregon
"concurrent jurisdiction over all offenses committed on" the river.273 The
defendant, a resident of Washington, was fishing on the Washington side of the
river with a purse net when he was arrested by Oregon authorities. Even
though he had a Washington state license to operate a purse net on the river, he
was convicted in Oregon of violating the Oregon statute. The Court indicated
that either state could prosecute a person for committing an act prohibited by
the laws of both states, regardless of where on the river that act was commit-
ted.274 However, "for an act done within the territorial limits of the State of
Washington under authority and license from that State one cannot be prose-
cuted and punished by the State of Oregon." 275 No constitutional basis or otherjustification for this conclusion was given.
Read broadly, Nielsen would prohibit one state from prosecuting even a
resident for obtaining a lawful abortion in another state. However, there are
differences between what Oregon did in Nielsen and the extraterritorial regula-
tion of abortion. First, the defendant in Nielsen was not a resident of Oregon,
and thus Oregon could not justify its regulation on that basis. Oregon had no
connection at all to the case, either territorial or domicile-based. Thus, Nielsen
is similar to Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,276 where the Court also disap-
proved the extraterritorial application of state law. However, although the
Court in Nielsen recognized that the defendant was a Washington resident,277
this fact was not significant in the Court's opinion.278
A second possible distinction focuses on the license issued by the state of
Washington allowing the defendant to use purse nets on the Columbia River.
One might argue that Oregon's criminalization of conduct that Washington
specifically licensed the defendant to engage in is a greater affront to
Washington's sovereignty than if no license was granted. Justice Brewer's
opinion in Nielsen repeatedly focuses on the Washington license279 and hints
what impact would be required or whether such an impact could be present where the conduct
itself is altogether extraterritorial.
272. 212 U.S. 315 (1909).
273. Id at 316.
274. Id at 320.
275. Id. at 321.
276. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
277. Nielsen, 212 U.S. at 316.
278. Professor Perkins argues that the result might be different if the defendant were
domiciled in Oregon. Perkins, supra note 47, at 1165. However, he reaches this result only by
combining Oregon's interest in regulating its domiciliary with the congressional grant of
concurrent jurisdiction; in the absence of concurrent jurisdiction, he argues that even a conviction
of an Oregon resident would be unconstitutional. Id
279. The Court says:
The'plaintiff in error was within the limits of the State of Washington, doing an
act which that State in terms authorized and gave hin a license to do. Can the
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that the result might differ if Washington had not authorized the act. Justice
Brewer states that the Court need not determine "whether, in the absence of any
legislation by the State of Washington authorizing the act, Oregon could
enforce its statute against the act done anywhere upon the waters of the
Columbia."280
A pregnant woman presumably would not have a specific license from
the state of the abortion to have an abortion, so Nielsen might be distinguished
on this basis. However, this distinction should not matter. Whether Washington
grants a license specifically allowing the defendant to use a purse net, passes a
statute allowing people generally to use purse nets, or just does nothing to pro-
hibit the use of purse nets, the effect is the same-purse nets are allowed in
Washington. The extraterritorial application of Oregon law interferes equally
with the Washington rule, and thus with Washington's territorial sovereignty,
in all three cases, even though the interference is more obvious in the license
case. Similarly, extraterritorial regulation of abortion infringes to the same
extent upon the territorial powers of the state where the abortion takes place
whether pregnant women are specifically licensed to abort or a state statute
grants a more general license allowing abortion. In any event, this distinction
may make little practical difference. If the validity of extraterritorial regulation
of abortion turned on the absence of a specific license, states allowing abortion
would be tempted to establish procedures to grant such licenses routinely, much
as marriage licenses are routinely granted even to non-residents.
The greatest problem with Nielsen is that it reflects a discredited consti-
tutional philosophy of choice of law. When Nielsen was decided, the Supreme
Court applied strict territorial limits even to civil choice of law. The Court
accepted the assumption that only a single state was competent to apply its law
to a dispute2Bl and seemed to be constitutionalizing vested rights territorial-
ism.282 Just as the Court said in Nielsen that a state could not apply its criminal
law to crimes occurring in other jurisdictions, it said in cases like New York
Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge283 and Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Liebing284
that a state could not apply its contract law to contracts "made" in other
states.285 Similarly, the Court said in Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
State of Oregon, by virtue of its concurrent jurisdiction, disregard that authority,
practically override the legislation of Washington, and punish a man for doing
within the territorial limits of Washington an act which that State had specially
authorized him to do?
Nielsen, 212 U.S. at 321 (emphasis added). Later, the Court says: "It is enough to decide, as
we do, that for an act done within the territorial limits of the State of Washington under authority
and licensefrom that State one cannot be prosecuted and punished by the State-of Oregon." lit
(emphasis added).
280. Id. Even if the result were different in the absence of a Washington license, that
would not necessarily answer the abortion question, because Oregon in Nielsen was operating
under a special congressional grant of concurrent jurisdiction, authority that would be lacking in
the abortion case.
281. BRILMAYER, supra note 54, at 118; LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 54, at 163.
282. BRILMAYER, supra-note 54, at 117-18; RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 511 (3d ed. 1986); WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L.
REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICr OF LAWS 234-36 (1984).
283. 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
284. 259 U.S. 209 (1922).
285. In Dodge, Dodge, a resident of Missouri, applied in Missouri for a life insurance
policy issued by the defendant, a New York corporation headquartered in New York. The policy
allowed the insured to borrow against the policy, which he did. He signed a loan application and
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Brown286 that a state could not apply its tort law unless it was the place of the
tort, at least not if its law provided for greater liability.287
Thus, Nielsen merely reflects the territorial attitude of all of the other
choice-of-law cases of its era. As shown in the previous section, the territorial
limits established in these early cases have been rejected in subsequent civil
cases288 and nothing in Nielsen justifies treating civil and criminal cases differ-
ently. We must look beyond Nielsen for territorial limits on state criminal law.
Other more recent Supreme Court cases expressly allow the extraterri-
torial application of state criminal law. For example, in Skiriotes v. Florida,289
a Florida resident was convicted of using diving equipment to take sponges
from the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Florida, in violation of Florida law.
He argued that his activities occurred outside of the territorial waters of Florida
and that Florida was powerless to make extraterritorial conduct criminal.290
The Court assumed that the appellant's activities were outside of Florida's terri-
torial waters, but nevertheless upheld the conviction. The Court held that a state
loan agreement in Missouri and gave them to the insurance company's Missouri branch office,
which forwarded the instruments to New York, where they were accepted and the proceeds
mailed to Dodge. When Dodge defaulted on the loan payments, the company applied the cash
value of the policy to repay the loan, as allowed by both the policy and New York law, and
cancelled the policy. A Missouri statute limited such forfeitures. The Supreme Court held that it
was unconstitutional to apply the Missouri statute to this loan. The Court conceded that the
policy itself was a Missouri contract, but held that the loan was "made" in New York. The Court
therefore held that, because the loan was a New York contract, "it was one which the Missouri
legislature could not destroy or prevent a citizen within its borders from making beyond them
.... "Dodge, 246 U.S. at 376-77. The Court argued that "[to hold otherwise would ... sanction
the impairment of that liberty of contract guaranteed to all by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
377. For an interesting comparison of this case to Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, see
WEINTRAUB, supra note 282, at 512-15. See also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta &
Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 149-50 (1934); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389,
399 (1924); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590-93 (1897).
286. 234 U.S. 542 (1914).
287. In Brown, a telegram was sent from South Carolina to Washington, D.C., to inform
the plaintiff that her sister had died. As a result of Western Union's negligence, the telegram was
not delivered, and the plaintiff missed her sister's funeral. She sued in South Carolina pursuant
to a South Carolina statute allowing recovery for mental anguish. The United States Supreme
Court reversed ajudgment in her favor, stating:
[I]t is established as the law of this court that when a person recovers in onejurisdiction for a tort committed in another he does so on the ground of an
obligation incurred at the place of the tort that accompanies the person of the
defendant elsewhere, and that is not only the ground but the measure of the
maximum recovery. The injustice of imposing a greater liability than that created
by the law governing the conduct of the parties at the time of the act or omission
complained of is obvious; and when a State attempts in this manner to affect
conduct outside its jurisdiction or the consequences of such conduct, and to
infringe upon the power of the United States, it must fail.
i at 547 (citations omitted).
288. See supra text accompanying note 197.
289. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
290. Id at 75-76. The Florida statute only applied to taking sponges "from the Gulf of
Mexico, or the Straits of Florida or other waters within the territorial limits of the State of
Florida." Id at 70 n.1 (emphasis added). The Florida courts held that the activity was within
Florida's territorial waters, even though outside the territorial waters of the United States. Id. at
70. The United States Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide the extent of Florida's
territorial waters; it assumed that the appellant's conduct was extraterritorial. Id. at 76. The Court
noted the inconsistency between this assumption and the language of the statute, but dismissed
that problem as a state law issue of statutory interpretation. Id. at 79.
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has broad power to control the conduct of its citizens on the high seas. This
authority, the Court wrote, "is analogous to the sovereign authority of the
United States over its citizens in like circumstances." 291
The "high seas" context limits Skiriotes' value to the present discussion.
Skiriotes does hold that state citizenship gives a state a sufficient basis to regu-
late extraterritorially, 292 but the applicable constitutional constraints were
weaker in Skiriotes than they would be in an extraterritorial abortion case. Full
'faith and credit concerns were completely absent in Skiriotes; since the conduct
occurred on the high seas, there was no other state law to which full faith and
credit could be given. Due process concerns might also be weaker in the high
seas context. A Florida citizen acting on the high seas off the coast of Florida
certainly does not expect any other state's law to apply, even if he might not
expect Florida law to apply. A citizen acting in another state might reasonably
expect the criminal law of that other state to apply, and the application of her
domicile state's law would result in a greater frustration of her expectations
than if she were on the high seas.
Skiriotes did not discuss this distinction, but the Court was very careful
to limit its statements to conduct on the high seas. Chief Justice Hughes also
quoted language from an earlier case that limits such legislative jurisdiction to
citizens "operating outside the territory of the State, ... but within no other
territorial jurisdiction.'293 Skiriotes nevertheless supports the conclusion that,
in at least some contexts, a state may apply its criminal laws extraterritori-
291. Id. at 79.
Since Skiriotes, several cases have approved state criminal jurisdiction over fishing in
extraterritorial waters. Felton v. Hodges, 374 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1967); FN American Eagle v.
State, 620 P.2d 657 (Alaska 1980); People v. Weeren, 607 P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1980); State v.
Sieminski, 556 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1976); State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976). See
also Corbin v. State, 672 P.2d 156 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (upholding conviction for
extraterritorial theft of crab pots because of the crime's close connection to the crab fishing
industry). But see Hjelle v. Brooks, 377 F. Supp. 430, 440-41 (D. Alaska 1974) (enjoining
Alaska's regulation of crab fishing outside Alaska's territorial waters where Alaska failed to
show a sufficient nexus between its extraterritorial regulation and protection of the crab fishery
within territorial waters).
Most of those cases involved defendants who were residents of the regulating state, as in
Skiriotes. However, one case extended the Skiriotes principle to cover non-residents. State v.
Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976). The state in that case argued that, because the
defendants held Alaska fishing licenses and had other connections to Alaska, they had effectively
become "crab fishing citizens" of Alaska. lId at 556. The court refused to adopt this theory, but
held that Alaska's police power did extend to non-resident defendants. The court's theory
seemed to be that allowing non-residents to fish would frustrate the conservation purposes
underlying Alaska's extraterritorial regulation. d at 554-55.
Surprisingly, the Florida Supreme Court, which upheld the conviction in Skiriotes,
subsequently held that a prosecution for extraterritorial spear fishing violated the accused's right
to a trial in the county where the crime was committed. Mounier v. State, 178 So. 2d 714, 717(Fla. 1965). The Florida Supreme Court quoted both the Florida constitution and the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, without specifying whether it felt that its result
was compelled by both. The requirement of a trial in the "county" where the crime was
committed is, of course, present only in the state constitution. See also Bateman v. State, 238
So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1970) (conviction reversed on venue grounds where state failed to prove that
prohibited shrimp fishing occurred within territorial boundaries of county and state).
292. Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 77-78.
293. Id. at 78 (quoting Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore (The Hamilton), 207 U.S. 398(1907)) (emphasis added). The Hamilton also involved conduct on the high seas, so the
emphasized language is dictum. Further, there is no discussion in The Hamilton of that
limitation.
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ally.294 In fact, at least one authority believes that the Skiriotes principle applies
outside the high seas context: "Although on its facts the case is limited to juris-
diction over a state's citizens for conduct on the high seas, the same principle
should be applicable to acts done on land outside the state, either abroad or in
another state of the United States" 295
Strassheim v. Daily296 is another Supreme Court case often cited to jus-
tify the extraterritorial application of state criminal law. Strassheim was a
habeas corpus proceeding; the respondent, Daily, was trying to avoid extradi-
tion from Illinois to Michigan. Daily allegedly bribed the warden of a Michigan
prison to purchase second-hand machinery represented as new. The bribe
occurred in Illinois, 297 although Daily had been to Michigan several times in
connection with the bid.298 The Court held that Daily was subject to punishment
under the Michigan criminal law:
[T]he usage of the civilized world would warrant Michigan in punishing
him, although he never had set foot in the State until after the fraud was
complete. Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the
cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State
should succeed in getting him within its power. We may assume there-
fore that Daily is a criminal under the laws of Michigan. 99
There are several problems in using Strassheim to justify extraterritorial
regulation of abortion. First, the Court's approval of Michigan criminal juris-
diction in the absence of any action in Michigan is dictum. Daily went to
Michigan several times to further his scheme. Nevertheless, this dictum is
important because, when Strassheim was decided, the territorial view was still
strong on the Court.300 Strassheim is also important because one of the cases
Justice Holmes cites, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,301 is a civil case
arising under federal law. In citing this case, Justice Holmes arguably saw no
distinction between civil and criminal cases or between federal extraterritorial
powers and state extraterritorial powers.
However, the conduct in Strassheim is different from an extraterritorial
abortion in an important respect. Daily's conduct in Strassheim, bribery, was
probably also illegal where it occurred. The abortion would be legal where
performed. This might make a difference, although the Supreme Court cer-
tainly did not focus on it.
The Supreme Court also had to deal with extraterritorial aspects of state
criminal law in the Williams v. North Carolina bigamy cases. 302 Each of the
two petitioners in those cases was married and living with his or her spouse in
294. "To be sure, the defendant was not within the territory of any other state or country
.... Still, allowing criminal prosecution in these circumstances indicates that a state's
constitutionally permissible interest in the behavior of its citizens does not stop at its territorial
boundaries." Regan, supra note 14, at 1908.
295. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, at 191-92.
296. 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
297. i at 283.
298. Id at 284.
299. Id at 284-85 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
300. See supra notes 281-87 and accompanying text.
301. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
302. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (hereinafter Williams 11); Williams
v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (hereinafter Williamns 1).
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North Carolina. In May 1940, they went to Las Vegas, and, in June of that
year, each filed a divorce action in the Nevada courts. The Nevada court
granted the divorces, after which they married each other and returned to
North Carolina. North Carolina tried and convicted them of bigamous cohabi-
tation.
Williams I reversed the original convictions. Both the majority and the
dissenters seemed to recognize that a state had power over its domiciliaries, at
least in the matrimonial context; the dispute centered on whether there was a
domicile connection to the prosecuting state. The majority assumed that the
petitioners were domiciled in Nevada at the time of the divorce303 and argued
that this was enough: "Domicil creates a relationship to the state which is ade-
quate for numerous exercises of state power."304 Since Nevada was the petition-
ers' domicile, the majority felt that the Nevada divorce decree was due full
faith and credit, and North Carolina could not prosecute for bigamy:
It is difficult to perceive how North Carolina could be said to have an
interest in Nevada's domiciliaries superior to the interest of Nevada.
Nor is there any authority which lends support to the view that the full
faith and credit clause compels the courts of one state to subordinate the
local policy of that state, as respects its dorniciliaries, to the statutes of
any other state.305
The majority refused to say "whether North Carolina could refuse to
recognize the Nevada decrees because, in its view and contrary to the findings
of the Nevada court, petitioners had no actual, bona fide domicil in Nevada
...."306 Justice Jackson, in dissent, argued that the petitioners never were
domiciled in Nevada and stated that "[a] state can have no legitimate concern
with the matrimonial status of two persons, neither of whom lives within its
territory." 307
Following the reversal, North Carolina retried the petitioners, this time
charging the jury to convict only if they were not convinced that the petitioners
were domiciled in Nevada at the time of the divorces.308 The petitioners were
convicted, and this time the Court upheld the convictions. The majority, in an
opinion written by Justice Frankfurter, held that Nevada's jurisdiction to grant
the divorce depended on domicile309 and that North Carolina had the right to
ascertain that jurisdictional fact for itself.310 Since the North Carolina jury had
303. Justice Douglas' majority opinion stated that
[h]owever it might be resolved in another proceeding, we cannot evade the
constitutional issue in this case on the easy assumption that petitioners' domicil in
Nevada was a sham and a fraud. Rather, we must treat the present case for the
purpose of the limited issue before us precisely the same as if petitioners had
resided in Nevada for a term of years and had long ago acquired a permanent
abode there.
Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 292.
304. ML at 298. Interestingly, the majority cited, inter alia, Skiriotes for this proposition.
Id.
305. Id. at 296. The Court cites two civil choice-of-law cases for this proposition,
indicative perhaps that the Court saw no distinction between civil and criminal full faith and
credit.
306. Maat 292-93.
307. IM at 320 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
308. Williams 11, 325 U.S. 226, 235-36 (1945).
309. Id. at 229.
310. Id. at 230, 234.
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found that the petitioners were not domiciled in Nevada at the time of the
Nevada divorce, they were subject to prosecution for bigamous cohabitation.31'
Justice Rutledge, dissenting, argued that the case involved more than just
full faith and credit to the Nevada judgment, but also the credit due to the
Nevada statutory law and the policy underlying the judgment.312 "Stripped of
its common law gloss," he argued,
the basic constitutional issue inherent in the problem is whether the
states shall have power to adopt so-called 'liberal' divorce policies and
grant divorces to persons coming from other states while there tran-
siently or for only short periods not sufficient in themselves, absent
other objective criteria, to establish more than casual relations with the
community.313
Justice Black also dissented. He argued that the conviction was support-
able only on two grounds, neither of which he felt was correct: "(1) North
Carolina has extra-territorial power to regulate marriages within Nevada's
territorial boundaries, or, (2) North Carolina can punish people who live
together in that state as husband and wife even though they have been validly
married in Nevada." 314 Justice Black also argued that allowing such convictions
impermissibly burdened the right to travel, subjecting people to criminal prose-
cutions for adultery or bigamy "merely because they exercise their constitu-
tional right to pass from a state in which they were validly married into another
state which refuses to recognize their marriage." 315
The Williams cases, although not directly relevant, make a few points
important to the constitutionality of state extraterritorial abortion statutes.
First, the Supreme Court allowed North Carolina to regulate criminally the
validity of an extraterritorial event-the Nevada divorce-which was legal
where performed. One could analogize the Williams petitioners' extraterritorial
flight to obtain a divorce to a pregnant woman's extraterritorial flight to obtain
an abortion. If the petitioners' extraterritorially legal divorce and remarriage
subject them to criminal sanctions in their state of domicile, then, by analogy, a
pregnant woman's extraterritorially legal abortion might subject her to crimi-
nal sanctions in her state of domicile.316 Second, both cases contain general
statements about a state's power to regulate its domiciliaries with respect to
extraterritorial conduct, including a citation to Skiriotes in Williams L Third,
the majority in Williams II cites the civil choice-of-law cases without qualifica-
tion or any indication that full faith and credit standards might differ in civil
and criminal cases. This supports the use of the civil choice-of-law cases to jus-
tify the extraterritorial regulation of abortion. Fourth, in Williams II, even
though the petitioners acted within the territorial boundaries of another state
and apparently believed that what they were doing was legal, the Court still up-
held their criminal conviction. Any expectations that Nevada law would apply
were apparently unimportant.
311. Iaat 238.
312. Id. at 249 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 256 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
314. L at 264 (Black, J., dissenting).
315. Id. at 265 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941), one of the early right-to-travel cases).
316. This analogy is not totally apposite because of divorce law's historically unique focus
on domicile.
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Although the Williams cases provide some support for the extraterrito-
rial regulation of abortion, Williams I also provides a possible way around such
a statute. Williams I rejected, as a natural consequence of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, the argument that extraterritorial flight could allow a person to
circumvent state laws.3 17 Thus, a pregnant woman wishing to obtain a legal
abortion could first establish domicile in a more liberal state, then obtain the
abortion. This could lead to "abortion mill" states, much like Nevada was at one
time considered a "divorce mill" state. However, Williams II says that the
original domicile state can always challenge domicile upon the woman's return.
Thus, an extraterritorial abortion would be risky for the pregnant woman
unless she truly intended to change residence and not return to her original
domicile. A more fundamental question is whether a legitimate change of
domicile would have the same preclusive effect on the prosecuting state in the
abortion case that it does in divorce cases. 18
A final Supreme Court case touching on the extraterritorial application
of state criminal law is Zablocki v. Redhail,3 19 decided in 1978. In Zablocki,
the Supreme Court faced equal protection and due process challenges to a
Wisconsin statute that prohibited Wisconsin residents under child support obli-
gations from remarrying, within or without Wisconsin, without court permis-
sion. Two of the opinions noted the extraterritorial reach of the statute.320
317. Justice Jackson argued in Williams I that the decision
subjects matrimonial laws of each state to important limitations and exceptions
that it must recognize within its own borders and as to its own permanent
population. It nullifies the power of each state to protect its own citizens against
dissolution of their marriages by the courts of other states which have an easier
system of divorce. ... It is not an exaggeration to say that this decision repeals the
divorce laws of all the states and substitutes the law of Nevada as to all marriages
one of the parties to which can afford a short trip there.
Williams 1, 317 U.S. 287, 311-12 (1942) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas rejected
this objection. According to Justice Douglas,
It is objected, however, that if such divorce decrees must be given full
faith and credit, a substantial dilution of the sovereignty of other states will be
effected. For it is pointed out that under such a rule one state's policy of strict
control over the institution of marriage could be thwarted by the decree of a more
lax state. But such an objection goes to the application of the full faith and credit
clause to many situations.
Id. at 302.
318. Since the fetus has no control over its residence, can the state's interest in the fetus be
bound by the mother's change of domicile? Probably so, for two reasons. First, if the mother's
domicile is not binding on the fetus, then what is the fetus's domicile? If it is not the mother's
domicile, every state through which the fetus passes might acquire an interest in it that wouldjustify application of that state's abortion law. This opening would present a host of issues,
including the personhood of the fetus, with which the Supreme Court would probably rather not
deal. Second, even if the fetus is treated as a person, the interest of the fetus in the extraterritorial
abortion case is not unlike the interest of the other spouse in the extraterritorial divorce cases. If
one spouse's state of domicile can harm the other spouse by terminating the marital relationship
without the other spouse's consent, then perhaps a mother's state of domicile can allow harm to
the fetus by terminating the fetus's existence through an abortion. Admittedly, the harm is
different, but, in each case, the "non-domiciled" party is being affected without consent by the
laws of one party's state of domicile.
319. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
320. Justice Marshall describes the statute's reach as follows: "Under the challenged
statute, no Wisconsin resident in the affected class may marry in Wisconsin or elsewhere
without a court remedy." Id. at 387 (emphasis added). He also states:
Counsel for appellee informed us at oral argument that appellee was
married in Illinois some time after argument on the merits in the District Court,
but prior to judgment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 23, 30-31. This development in no way
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Justice Marshall's majority opinion even cited a Wisconsin case applying the
statute to an extraterritorial marriage.321 The extraterritorial reach of the
statute was necessary to affect the appellee because he had already remarried in
another state.322 Yet, not one of the six opinions in the case questioned the
statute's extraterritoriality. If extraterritorial regulation of domiciliaries were a
possible constitutional defect, one would at least expect the Court to mention it,
particularly because the cited Wisconsin case involved a direct challenge to the
statute's extraterritoriality.323
Thus, the Supreme Court has decided several cases that, while not con-
clusively indicating that an extraterritorial abortion statute would be constitu-
tional, at least cast doubt on the unsupported assertions of some scholars that
state criminal law may not be applied extraterritorially. Cases like Skiriotes,
Strassheim, Williams I, and Williams I bolster the previous section's argument
that an extraterritorial abortion statute, especially as applied to a resident
woman, could survive due process and full faith and credit challenges. I now
turn to other possible constitutional sources of limitation on the extraterritorial
application of abortion law.
VI. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Another possible restriction on state criminalization of extraterritorial
abortions is the Sixth Amendment right to trial by a jury of the state and dis-
trict where the crime was committed. 324 This Amendment, like the rest of the
moots the issues before us. First, appellee's individual claim is unaffected, since
he is still a Wisconsin resident and the Illinois marriage is consequently void
under the provisions of §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5). See State v. Mueller, 44 Wis. 2d
387, 171 N.W.2d 414 (1969) (§ 245.10 has extraterritorial effect with respect to
Wisconsin residents).
Id at 382 n.9. Justice Powell's concurrence in the judgment also notes the extraterritorial reach
of the statute: "The monopolization present in this case is total, for Wisconsin will not recognize
foreign marriages that fail to conform to the requirements of § 245.10." Id. at 401 (Powell, I.,
concurring in the judgment).
321. See supra note 320.
322. See supra note 320.
323. See Mueller, 171 N.W.2d at 418. The Mueller court held that
We are of the opinion that § 245.10, Stats., and the penalty section,
245.30(1)(, are valid legislative acts. Only the conduct of Wisconsin residents
can be punished; the interest Wisconsin seeks to protect is a legitimate and
substantial protectible interest of this state both as to the protection of the welfare
of its minors and the marriage relationship of its residents; it does not call for
enforcement nor impose duties upon any foreign state; it does not violate due
process because it applies to only residents of this state; and the statutory
permission to marry, and the enforcement of the statute is in the courts of this
state, and it is not repugnant to the laws of another state.
In determining whether a given legislative enactment can have
extraterritorial effect, we believe the legitimate protectible interests of the state
should be balanced against inconvenience to the accused and invasion, if any,
upon the sovereignty of sister states. In balancing these interests as applied to the
statutes in question we believe the legitimate interests of the state of Wisconsin
clearly preponderate and the statute should be upheld as a legitimate exercise of
legislative power.Id.
324. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
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Bill of Rights, was probably not originally intended to apply to the states,325 but
the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment selectively incor-
porates and makes applicable to the states various Sixth Amendment require-
ments. 326 However, the Court has never held, or even stated in dictum, that the
Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement applies to the states, so, before dis-
cussing the substance of the Sixth Amendment limitation, I must first deal with
the incorporation question.
A. Does the Sixth Amendment Vicinage Requirement Apply to the
States?
The Supreme Court has rejected the "total incorporation" theory that the
Fourteenth Amendment made all of the Bill of Rights' guarantees applicable to
the states.327 Only those rights that are "fundamental to the American scheme of
justice" are applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.328 The
question is not whether a civilized system could exist without a particular Bill
of Rights protection, but whether the requirement is "fundamental in the con-
text of the criminal processes maintained by the American States,"329 "whether,
that is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered lib-
erty." 330 In making this determination, the Supreme Court has looked to the
practices of England and the American colonies prior to the adoption of the
Constitution,331 requirements in state constitutions and the current practices of
the states,332 and the policy reasons underlying the particular requirement.
333
law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). This is not the only place in the
Constitution where such a limitation appears. Article III, § 2, provides that
The Trial of all Crimes except in Cases of Impeachment shall be by Jury;
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article III deals with the judicial power of the federal government
and is an unlikely source for a restriction on state legislative jurisdiction. The Sixth Amendment,
as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is a much more plausible source for restrictions
on state powers.
Strictly speaking, the Sixth Amendment deals with vicinage, because it deals with the
location from which jurors are to be selected, and Article III, § 2, is a venue provision, because
it deals with the location of the trial. However, "[t]his technical distinction has been of no
importance." 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL
§ 301, at 190 (2d ed. 1982).
325. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 332 (4th ed. 1991). Although Barron v. Baltimore was a
Fifth Amendment claim, the Court subsequently held that the Barron position applied to the
Sixth Amendment as well. Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 321, 325, 327 (1868).
For a later view that the Sixth Amendhnent did not apply to the states, see Gaines v. Washington,
277 U.S. 81, 85 (1928).
326. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (trial-by jury); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process to obtain witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of
witnesses against the defendant); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (assistance of
counsel); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (impartial jury); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948) (public trial; information of the nature and cause of the accusation).
327. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 325, at 332.
328. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149.
329. Id. at 149 n.14.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 151-52.
332. Id. at 153-54.
333. Id. at 155-56.
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The distinction between total incorporation of the Bill of Rights and
selective incorporation of only fundamental rights may be more apparent than
real, because "virtually all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights have been
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the
states."334 There are exceptions, however,335 so it is necessary to determine if
the vicinage requirement might be one of those exceptions.
The vicinage requirement did not originate with the Constitution. Trial
by a jury from the vicinity of the crime was a practice in England hundreds of
years before the Constitution was written.336 Some of the early colonial char-
ters and constitutions contained provisions requiring juries to be selected from
the locale where the crime was committed. For example, West New Jersey's
Charter of Fundamental Laws of 1676 provided that the trial of all civil and
criminal cases shall be heard by a jury "of the neighborhood, only to be sum-
moned and presented by the sheriff of that division, or propriety where the fact
or trespass is committed .... "337 In Virginia, the General Court in Jamestown,
where all Virginia cases involving loss of life or limb had to be tried, originally
drew jurors from among the bystanders at court.338 However, a 1662 statute
provided that the sheriff of the accused's county was to summon six freeholders
from the neighborhood for jury service, with the other six jury members to
continue to be selected as before.339
Vicinage and venue of criminal trials also assumed importance in the
events leading to the American Revolution. An English statute passed in 1543
provided for the trial of treasons committed outside the realm "before such
commissioners, and in such shire of the realm, as shall be assigned by the
King's majesty's commission."340 On December 15, 1768, the House of Lords
adopted resolutions condemning certain acts of the Massachusetts Bay colonists
and approved an address to the King recommending that the King utilize this
statute to deal with any treason committed by those colonists. 341 The House of
Commons approved these resolutions and the address on January 26, 1769.342
The Virginia legislature was in session when it received news of Parliament's
334. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 325, at 385.
335. The only explicit exceptions made by the Supreme Court are the Second Amendment
guarantee of the right to bear arms, the Fifth Amendment guarantee of criminal prosecutions only
on a grand jury indictment, and the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 325, at 332-34.
336. Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 813 (1976); William W.
Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L.
REV. 59, 60 (1944).
337. West New Jersey Charter of Fundamental Laws ch. XXII (1676), reprinted in 5
FRANCIS N. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS,
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2551 (1909). The Fundamental
Constitutions of East New Jersey provided for a trial by a jury of "as near as it may be, peers
and equals, and of the neighborhood ..... Fundamental Constitutions for the Province of East
New Jersey in America ch. XIX (1683), reprinted in id, vol. 5, at 2580. However, the text of
this provision does not specify whether it means the neighborhood of the crime or the
neighborhood of the defendant.
338. FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 20 (1951).
339. Id.
340. 35 Hen. VIII, c. 2 (1543), discussed in Blume, supra note 336, at 62.
341. Kershen, supra note 336, at 806; Blume, supra note 336, at 63-64.
342. Blume, supra note 336, at 64.
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action, and it immediately introduced and passed resolutions that later became
known as the Virginia Resolves.343 One of these resolutions stated that any trials
for treason should be "held within the said Colony, according to the fixed and
known Course of Proceeding." 3 " The resolution further argued that "the seiz-
ing any Person or Persons, residing in this Colony, suspected of any Crime
whatsoever, committed therein, and sending such Person, or Persons, to Places
beyond the Sea, to be tried, is highly derogatory of the Rights of British sub-
jects; as thereby the inestimable Privilege of being tried by a Jury from the
Vicinage ... will be taken away from the Party accused" 345
Parliament responded with further legislation allowing prosecutions
involving revolutionary activities to be tried outside of the American
colonies.346 Such legislation provoked an angry reaction from the first
Continental Congress, which declared in 1774 "that the respective colonies are
entitled to the common law, and more especially to the great and inestimable
privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course
of the law."347 Two years later, the Declaration of Independence mentioned the
colonists' warnings against "attempts by their [the British] legislature to extend
an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us," and one of the particular complaints
against the King relates to "transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pre-
tended offences." 348
There are other indications that the founding fathers considered the right
to trial in the vicinage important. In the Virginia convention on the adoption of
the Constitution, Patrick Henry objected to the lack of a narrowly drawn vici-
nage requirement, arguing that "this great privilege ... is prostrated by this
paper. Juries from the vicinage being not secured, this right is in reality sacri-
ficed. All is gone .. ,349 Grayson echoed Henry's attack: "It may be laid down
as a rule that, where the governing power possesses an unlimited control over
the venue, no man's life is in safety .. ."350 Holmes made another strong attack
in the Massachusetts convention, arguing that a local jury was needed to prop-
erly judge the character of the accused and the credibility of the witnesses. 351
343. Id.
344. Kershen, supra note 336, at 806; Blume, supra note 336, at 64.
345. Kershen, supra note 336, at 806; Blume, supra note 336, at 64; 2 WRIGHT, supra
note 324, at 189.
346. One statute provided that persons charged with destroying "in any place out of this
realm" the King's dock yards, magazines, ships, ammunition, and stores could be indicted and
tried "in any shire or county within this realm." 12 Geo. III, c. 24 (1772), discussed in Blume,
supra note 336, at 63. A statute passed two years later allowed persons accused of certain
murders or other capital offenses to be tried in another province or in England if "an indifferent
trial cannot be had within the said province." 14 Geo. III, c. 39 (1774), discussed in Blume,
supra note 336, at 63.
347. Declaration of Rights of the Continental Congress art. 5 (1774), quoted in HELLER,
supra note 338, at 21. See also Blume, supra note 336, at 65.
348. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
349. HELLER, supra note 338, at 25. For an extensive discussion of the debate concerning
vicinage during ratification of the Sixth Amendment, see Kershen, supra note 336, at 817-28.
350. HELLER, supra note 338, at 25-26.
351. Holmes argued:
It is a maxim universally admitted, that the safety of the subject consists in
having a right to a trial as free and impartial as the lot of humanity will admit of.
Does the Constitution make provision for such a trial? I think not; for in a criminal
process, a person shall not have a right to insist on a trial in the vicinity where the
fact was committed, where a jury of the peers would, from their local situation,
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In light of these protestations by the American colonists, the practice of
the states themselves with respect to vicinage and criminal venue is surprisingly
mixed. Contemporaneous with the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, at least two, and possibly three, state constitutions provided for a jury
of the vicinage in criminal cases.352 One of those states, Vermont, also
expressly prohibited extradition of a person to another state for a crime com-
mitted in Vermont. 353 An additional four states required that criminal venue be
where the crime was committed.3 54 Two of those state constitutions contained
language indicating the drafters considered the right to trial in the place where
the crime was committed fundamental. The Maryland Constitution of 1776
declares the right to a trial of the facts where they arise "one of the [greatest]
securities of the lives, liberties and estates of the people." 355 Similarly, the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 calls it "one of the greatest securities of the
life, liberty, and property of the citizen." 356
However, at the time the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were
approved, about half of the states had nothing in their state constitutions
expressly restricting criminal venue or vicinage.357 When the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868, sixteen states still had no constitutional pro-
have an opportunity to form a judgment of the character of the person charged
with the crime, and also to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. There a
person must be tried by a jury of strangers; a jury who may be interested in his
conviction; and where he may, by reason of the distance of his residence from the
place of trial, be incapable of making such a defence as he is, in justice, entitled
to, and which he could avail himself of, if his trial was in the same county where
the crime is said to have been committed.
Debate in Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 30, 1788), reprinted in5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 260 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
Gore responded to Holmes that the impartiality of the jury was premised on the jury not
knowing the character and circumstances of the parties and that Holmes' rationale for a vicinage
requirement was therefore flawed. Id. at 261.
352. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 9, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 337, at 3100;
VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 8, reprinted in 7 THORPE, supra note 337, at 3813.
Pennsylvania's 1776 constitution and Vermont's 1777 constitution may have been intended to
have a similar effect. Each provided for an "impartial jury of the country." PA. CONST. of 1776,
Declaration of Rights, art. IX, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 337, at 3083; VT. CONST. of
1777, ch. 1, § X, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 337, at 3741.
353. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. XIX, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 337, at
3742.
354. GA. CONST. of 1789, art. III, § 4, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 337, at 788;
GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIX, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 337, at 783; MD.
CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVIII, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 337, at
1688; MASS. CONST. of 1780 part I, art. XIII, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 337, at 1891;
N.H. CONST. of 1784, part I, art. XVII, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 337, at 2455-56.
355. MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVIII, reprinted in 3 THORPE,
supra note 337, at 1688.
356. MASS. CONST. of 1780, part I, art. XIII, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 337, at
1891.
357. See CONN. CONST. of 1818, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 337, at 536; DEL.
CONST. of 1776, reprinted in I THORPE, supra note 337, at 562; DEL. CONST. of 1792,
reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 337, at 568; NJ. CONST of 1776, reprinted in 5 THORPE,
supra note 337, at 2594; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 337, at
2623; N.C. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 337, at 2787; R.I. CONST. of
1842, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 337, at 3222; S.C. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 6
THORPE, supra note 337, at 3241; S.C. CONST. of 1778, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note
337, at 3248; S.C. CONST. of 1790, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 337, at 3258.
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visions restricting criminal venue or vicinage.358 Even today, eleven states have
nothing in their state constitutions expressly restricting criminal venue or vici-
nage,359 and another three provide only for a jury of the defendant's peers, 36° a
provision that might arguably be construed to include a vicinage requirement.
Thus, the evidence of the historical and current practices of the states is hardly
overwhelmingly in favor of characterizing the vicinage right as fundamental.
The criminal processes of at least some of the states have apparently functioned
quite well without an express vicinage requirement.
But perhaps the policies underlying the Sixth Amendment requirement
are important enough that a vicinage requirement should be imposed on the
states in spite of the mixed historical evidence. The difficulty is in determining
exactly what those policies are. The Supreme Court has offered no consistent
view of exactly what the public policy of the vicinage requirement is.361
Vicinage restrictions arose at a time when jurors were expected to decide cases
based, in part, on their own personal knowledge of the facts. 362 That expecta-
tion made vicinage essential; a jury living elsewhere would not have the rele-
vant personal knowledge. This formed the core of the arguments for a strong
Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement. 363 But, as opponents of a vicinage
requirement pointed out,364 by 1789, jurors were expected to decide cases based
on the evidence heard in court, and knowledge of the case had become a princi-
pal cause for the rejection of jurors.365 Other policies might also support a
358. CAL. CONST. of 1849, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 337, at 391; CONN.
CONST. OF 1818, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 337, at 536; DEL. CONST. of 1831,
reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 337, at 582; FLA. CONST. of 1868, reprinted in 2 THORPE,
supra note 337, at 704; GA. CONST. of 1868, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 337, at 822;
IOWA CONST. of 1857, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 337, at 1136; MD. CONST. of 1867,
reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 337, at 1779; NEB. CONST. of 1866, reprinted in 4 THORPE,
supra note 337, at 2349; NEv. CONST. of 1864, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 337, at
2401; NJ. CONST. of 1844, reprinted ii 5 THORPE, supra note 335, at 2599; N.Y. CONST. of
1846, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 337, at 2653; N.C. CONST. of 1868, reprinted in 5
THORPE, supra note 337, at 2800; R.I. CONST. of 1842, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note
337, at 3222; S.C. CONST. of 1868, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 337, at 3281; TEX.
CONST. of 1866, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 337, at 3569; VT. CONST. of 1793,
reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 337, at 3762.
Of these 16 states, six had provisions in their constitutions requiring a judgment of the
accused's peers, language that might arguably support a vicinage requirement. DEL. CONST. of
1831, art. I, § 7, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 337, at 583; MD. CONST. of 1867, art. 23,
reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 337, at 1781; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 1, reprinted in
5 THORPE, supra note 337, at 2653; R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 10, reprinted in 6 THORPE,
supra note 337, at 3223; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 14, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note
337, at 3282; VT. CONsT. OF 1793, ch. I, art. 10, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 337, at
3763.
359. See ALAsKA CONST.; CONN. CONST.; IDAHO CONST.; IOWA CONST.; MICH.
CONST.; NEV. CONST.; N.J. CONST.; N.Y. CONST.; N.C. CONST.; N.D. CONST.; TEX.
CONST.
360. DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 10; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10.
361. Note, Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, 82
MICH. L. REV. 90, 91 (1983).
362. HELLER, supra note 338, at 95; Kershen, supra note 336, at 813.
363. Kershen, supra note 336, at 833-34.
364. Id. at 834-35.
365. HELLER, supra note 338, at 95. But see United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435
F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1970), where the court stated that it
would not lightly assume that the jury's original role as the voice of the country
may not sufficiently persist that neither the specific guarantees of an impartial jury
and of confrontation nor the more general one of due process would be violated
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vicinage requirement. For one thing, since most crimes are committed where
the defendant resides, such a requirement is usually more convenient to the
defendant.366 However, this policy is not directly furthered by the Sixth
Amendment vicinage requirement, because the trial is required to be held
where the crime was committed, which is not necessarily where the defendant
resides. The relevant evidence and witnesses are most likely to be found where
the crime was committed,367 but even that presumption sometimes fails given
the leniency with which the Supreme Court has interpreted the vicinage
requirement. 368 Some authors have argued that the vicinage requirement is
based, at least in part, on the concept of the jury as an institution for
"customizing" local criminal law.369 The jury, as "the conscience of the com-
munity,"370 can adapt the general criminal law to meet local circumstances and
mores. This fits well with the traditional territorial restrictions on criminal
jurisdiction-the idea that the only state that can speak to whether behavior is
criminal is the state in which that behavior occurs.
Whatever the policies served by the Sixth Amendment vicinage require-
ment, the Court seems to consider them important. In United States v.
Johnson,371 the Court spoke of "the unfairness and hardship to which trial in an
environment alien to the accused exposes him" 372 and stated that questions of
venue in criminal cases "are not merely matters of formal legal procedure." 373
Instead, "[t]hey raise deep issues of public policy"37 4 and "touch closely the fair
administration of criminal justice and public confidence in it, on which it ulti-
mately rests. '375 The Court saw the placement of venue restrictions in both
Article II, Section 2 and the Sixth Amendment as underscoring the importance
of the venue safeguard.376 However, it is impossible to determine whether the
Supreme Court considers the policies underlying vicinage so important that the
Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement is "necessary to an Anglo-American
regime of ordered liberty" 377 and therefore applicable to the states.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet considered the issue, a few
lower federal courts have done so. Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held
that the Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement does not apply to state prose-
simply because jurors with open minds were influenced to some degree by
community knowledge that a defendant was "wicked" or the reverse, even though
this was not in evidence.
Id at 817.
366. United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 410 (1958); United States v. DiJames, 731
F.2d 758, 762 (11th Cir. 1984); Kershen, supra note 336, at 808-09.
367. DiJames, 731 F.2d at 762; Kershen, supra note 336, at 810. For an argument, based
on historical evidence, that this was the primary purpose of the constitutional venue limitation,
see Note, supra note 361, at 105-08.
368. See infra part VI.B.
369. Kershen, supra note 336, at 839-40. See also Hernandez v. Municipal Court, 781
P.2d 547,548 n.1 (Cal. 1989) (arguing that the vicinage right "protects the right of the offended
community to pass judgment in criminal matters"); People v. Guzman, 755 P.2d 917, 929 (Cal.
1988) (same).
370. Kershen, supra note 336, at 843.
371. 323 U.S. 273 (1944).
372. Id at 275.
373. Id. at 276.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. l at 275.
377. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145. 149-50 n.14 (1968).
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cutions.378 In Cook v. Morrill,379 the Fifth Circuit concluded, without much
discussion, that the right to trial in the district where the crime was committed
"is not one of those rights which rises to the level of being 'fundamental and
essential to a fair trial,"' 380 and thus does not apply to the states.381 Technically,
these cases involved only attempts to require a trial in the particular district or
county where the crime was committed; the "state" portion of the Sixth
Amendment vicinage requirement was not at issue. However, the cases do not
distinguish the "state" and "district" requirements, and the language of the
opinions is often broad enough to encompass both.382
Several state court cases have also held, usually with little analysis, that
the Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement does not apply to prosecutions in
state court.383 However, most state cases involving Sixth Amendment vicinage
378. Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344, 345 (6th Cir. 1988); Cook v. Morrill, 783 F.2d 593,
595 (5th Cir. 1986). Accord United States ex reL Chatary v. Nailon, 211 F. Supp. 676, 678
(E.D. Pa. 1962). See also Martin v. Beto, 397 F.2d 741, 748 (5th Cir. 1968). But see State v.
Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63, 77-82 (D. Md. 1969) (assuming that the Sixth Amendment venue
requirements apply to the states but rejecting the view that the "district" requirement requires trial
in the county where the crime was committed).
379. 783 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1986).
380. Cook, 783 F.2d at 595. Cook followed an earlier Fifth Circuit case, Martin v. Beto,
397 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1968), which Cook reads as holding that the vicinage provision of the
Sixth Amendment does not apply to the states. 783 F.2d at 595. The Martin opinion is
confusing, to say the least. In Martin, the court noted that the Sixth Amendment vicinage
requirement had not yet been held applicable to the states, argued that the requirement was an
important one of long standing, indicated that the issue "is a question of extreme difficulty and
gravity," and then proceeded without further discussion to state that it found the change of venue
at issue not to violate due process. 397 F.2d at 748. However, the court in Martin seems to
concede that the venue requirement might be fundamental. Martin states that the venue
requirement "is more than a matter of formal legal procedure and touches 'closely the fair
administration of criminal justice and public confidence in it, on which it ultimately rests."' Id.
Martin also noted that the venue restriction was designed to protect the accused against the
hardship and unfairness of trial in a remote place and argued that "an accused in a State court, no
less than an accused in federal court" is exposed to that hardship. Id
381. The court in Cook was not willing to concede that a state has latitude to try a
defendant wherever it chooses. "In a state conviction where the change of venue resulted in a
conviction obtained without due process," the court noted, "a petitioner could obtain relief on
due process grounds," Cook, 783 F.2d at 596, but the court held that the defendant in Cook had
shown no prejudice resulting from the change of venue. The situation at which this dictum is
aimed is unclear; perhaps the court is merely precluding transfer into a venue where, due to
pretrial publicity or some other cause, a defendant could not receive a fair trial.
382. For example, the Fifth Circuit panel in Cook writes that "[t]he United States Supreme
Court has yet to decide whether the venue provision of the sixth amendment applies to the states;
however, the Fifth Circuit has previously decided that it does not." Id. at 595. The district court
in United States ex rel. Chatary v. Nailon similarly makes no such distinction: "The Sixth
Amendment guarantees to the accused a trial 'by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed.' This is a limitation, however, upon Federal and
not State courts." 211 F. Supp. 676, 678 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
383. State v. Bowman, 588 A.2d 728, 730 (Me. 1991); State v. Byrnes, 150 N.W.2d
280, 282 (Iowa 1967); People v. Lee, 54 N.W.2d 305, 308 (Mich. 1952). See also
Commonwealth v. Duteau, 424 N.E.2d 1119, 1126 (Mass. 1981) (Sixth Amendment state-and-
district requirement "has never been held to apply to the States, and might not be even relevant to
State prosecutions."); State v. Paiz, 817 S.W.2d 84, 85-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ("We have
found no case from the United States Supreme Court holding that the Sixth Amendment's
vicinage provision is applicable to the states."). But see Mississippi Publishers Corp. v.
Coleman, 515 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Miss. 1987) (vicinage right is fundamental and thus
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and applicable to the states).
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challenges simply assume, without analysis, that the Amendment applies.38 In
some cases the applicability of the federal constitutional provision does not
matter because a similar state limitation on venue or vicinage exists.38 5 It is
often difficult to tell whether some of these decisions are based on common law
territorial limits on criminal jurisdiction, state constitutional limits, state statu-
tory limits, or the Sixth Amendment.386
In conclusion, the applicability of the Sixth Amendment's vicinage
requirement to the states is far from certain. The weight of federal authority
seems to be to the contrary, although the Supreme Court has not spoken, and
one could certainly make a colorable argument for incorporation. If the vici-
nage requirement does not apply to the states, no further discussion is neces-
sary. In the next subsection, I assume that it does apply to state prosecutions and
ask whether, if applicable, the Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement would
preclude a state from enforcing a ban on extraterritorial abortions by its citi-
zens.
B. Sixth Amendment Limitations on Extraterritorial Abortion
Prosecutions
The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has become little
more than "formalistic statutory analysis," 38 7 looking to the verbs used in the
statute to determine where the crime was committed.388 What one author wrote
more than sixty-five years ago is still true: "All federal crimes are statutory,
and these crimes are often defined, hidden away amid pompous verbosity, in
terms of a single verb. That essential verb usually contains the key to the solu-
tion to the question: [I]n what district was the crime committed?" 38 9 As a result,
"[b]y altering the verb in a statute [Congress] may alter the nature of the
offense, and thus the proper venue, or it may proscribe some additional offense
384. Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007, 1008 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Hayes V.
Commonwealth, 698 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Ky. 1985); Trindle v. State, 602 A.2d 1232, 1238-39(Md. 1992) (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Harvey, 730
S.W.2d 271, 277 (Mo. App. 1987); State v. Bretz, 534 P.2d 496, 497-98 (Mont. 1975); State
v. Darroch, 287 S.E.2d 856, 859-60 (N.C. 1982); State v. Beuke, 526 N.E.2d 274, 288 (Ohio
1988); State v. Murphy, 353 A.2d 346, 348 (Vt. 1976); State v. Harrington, 260 A.2d 692,
697-98 (Vt. 1970); State v. Klein, 484 P.2d 455, 456 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Moore,
66 P.2d 836, 840-42 (Wash. 1937).
385. E.g., Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (state statutory
restriction on criminal jurisdiction); State v. Smith, 421 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. 1988) (state
constitutional restriction on venue in criminal cases); State v. Bretz, 534 P.2d 496 (Mont. 1975)(same); State v. Murphy, 353 A.2d 346 (Vt. 1976) (state constitutional vicinage requirement).
386. E.g., State v. Smith, 421 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. 1988); State v. Darroch, 287 S.E.2d
856 (N.C. 1982).
387. Note, supra note 361, at 91-92.
388. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 277-78 (1944); Salinger v. Loisel,
265 U.S. 224, 234 (1924); United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 78-79 (1916); Homer v.
United States, 143 U.S. 207, 214 (1892). Lower federal courts have recognized that one
acceptable method of determining the situs of a crime is to examine the key verbs in the statute
defining the offense. E.g., United States v. Barsanti, 943 F.2d 428. 434 (4th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Tedesco, 635 F.2d 902,
905 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Chestnut, 533 F.2d 40, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1976).
389. Armistead M. Dobie, Venue in Criminal Cases in the United States District Court, 12
VA. L. REV. 287, 289 (1926).
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related to the principal offense."39o Thus, the venue possibilities accepted by the
Supreme Court "virtually negate the constitutional venue limitations," 391 and
the Sixth Amendment is not a significant restriction on legislative power.392
At least two principles are clear from the Supreme Court's Sixth
Amendment decisions. First, the Court does not accept the old common law
territorial view that a crime has only a single situs; for Sixth Amendment pur-
ppses, a crime may be committed in more than one jurisdiction.3 93 The
Supreme Court has stated that
where a crime consists of distinct parts which have different localiies
the whole may be tried where any part can be proved to have been done;
or where it may be said there is a continuously moving act commencing
with the offender and hence ultimately consummated through him, as
the mailing of a letter; or where there is a confederation in purpose
between two or more persons, its execution being by acts elsewhere, as
in conspiracy.3 94
Second, it is clear that, for Sixth Amendment purposes, a crime may be com-
mitted in a place even though the defendant was not there at the time of the
crime: "The constitutional requirement is that the crime shall be tried in the
State and District where committed, not necessarily in the State or District
where the party committing it happened to be at the time." 395
Given the focus on the verbs in the statute, it is reasonably clear that a
statute prohibiting a state resident from having an abortion in another state
could be worded to avoid Sixth Amendment problems. If the statute prohibited
leaving the state to obtain an abortion, the relevant verb, "leaving," would
involve activity in the prosecuting state. Under the Supreme Court cases, that
would apparently be enough. Where the crime is defined in terms of trans-
portation, the Supreme Court has stated that the crime is committed, for Sixth
390. 2 WRIGHT, supra note 324, at 201. See also HELLER, supra note 336, at 100 (the
nature of a crime depends on the terms of the statute, and the situs of the crime for Sixth
Amendment purposes is therefore "not a question of procedure but of substantive criminal law").
391. Note, supra note 361, at 93.
392. 2 WRIGHT, supra note 324, at 201.
393. Numerous examples could be offered. In United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405
(1958), for example, the crime charged was willfully remaining in the United States for more
than the 29 days allowed an alien by a conditional landing permit. The Court held that the
offense was committed in any district where the defendant stayed after the twenty-ninth day, not
just in the district where he was on the twenty-ninth day. Id. at 408-09. In United States v.
Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 274 (1944), the Court indicated that Congress could constitutionally
make a criminal statute regulating the mailing of dentures triable in any federal district through
which the dentures were transported. In Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 233-34 (1924), the
Court indicated that a criminal prosecution for wrongful use of the mails could 6 e tried either in
the district where the offending material was deposited in the mails or where delivered. In
Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908), the Court held that the crime of
shipping goods pursuant to an unlawful rate concession could be tried anywhere those goods
were transported: "[Tihe transportation being of the essence of the offense, when it takes place,
whether in one district or another, whether at the beginning, at the end, or in the middle of the
journey, it is equally and at all times committed." Id. at 74.
394. United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 77 (1916). See also In re Palliser, 136
U.S. 257, 266 (1890) (crime committed partly in one district and partly in another may be tried
in either district).
395. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 387 (1906). Accord Salinger, 265 U.S. at
235; Anour Packing Co., 209 U.S. at 74; Palliser, 136 U.S. at 265.
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Amendment purposes, in any jurisdiction through which the transportation
occurs.
9 6
A state statute prohibiting the extraterritorial abortion itself, without any
"leaving the state" language, would be more difficult. Such a statute would
clearly falter under the Supreme Court's focus on the verbiage of the statute
because the abortion would occur elsewhere. However, it might still survive a
Sixth Amendment challenge on one of two possible theories. First, the Supreme
Court has held that, where the offense is a failure to perform a duty, such as
failure to report for duty or failure to file a report, the crime occurs where the
duty should have been performed--the place where the defendant was supposed
to report or the place where the report was to be filed.397 The Court was aware
of state court decisions holding that a state may punish a father for nonsupport
even though the father is outside the state and apparently viewed them as consis-
tent with the Sixth Amendment. 398 As in the child support cases, one might
argue that the mother owed the duty to the fetus primarily in the state of
domicile, and that therefore the violation of that duty was also in the state of
domicile, even though the abortion was in the other state. Second, an extraterri-
torial abortion statute might also survive under a test that considered not just
the location of the abortion but also its effects, focusing on the state's interest in
protecting the fetus, no matter where the fetus is taken. It is unclear whether
the Supreme Court would accept vicinage based solely on a policy interest such
as this when the actual physical injury occurs elsewhere. However, the Second
Circuit has recently developed, 399 and two other circuits have followed, 400 a
"substantial contacts" rule, which "takes into account a number of factors-the
site of the defendant's acts, the elements and nature of the crime, the locus of
the effect of the criminal conduct, and the suitability of each district for accu-
rate factfinding." 401 Of particular interest for present purposes is the rule's
focus on the effects of the criminal conduct, and not just the conduct itself.
According to the Second Circuit, "[s]uch districts have an obvious contact with
the litigation in their interest in preventing such effects from occurring." 402 A
state prohibiting extraterritorial abortion would have a better Sixth Amendment
argument using such an effects-based test.4 03 However, it is unclear if this
396. Armour Packing Co., 209 U.S. 56. See also United States v. Walden, 464 F.2d
1015, 1017 (4th Cir. 1972) (crime of transportation of stolen money across state lines may be
tried where the interstate transportation began or ended).
397. Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215 (1956); United States v. Anderson, 328
U.S. 699 (1946); Rumely v. McCarthy, 250 U.S. 283 (1919). These holdings appear to be
based more on statutory construction than on any independent restrictions imposed by the Sixth
Amendment. See Johnston, 351 U.S. at 224 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (conceding that the issue
is a statutory one and that Congress could constitutionally place venue where the majority held).
398. In Lomnbardo, 241 U.S. 73, the Court stated:
It may be that where there is a general duty it may be considered as insistent both
where the "actor" is and the "subject" is, to borrow the Government's apt
designation, as in the case of the duty of a father to support his children; and if the
duty have criminal sanction it may be enforced in either place.
Id at 77-78. See also Johnston, 351 U.S. at 220 n.5 (apparently favorable reference to the state
cases punishing a nonresident father for nonsupport of resident children).
399. United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 1985).
400. United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir. 1986).
401.- Reed, 773 F.2d at 481.
402. Id. at 482.
403. For a discussion of the "effects" justification for regulation of extraterritorial
abortions, see supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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effects-based analysis is supported by the Supreme Court cases. A focus on
effects is consistent with the Supreme Court's choice-of-law cases, 404 but it has
never expressly entered into the Court's Sixth Amendment determination of
where a crime occurs. In addition, more recent Second Circuit cases, although
reciting the "substantial contacts" test, appear more traditional in focusing on
the verbs in the criminal statute and the place of such conduct.40 5 Thus, the
Second Circuit itself may be silently retreating from this position.
If the state can constitutionally prosecute the woman for having the abor-
tion, it is reasonably clear that prosecuting the doctor for performing the abor-
tion would not violate the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that
conspirators may be prosecuted in the jurisdiction where the agreement was
formed406 or in the jurisdiction where any overt act occurred, even if some of
the conspirators were not present where the overt act occurred.407 The latter
holding was based on a theory of constructive presence.408 The lower courts
have extended this view to aiding-and-abetting prosecutions, holding that an
alder and abettor may be prosecuted where the principal commits the offense,
even if the aider and abettor was not present there.409 Thus, the doctor proba-
bly could be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the woman's crime, even
though the doctor never entered the prosecuting state.
The state court cases involving Sixth Amendment challenges often ignore
the federal Sixth Amendment cases entirely. Instead, these courts often treat the
question of where the crime occurred for Sixth Amendment purposes as coex-
tensive with the question of whether the state has criminal jurisdiction 410 These
courts apparently take the view that, if a state has jurisdiction to prosecute an
offense, the crime occurs there for Sixth Amendment purposes. Given the
Supreme Court's focus on statutory language in Sixth Amendment cases, the
equivalence of the two concepts is doubtful. However, to the extent that these
state cases are correct, the analysis would track that in the earlier section dis-
cussing criminal jurisdiction.411
404. See supra part IV.
405. United States v. Delia, 944 F.2d 1010, 1013 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1189-90 (2d Cir. 1989).
406. Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 76-77 (1905).
407. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
408. 1l at 362.
409. E.g., United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429, 1434 (11th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Kibler, 667 F.2d 452, 455 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619,
627 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Jackson, 482 F.2d 1167, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Kilpatrick, 458 F.2d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 1972). But cf. United States v.
Walden, 464 F.2d 1015, 1019-20 (4th Cir. 1972) (accessory may be tried at the location of the
crime he assists or at the location of his accessorial acts, but principal violator may not be tried at
place where the accessory acts).
410. E.g., Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007, 1008-1012 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Trindle
v. State, 602 A.2d 1232, 1238-39 (Md. 1992) (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); State v. Smith, 421 N.W.2d 315, 318-19 (Minn. 1988); State v. Darroch, 287 S.E.2d
856, 859-865 (N.C. 1982); Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242, 244-49 (Wyo. 1987).
The extent to which the state courts often ignore the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence is indicated by a quote from a state case involving a Sixth Amendment challenge:
"How a state chooses to label a crime cannot be relevant to jurisdiction. To conclude otherwise
would be to place form above substance." Darroch, 287 S.E.2d at 863. As can be seen from the
Supreme Court cases discussed earlier, how a crime is labeled is in fact determinative for Sixth
Amendment purposes.
411. See supra part Ill.
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VH. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. Introduction
The most likely source for holding art extraterritorial abortion statute
unconstitutional is the Commerce Clause4 12 The Commerce Clause does not
expressly prohibit state extraterritorial regulation; it merely authorizes
Congress to "regulate Commerce with the foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States."413 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has read into that clause a
"negative," or "dormant," Commerce Clause limitation on the power of states
to interfere with interstate commerce.414
The dormant Commerce Clause is one constitutional provision for which
the distinction between civil choice-of-law doctrine and state regulatory law
may make a difference. The Commerce Clause has been "generally ignored" in
the civil choice-of-law context, 41 5 but it has much to say concerning the appli-
cation of a state's regulatory and criminal law.
Unfortunately, as even the Supreme Court recognizes, the Court's inter-
pretation of the negative Commerce Clause "has not always been easy to fol-
low." 41 6 The Court has articulated a variety of tests, 417 and the decision depends
on a close examination of the facts of each case. 418
412. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
413. Id.
414. E.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177,
184 n.2 (1938), and cases cited therein. Not everyone accepts these dormant Commerce Clause
limitations. Martin Redish and Shane Nugent make a convincing argument that
[t]he dormant commerce clause lacks a foundation or justification in either the
Constitution's text or history, and, despite the efforts of respected constitutional
scholars, the clause cannot be satisfactorily rationalized outside the text of the
Constitution. More importantly, the dormant commerce clause alters the delicate
balance of federalism clearly manifested in the constitutional text.
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Donnant Cormnerce Clause and the Constitutional
Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKEL.J. 569,617. See also Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE LJ. 425,428 (1982) (arguing for a "radically diminished
role" for the dormant Commerce Clause).
415. Harold W. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of.Law
Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806, 807 (1971). Professor Horowitz argues that the Commerce
Clause should be applied to control civil choice-of-law doctrine. Id. at 813-23.
416. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987). Earl Maltz
quotes a facetious 1932 restatement of constitutional law that still rings true:
Although the power of the Federal Government over interstate commerce is
plenary, the states may regulate commerce some, but not too much. If a state
attempts to regulate commerce too much such regulation will be unconstitutional.
Caveat: This Restatement is not intended to express any opinion as to how
much regulation is too much.
Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 47, 47 (1981). Professor Maltz accuses the Court of
failing to generate "the kind of consistent, principled decisionmaking that is essential to the
orderly development of constitutional law." Ma at 89.
417. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 87; Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,
440-41 (1978).
418. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., 434 U.S. at 441 ("[Tlhe inquiry necessarily
involves a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern in light
of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of interstate commerce."); Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 719 (1963) ("[C]ourts
must examine closely the facts of each case to determine whether the dangers and hardships of
diverse regulation justify foreclosing a State from the exercise of its traditional powers.").
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B. Stricter Scrutiny: Discrimination, Inconsistent Regulation, and
Economic Protectionism
The principal objects of negative Commerce Clause scrutiny have been
state statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce. 419 "When a state
statute ... discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to
favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, [the Court has] gen-
erally struck down the statute without further inquiry."420 Some scholars con-
tend that almost all of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause decisions are
explainable on the basis of discriminatory purpose or impact: The Court usually
upholds nondiscriminatory state regulation and invalidates discriminatory state
regulation 21 Other scholars, while not necessarily conceding that discrimina-
tion is all the Court is worried about, have argued that discrimination is all the
Court should be worried about 4 22
An extraterritorial abortion statute clearly would not discriminate against
interstate commerce or favor local economic interests over out-of-state eco-
nomic interests. Whether one focuses on the purpose of such a statute or its
effect, the regulation is evenhanded. The state would prohibit abortions on its
residents, whether performed within or without the -state, whether performed
by local doctors and clinics or out-of-state doctors and clinics. The only
arguable discrimination is against the state's own resident women, who may not
obtain abortions outside the state, and in favor of out-of-state women, who
may. This is hardly the discrimination against interstate commerce at which the
dormant Commerce Clause is aimed.
The Court has also looked askance at state laws that might subject a single
person to inconsistent regulation by different states.423 According to the Court,
the practical effect of the particular state regulation being challenged "must be
evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also
by considering how the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate regu-
latory regimes of other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many
or every State, adopted similar legislation." 424 A state statute prohibiting a resi-
dent from leaving the state to obtain an abortion presents no problem of incon-
sistency. As long as each state regulates only its own residents, each woman
419. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 87.
420. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986).
421. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1206-84 (1986); Robert A. Sedler, The
Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in
Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNEL. REV. 885,965 (1985).
422. Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST.
COMMENTARY 395, 403-06 (1986). Professor Farber argues that this is the only rule consistent
with what he calls the process rationale for the negative Commerce Clause: preventing
discrimination against outsiders who are not represented in the state's political process. Id. at
400-01. See also Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978) (criticizing
statutory exemptions for specified local industries as undermining "the assumption that the
State's own political processes will act as a check on local regulations that unduly burden
interstate commerce"); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L.
REV. 125, 164-65 (accepting the political theory of the Commerce Clause). For a criticism of
this political process model, see Redish & Nugent, supra note 414, at 612-17.
423. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989); CTS Corp., 481
U.S. at 88, and cases cited therein; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 583.
424. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
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would be subject to only one rule. No inconsistency results even if the other
state attempts to apply its more liberal abortion law on a territorial basis. The
more liberal state is not requiring the woman to obtain the abortion; thus, the
application of her own state's prohibition of abortion does not subject her to
inconsistent, irreconcilable obligations.425 She can comply with the laws of both
states.
Regulation of the doctor performing the abortion presents a trickier issue
of inconsistent regulation. Presumably, nothing in the law of the doctor's home
state would require him to perform abortions, so he is not facing inconsistent
obligations in that sense.426 He might face inconsistent obligations, however, if
the state regulation in question was something short of an absolute prohibition
on abortion. If, for example, the woman's state of residence required that no
abortion be performed unless the doctor distributed certain material or
obtained a certain type of consent, and the doctor's state required different
information or a different type of consent, inconsistency would result. An abso-
lute prohibition would not, however, present the type of inconsistency with
which the Court is concerned.
The Supreme Court has also applied a stricter standard of review when
the state regulation is designed to protect local economic interests than when the
state regulation is designed to promote health or safety: 427
The opinions of the Court through the years have reflected an alertness
to the evils of "economic isolation" and protectionism, while at the same
time recognizing that incidental burdens on interstate commerce may be
unavoidable when a State legislates to safeguard the health and safety of
its people. Thus, where simple economic protectionism is effected by
state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected ...
425. In a forthcoming article, Lea Brilmayer argues that regulation of abortion could
present a case of inconsistent regulation. Brilmayer, supra note 16. She argues that a regulatory
state's prohibition of an extraterritorial abortion may conflict with the territorial state's
affirmative grant to those within its borders of the autonomy to choose. She further argues that,
as a matter of constitutional law, the territorial state's grant of autonomy should trump the
domiciliary state's prohibition of abortion.
Professor Brilmayer's article appears to be prescriptive rather than descriptive. She
makes an analogy to federal preemption cases, where the Supreme Court has held that federal
law may preempt state law; even if it is possible to comply with both. See, e.g., Franklin Nat'l
Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954). However, she does not claim that any existing
Commerce Clause case directly supports her position.
Her prescriptive rule presents difficulties. She does not explain why the territorial state
has an overriding interest in granting autonomy to women domiciled in other states. Also
troublesome is her argument that the autonomy interest involved in not regulating abortion is
qualitatively different from other refusals to regulate. Whatever the merits of her prescriptive
argument, however, her position does not appear to be supported by the Court's existing
Commerce Clause cases. The Court seems to be using "inconsistent regulation" in the sense
indicated in the text-where it is impossible to comply with the laws of both states. See CTS
Corp., 481 U.S. at 88 (state regulation of corporate voting rights presents no problem of
inconsistent regulation as long as each state regulates only its own domestic corporations).
426. Such a possibility is certainly conceivable. Assume, for example, that the doctor
practices in a state hospital that requires him to perform abortions on all women who do not have
the financial resources to pay for them, and that this obligation is not restricted to women
residing in the state. The doctor would then face inconsistent obligations. His home state
requires him to perform an abortion on the nonresident woman, but her law subjects him to
criminal penalties if he does.
427. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
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But where other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is
no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the court has adopted a
much more flexible approach, the general contours of which were out-
lined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inca428
Again, an extraterritorial abortion statute would be subject to a lesser
standard of review, for it clearly is not designed to protect local economic
interests, nor would it have that effect. As long as abortion is also prohibited
within the state, the prohibition on a woman leaving the state to obtain an abor-
tion furthers no local economic interest, nor is such a provision designed to
prevent out-of-state businesses from competing with local businesses.
C. Balancing Burdens and Benefits
The Supreme Court's Commerce Clause analysis currently involves a
two-tiered approach. The first tier is the strict scrutiny triggered by statutes
discriminating against interstate commerce. 429 However, the Court does not
automatically approve state regulation lacking discriminatory purpose or effect.
Instead, it engages in a weaker, second tier of analysis, first articulated in Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc.:430 "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectu-
ate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative l6cal benefits." 431 Among other
things, the Court will consider whether the state's objective could be accom-
plished as well through an alternative means less burdensome on interstate
commerce.
432
Thus, assuming that an extraterritorial abortion statute, at least as applied
to the woman, does not fall within the first tier of the Court's Commerce
Clause analysis, one must balance its benefits against the burden it imposes on
interstate commerce. It is difficult to predict the result of such balancing. The
state interest and the burdens on interstate commerce are fairly easily identifi-
able, but the weighing of those interests is much less predictable, because the
428. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623-24 (citations omitted). For an argument that,
except in cases involving transportation and taxation, the Court has been concerned exclusively
with preventing states from engaging in economic protectionism, see Regan, supra note 421.
429. It is not completely clear from the cases whether the problems of inconsistent
regulation or economic protectionism themselves trigger the strict scrutiny approach or merely
weigh very heavily in the balancing of the benefits and the burdens on interstate commerce. The
Court itself does not strictly separate the two tiers of its Commerce Clause analysis, indicating
that "there is no clear line separating the category of state regulation that is virtually per se invalid
under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing
approach." Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986). The issue is not important for present purposes, because, as explained in the text,
an extraterritorial abortion statute would involve neither inconsistent regulation nor economic
protectionism.
430. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
431. Id at 142. Accord Brown-Fornan Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579. Not all of the
justices accept the balancing approach. Justice Scalia would invalidate a state statute under the
Commerce Clause "if, and only if, it accords discriminatory treatment to interstate commerce in a
respect not required to achieve a lawful state purpose." Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 898 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). See also CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
432. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
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Court has not adequately specified how the weighing is done.433 Justice Scalia
has cynically likened Commerce Clause balancing to 'judging whether a par-
ticular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy." 434 It appears likely that
the application of an extraterritorial prohibition to the resident woman would
survive this balancing process, but the constitutionality of a law applicable
directly to the doctor performing the abortion is much less certain.
The principal benefit of an extraterritorial abortion statute is the protec-
tion of the resident fetus. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court recognized
this interest as legitimate in both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.435 If Roe is overruled, it is unlikely that the Court would contest the
legitimacy of the state's interest in protecting the unborn fetus.
Against this benefit, the burden on interstate commerce must be weighed.
If the extraterritorial abortion statute applies only to the woman seeking the
abortion, the impact on interstate commerce is trivial. The statute would not in
any way inhibit doctors performing abortions in other states, as the doctor
would not be subject to prosecution. If the doctor performed an abortion on a
woman from a state with an extraterritorial abortion statute, he might be
requested to provide evidence, but this request would be no more burdensome
than a civil discovery request, and the Court has allowed state civil law to be
applied in interstate disputes. 436 In any event, such evidentiary requests are
separate from the criminal statute itself; if the state goes too far, such as by
trying to force the doctor to come to the prosecuting state to testify, those
requests could themselves be subjected to interstate commerce analysis. The
constitutionality of the underlying criminal prohibition should not depend on
the constitutionality of certain means of gathering evidence to prove the crime.
There is, of course, a minor burden on the out-of-state doctor's business:
he has fewer patients. But that burden is hardly disruptive of interstate com-
merce. As long as the burden on the out-of-state doctor is no greater than the
burden on the in-state doctor, the fact that the out-of-state doctor now has
fewer abortion patients would not preclude state regulation. Additionally, it is
without question that a state could prohibit the out-of-state doctor from enter-
ing the state and performing abortions there. This has an impact on interstate
commerce similar to prohibiting the woman from going to the out-of-state
doctor, but no one suggests that the former would violate the Commerce
Clause. In sum, a criminal prohibition limited to the woman seeking the abor-
tion would probably survive Commerce Clause balancing.
The question is more difficult if the state law also tries to make the out-
of-state doctor a criminal defendant, for that would impose a much greater
burden. To avoid criminal liability, every doctor in every state would have to
screen all of his or her patients to make sure they were not from a state that
prohibits extraterritorial abortions. If the statute did not require that the doc-
tor, to be liable, have actual knowledge of the patient's residence, the investiga-
tory burden would be enormous. The doctor would have to investigate each
patient and verify her identity and address before performing the abortion. The
433. This uncertainty is, of course, "inherent in the basic balancing approach itself."
Maltz, supra note 416, at 89.
434. BendixAutolite Corp., 486 U.S. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
435. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
436. See supra part IV.
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doctor would endure this burden for every patient, whereas the benefit of regu-
lation would exist only for those few patients actually from the state regulating
the abortion. Weighing benefits and burdens is difficult, particularly when an
economic interest is on one side of the balance and an interest in life or poten-
tial life is on the other. However, because of the greater burden, such a statute
would be less likely to survive Commerce Clause balancing.
If the statute allowed the doctor to rely on the address provided by the
patient, no additional investigatory burden would be imposed. The doctor, or
his or her staff, would only have to look at the admission form and reject
patients from states with prohibitory abortion laws. Since the staff already has
to review the forms for medical history, the additional burden appears to be
minimal. Even here, however, the burden would be more substantial if the state
law involved not an absolute prohibition, but less restrictive limitations on the
right to an abortion. The criminality of abortion might vary depending upon
the age of the patient, whether a waiting period has been observed, whether the
appropriate consent or disclosure form has been signed, how advanced the
pregnancy is, and so on. It would undoubtedly prove difficult and costly for
doctors to keep up with various states' abortion laws and apply these different
rules. Given this burden, the Court probably would not accept the application
of such laws directly to the doctor.
D. The New Territorialism
There is a final strand of analysis in the Commerce Clause cases that is
tremendously important to the constitutionality of an extraterritorial abortion
statute. Older Commerce Clause cases distinguished between direct regulation
of interstate commerce and state regulation with only indirect effects on inter-
state commerce. 437 Recently, that distinction has returned to the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause cases, with a definite territorial component.438 In its
current recitation of the two-tier Commerce Clause analysis, the Court includes
within the category deserving stricter scrutiny state statutes that "directly regu-
late" interstate commerce.439
The "direct regulation" line of analysis has arisen most recently in the
Court's review of liquor price affirmation statutes, pursuant to which a state
requires distributors of alcoholic beverages to post a schedule of prices at
which those beverages will be sold to wholesalers within the state and to affirm
that the posted prices are no higher than the prices charged in other states.40 In
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority441 and
437. E.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935); Shafer v. Farmers
Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925). See also Sam Kalen, Reawakening the Dormant
Commerce Clause in its First Century, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 417, 452-62 (1988) (arguing
that concepts of territorial sovereignty were one factor affecting the validity of state statutes in
nineteenth century Supreme Court cases).
438. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580-82 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 640, 642-43 (1982) (White, J.). See Kalen, supra note 437, at 422 (arguing that
CTS and Brown-Forman represent a newly emerging concern over the extraterritorial effect of
state regulations, resurrecting constitutional theory that has long been eroded).
439. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 578-79.
440. See Healy, 491 U.S. 324; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. 573.
441. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
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Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc.,442 the Supreme Court held that such statutes vio-
lated the Commerce Clause because the statutes had the practical effect of con-
trolling prices in other states.443 According to the Court, a state "may regulate
the sale of liquor within its borders, and may seek low prices for its residents,
[but] it may not 'project its legislation into [other States] by regulating the price
to be paid' for liquor in those States."4" Healy summarized this territorialist
view of the negative Commerce Clause:
First, the "Commerce Clause ... precludes the application of a state
statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's bor-
ders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State"; and,
specifically, a State may not adopt legislation that has the practical effect
of establishing "a scale of prices for use in other states .... " Second, a
statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the
boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State's
authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterrito-
rial reach was intended by the legislature. The critical inquiry is
whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct
beyond the boundaries of the State.445
It is unclear what to make of these cases. Healy hints that these principles
are not inexorable, but are based on specific calculations of burdens on com-
merce. 46 Furthermore, all of the new territorial cases involve discrimination
against interstate commerce, 447 economic protectionism,448 or the possibility of
inconsistent regulation.449 Thus, these laws would have been subjected to
stricter scrutiny even in the absence of their extraterritoriality. It is unclear
whether the Court would actually subject a state statute to strict scrutiny merely
because of its extraterritoriality, where it is neither discriminatory nor
designed to protect local economic interests.
Assuming that the Court meant what it said, the application of an abor-
tion statute to an out-of-state doctor performing an out-of-state abortion would
clearly be extraterritorial and therefore unconstitutional. This would apparently
be true even if the regulating state could demonstrate that the out-of-state abor-
tion affected the regulating state's interests. 450
442. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
443. E.g., id. at 337-39.
444. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 582-83.
445. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (citations omitted).
446. After reciting the rules quoted above, the Court writes,
We further recognized in Brown-Forman that the critical consideration in
determining whether the extraterritorial reach of a statute violates the Commerce
Clause is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate commerce.
Our distillation of principles from prior cases involving extraterritoriality is meant
as nothing more than a restatement of those specific concerns that have shaped
this inquiry.
Id at 337 n.14.
447. Id. at 340-41.
448. Id. at 339; Brown-Fonnan Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579-80.
449. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 583; Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624 (1982) (White, J.). See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 88
(1987) (reading the plurality opinion in Edgar v. MITE Corp. as based on the problem of
inconsistent regulation).
450. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336; Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642-43.
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The application of an extraterritorial abortion statute to the woman
seeking the abortion is more likely to be upheld.4 51 The new territorial
Commerce Clause cases have recognized that states have legitimate interests in
protecting their residents, 452 and it is clear that a legitimate interest in protect-
ing residents from something other than economic competition can justify some
extraterritoriality. The Supreme Court has consistently distinguished "between
the power of the State to shelter its people from menaces to their health or
safety ..., even when those dangers emanate from interstate commerce, and its
lack of power to retard, burden or constrict the flow of such commerce for
their economic advantage."453 For example, in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc.,454 the Court rejected as a direct burden on interstate commerce a state law
that prohibited the sale of milk imported into New York unless an acceptable
price was paid to the out-of-state milk producers. The Court found that the law
was not designed to further any health or safety interest, 455 but indicated, in
dictum, that extraterritoriality would be more acceptable if such an interest
were served. To protect its interest in sanitary precautions in producing milk,
the Court said, "[a]ppropriate certificates may be exacted from farmers in
Vermont and elsewhere; milk may be excluded if necessary safeguards have
been omitted." 456 Thus, the same type of extraterritorial control that was
rejected if designed to further economic ends was acceptable to further health
ends. An extraterritorial abortion statute, designed to protect the resident fetus
from physical harm, might take advantage of this distinction.
The contrast between two cases involving state anti-takeover statutes
further illustrates the Court's recognition of states' interest in protecting their
own residents. In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,457 the Court struck down an Illinois
law directly regulating hostile tender offers for companies with certain connec-
tions to Illinois. The plurality opinion condemned the statute's "sweeping
extraterritorial effect," 458 pointing out that the Illinois law could apply to an
out-of-state corporation having no shareholders residing in Illinois. 459 In the
only portion of the opinion commanding a majority, Justice White wrote,
"While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State
has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders." 46° Five years
later, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,461 the Court approved an
anti-takeover statute limiting the stock voting rights of shareholders trying to
gain hostile control of Indiana corporations. The statute clearly might burden
interstate tender offers, but the Court distinguished MITE because, unlike the
statute in MITE, the Indiana act applied only to Indiana corporations, and
451. For analysis tentatively reaching the same conclusion as that expressed in the text,
although on slightly different grounds, see Regan, supra note 14, at 1912.
452. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 580; Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644 (White,
J.).
453. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949). See also supra
notes 427-28 and accompanying teXt.
454. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
455. Id at 523.
456. Itd at 524.
457. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
458. Id at 642 (White, J3.).
459. Id.
460. Id at 644 (White, J.).
461. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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[m]oreover, unlike the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE, the Indiana
Act applies only to corporations that have a substantial number of
shareholders in Indiana. Thus, every application of the Indiana Act will
affect a substantial number of Indiana residents, whom Indiana indis-
putably has an interest in protecting. 6 2
Similarly, an extraterritorial abortion statute would apply only to the state's
residents and only to protect resident fetuses, whom the state indisputably has
an interest in protecting. The state's interest in protecting the non-economic
interests of its residents might sufficiently distinguish an extraterritorial abor-
tion statute from the extraterritorial regulations disapproved by the recent
Commerce Clause cases.
Also, if the statute, instead of prohibiting the abortion itself, prohibits the
woman from leaving the state to obtain the abortion, the statute is no longer
purely extraterritorial. By analogy to the Sixth Amendment cases, the crime
(leaving) then occurs, in part, in the regulating state, and the Court's rejection
of extraterritoriality is arguably irrelevant. The question then becomes whether
it is constitutional to restrict the woman's right to travel in this manner, a ques-
tion I deal with in a later section. 463 However, it is not clear if the Commerce
Clause concept of territoriality is equivalent to the Sixth Amendment concept of
territoriality. Language in some of the most recent Commerce Clause cases
focuses on whether the "practical effect" of the state law is to regulate com-
merce wholly outside of the state's borders.4 64 The Court has not defined
"practical effect," but it could mean that a state may not do indirectly what it
cannot do directly. Although a statute making it criminal to leave the state to
obtain an abortion does not directly prohibit the extraterritorial transaction, its
"practical effect" may be to do so. This argument is consistent with the case that
introduced the "practical effect" language, Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona.465
The Southern Pacific case involved an Arizona restriction on the length of
trains that applied only within the state of Arizona. In spite of the law's terri-
torial limit, the Court held that it was an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce. However, given the Court's limited definition of the "practical
effect" terminology, applying it to an extraterritorial abortion statute is little
more than supposition.
Other than right-to-travel cases,46 6 which are sometimes premised on the
Commerce Clause but are discussed in a separate section of this article, there
are almost no Commerce Clause cases involving statutes prohibiting a citizen
from leaving a state to engage in a particular activity elsewhere 4 67 There are
cases holding that states generally may not prohibit the exportation of com-
modities to other states.468 However, there are at least two important differ-
462. Id. at 93.
463. See infra part VIII.
464. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 332, 336 (1989); Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643.
465. 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945).
466. See infra part VIII.
467. One such case is Riis v. Commonwealth, 418 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1967), where the
court rejected, with little discussion or analysis, a Commerce Clause challenge to a state statute
making it a crime to unlawfully transport others beyond the bounds of the state.
468. E.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (state
prohibition on selling outside the state hydroelectric energy generated within the state); Hughes
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (state statute prohibiting transportation or shipment for sale
out of state of minnows obtained from state waters). See also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
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ences between those cases and a prohibition on leaving the state for the purpose
of obtaining an extraterritorial abortion. First, the motivation behind prohibi-
tions on exportation is generally economic protectionism-the state is benefit-
ting local consumers and producers at the expense of out-of-state consumers
and producers. A prohibition on leaving the state to obtain an abortion would
not have the purpose or effect of protecting the economic interests of local con-
sumers or producers, but instead would be motivated by a health interest-
protecting the resident fetus. Second, cases striking down prohibitions on
exportation often involve discrimination against interstate commerce-state law
bans only export of the product, not its internal sale or use.469 The Court's
opinion in Hughes v. Oklahoma470 is instructive in this regard. Hughes held
unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the shipment for sale outside
the state of minnows obtained from Oklahoma waters. The Court recognized
the legitimacy of the state's interest in preserving its minnow population,4 71 but
refused to allow Oklahoma to protect that interest in a discriminatory manner.
The Court suggested instead a less discriminatory alternative, such as a general
prohibition on taking or disposing of minnows within the state.472 This is pre-
cisely how an extraterritorial abortion statute would work-it would not dis-
criminate against those leaving the state, but it would prohibit state citizens
from obtaining abortions either within or without the state. The Court
approved such an evenhanded prohibition in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas.473 Sporhase approved, in part, a Nebraska statute that restricted the
withdrawal of groundwater intended for use in an adjoining state.4 74 The Court
noted that the statute imposed similar restrictions on water withdrawn for use
within Nebraska and concluded that the state was not discriminating against
interstate commerce:
Obviously, a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions
on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate commerce
when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out of the
State. An exemption for interstate transfers would be inconsistent with
the ideal of evenhandedness in regulation.475
In reaching this result, the Court specifically noted the distinction between
health and safety regulation, on the one hand, and economic protectionism, on
the other hand.476 Thus, a prohibition on leaving the state to obtain an abortion
might survive because it is not discriminatory and it is intended to promote
health rather than economic interests.
Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (involving the state's denial of a license for a milk plant that would
receive milk to be shipped out of state).
469. E.g., New England Power Co., 455 U.S. 331; Hughes, 441 U.S. 322.
470. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
471. Id. at 337.
472. Id at 338.
473. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
474. The Court struck down the portion of the statute that limited exportation to states that
granted reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport water to Nebraska. Id. at 957-58.
475. lId at 955-56.
476. The Court stated that
a State's power to regulate the use of water in times and places of shortage for the
purpose of protecting the health of its citizens-and not simply the health of its
economy-is at the core of its police power. For Commerce Clause purposes, we
have long recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on the one
hand, and health and safety regulations, on the other.
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VIII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Another possible constitutional argument against an extraterritorial
abortion statute is that it might violate the woman's constitutional right to
travel. 477 The Supreme Court has long recognized a constitutional right to
travel among the states,478 although the textual source of that right is unclear.479
In Crandall v. Nevada,480 the Court wrote that "[w]e are all citizens of the
United States, and as members of the same community must have the right to
pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our
own States."481 All citizens must be free to engage in such travel, "uninhibited
by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this
movement." 48 2 State laws may restrict or burden the right to travel only if they
serve a sufficiently compelling governmental interest.483
The exact standard for reviewing state-imposed burdens on the right to
travel is unclear. In Shapiro v. Thompson,484 the Supreme Court required a
"compelling governmental interest" to justify restrictions on the right to
travel 485 But in Jones v. Helms,48 6 the Court apparently applied a rational basis
standard487 Later cases are no more helpful. The Court either avoided deciding
what the standard is by concluding that the state law did not even meet the
rational basis standard488 or was unable to produce a majority opinion. 48 9
Whatever the standard, an extraterritorial abortion standard would probably
not be an unconstitutional restriction on the right to travel.
Most of the cases involving the right to travel involve laws restricting or
discouraging the entry of non-residents into the state.490 These statutes present a
Id at 956.
477. Justice Blackmun's opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey recognizes a possible
right-to-travel problem if Roe is overruled. He asks, "What effect w9uld differences among
States in their approaches to abortion have on a woman's right to engage in interstate travel?"
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2854 n.12 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun neither
explains nor answers his question.
478. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). See generally NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 325, § 14.38.
479. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 325, at 300-03; Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S.
412, 418-19 (1981). See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630 ("We have no occasion to ascribe the
source of this right ... to a particular constitutional provision.").
480. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
481. Id. at 49.
482. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
483. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 325, at 873.
484. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
485. Id at 634.
486. 452 U.S. 412 (1981).
487. lId at 422-23.
488. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55, 60-62 (1982).
489. In the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement, Attorney General of New York v.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904-07 (1986) (Brennan, J.), four justices concluded that a
compelling governmental interest must be shown.
490. E.g., Hooper, 472 U.S. 612 (state property tax exemption conditioned on residency
in the state before a certain date); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (state statutes
denying welfare benefits to persons who had not resided within the jurisdiction for at least a
year); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 170 (1941) (state statute penalizing bringing a non-
resident indigent person into the state). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 325,
§ 14.38 (collecting right-to-travel cases).
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concern not applicable to statutes preventing residents from leaving the state.
With respect to the former, there is no inner political check: The non-residents
burdened by the regulation had no voice in the political process through which
the provision was enacted.4 91 Residents, on the other hand, have a weaker
complaint against burdens on travel imposed by their own legislature because
residents elect the legislators and have political power to remove the burdens
imposed. However, not all of the Supreme Court's right-to-travel cases have
involved restrictions on non-residents; some involve burdens on a resident's
right to travel elsewhere 4 92 One of the earliest right-to-travel cases, Crandall
v. Nevada,493 struck down a state law imposing a capitation tax of one dollar on
every person leaving the state "by any railroad, stage coach, or other vehicle
engaged or employed in the business of transporting passengers for hire."494
Although Crandall's narrow holding is suspect, at least where the state has a
legitimate public purpose for enacting the tax,495 the view that the right to
travel protects the right to leave, as well as to enter, the state remains unchal-
lenged.
The Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Helms 496 deserves special
attention. Jones involved a Georgia statute that made it a misdemeanor for a
parent to willfully and voluntarily abandon his or her dependent child.497 The
same statute made it a felony for a parent to abandon the child and thereafter
leave the state.498 The Court held that the statute, as applied to a parent who was
a resident of Georgia,499 did not unconstitutionally impair the right to travel.
The Court held that the appellee's criminal conduct in Georgia prior to
leaving "necessarily qualified his right thereafter freely to travel interstate"500
and thus rendered the case on a different footing from the claims in the earlier
right-to-travel cases. 501 This rationale would not support a state statute making
it a crime to leave the state for an extraterritorial abortion. At the time she left
the state to obtain an abortion, a woman would not have already committed a
separate crime in her state of domicile (other than merely leaving, which
clearly could not be absolutely prohibited).502 Thus, the Court's analogies in
Jones to criminal extradition and laws restricting the mobility of persons con-
victed of crimes503 would be inapposite.
However, the Jones Court gave a second rationale for approving the
statute. According to the Court, "a restriction that is rationally related to the
offense itself-either to the procedure for ascertaining guilt or innocence, or to
the imposition of a proper punishment or remedy-must be within the State's
491. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975); Edwards, 314 U.S. at 174.
492. Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981); Evansville-Vandenburgh Airport Auth. Dist.
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
493. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
494. Id. at 36.
495. See Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (distinguishing Crandall and upholding state
per-passenger service charges on airlines using public airports in the state).
496. 452 U.S. 412 (1981).
497. Id, at 413.
498. Id.
499. The Court expressed no opinion as to whether the statute could constitutionally be
applied to a non-resident parent. Id. at 417-18 n.11.
500. Il at 421.
501. Id.
502. "[A] simple penalty for leaving a state is plainly impermissible." Id. at 422.
503. Id at 419.
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power."50 4 Thus, "if departure aggravates the consequences of conduct that is
otherwise punishable, the State may treat the entire sequence of events, from
the initial offense to departure from the State, as more serious than its separate
components."505 Since the state had an unarguably legitimate interest in having
parents support their children, and since departure made that obligation more
difficult to enforce, the additional penalty was justified. 06
A state might similarly argue that departure from the state makes it more
difficult, in fact impossible, for the state to enforce its interest in protecting the
unborn fetus. Therefore, the state should be able to prevent that departure for
the purpose of circumventing the statutory obligation not to injure the fetus.
The state's argument that an extraterritorial abortion statute does not
impermissibly infringe upon the right to travel is even stronger than the argu-
ment in Jones. First, an extraterritorial abortion statute would more carefully
tie the restriction on travel to the state interest. Unlike the statute in Jones, an
extraterritorial abortion statute would not absolutely bar the pregnant woman
from leaving the state; she could travel freely as long as her purpose was not to
obtain an abortion. Second, unlike the statute in Jones, an extraterritorial abor-
tion statute would not place a greater burden on those who travel than on those
who do not. Pregnant women residing in the state would face the same penalties
and restrictions whether they had the abortion within the state or travelled to
another state for the abortion. In Jones, the statute penalized parents leaving the
state more than those who stayed.507 Rather than burdening the right to travel,
an extraterritorial abortion statute merely equalizes the burden on those who
travel with the burden on those who do not.
This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's most recent explana-
tion of the right to travel in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,508 a
case which also involved the right to an abortion. The plaintiffs in Bray argued
that the defendants' attempts to block access to abortion clinics deprived women
of their constitutional rights, including the right to travel, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1985.
The plaintiffs in Bray pointed out that substantial numbers of women
trying to reach the blockaded clinics were from other states, and argued that the
blockade therefore deprived these women of their right to interstate travel.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion disagreed. Justice Scalia stated that the right to
travel only protects interstate travelers against two sets of burdens: (1) "the
erection of actual barriers to interstate movement;" 509 and (2) "being treated
differently from intrastate travelers."510 Since the blockaders did not discrimi-
nate against women from other states, Justice Scalia held that the right of inter-
state travel was not implicated. 511 The majority apparently accepted the charac-
504. IM at 422.
505. IM at 422-23.
506. Id. at423.
507. This sounds like the discriminatory treatment analysis used in Commerce Clause
cases. See supra part VII.B. That should not be surprising because the Commerce Clause has
been used as one of the textual bases for the right to travel. E.g., Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941). But see Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 763 n.7
(1993) (concluding that the right to travel does not derive from the Commerce Clause).
508. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
509. Id at 763 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,60 n.6 (1982)).
510. Id. (quoting Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n.6).
511. Id.
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terization in Justice Stevens' dissent that "even an intentional restriction on out-
of-state travel is permissible if it imposes an equal burden on intrastate
travel."5 12
A prohibition on extraterritorial abortion apparently survives the Bray
analysis. Such a statute would-not bar the pregnant woman's interstate move-
ment and, since in-state abortions would also be prohibited, interstate travelers
would be treated no differently from intrastate travelers.
Several lower court cases have approved federal statutes making it a
crime to travel interstate for the purpose of doing something unlawful in
another state. These cases are relevant because the Supreme Court has held that
the constitutional right to travel restricts both the federal and state govern-
ments.5 1 3 Two lower court cases held that a federal statute making it unlawful
to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to incite, organize, promote, or
encourage a riot did not violate the 'constitutional right to travel. 5 14 Another
case upheld a federal statute making it unlawful to travel in interstate commerce
to further an unlawful activity. 515 These cases held that the government's inter-
est in the underlying unlawful activity justified an interference with travel in
aid of that activity.516 One might argue that a state has no legitimate govern-
mental interest in preventing the wrongful action in another state and thus no
compelling governmental interest to justify restricting travel. That issue, how-
ever, goes to the question of criminal jurisdiction, discussed earlier. If the state
has a legitimate, otherwise constitutional, interest in controlling abortions per-
formed on its residents out of the state (in other words, if the state law survives
full faith and credit, due process, and Commerce Clause challenges), these
lower court cases would arguably allow the infringement on the right to travel.
Cases involving restrictions on a custodial parent's right to take a child to
another state51 7 are also analogous. The child custody cases have uniformly held
that a state may constitutionally condition child custody on the custodial parent
remaining in the state, if it is in the best interests of the child to do so. 518
512. li at 793 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf id. at 763 n.7.
513. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969) (applying right-to-travel
restrictions to District of Columbia Code adopted by Congress).
514. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 362 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 970 (1973); United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504, 509 (D.D.C. 1971).
515. United States v. Corallo, 281 F. Supp. 24, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
516. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 362; Corallo, 281 F. Supp. at 28.
517. E.g., Miller v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App. 1977), vacated, 587
P.2d 723 (Cal. 1978); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 691 P.2d 773 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985); Clark v. Atkins,
489 N.E.2d 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Carlson v. Carlson, 661 P.2d 833 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983);
Le Bouef v. Fontenot, 390 So. 2d 266 (La. Ct. App. 1980); In re Marriage of Cole, 729 P.2d
1276 (Mont. 1986); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1991); Alfieri v. Alfieri, 733
P.2d 4 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); McRae v. Carbno, 404 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1987).
518. Ziegler, 691 P.2d at 779-81; Clark, 489 N.E.2d at 99-100; Carlson, 661 P.2d at
836; Le Bouef, 390 So. 2d at 269; Alfieri, 733 P.2d at 7-8; McRae, 404 N.W.2d at 509. See
also Miller, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 130 (rejecting right-to-travel challenge to Australian court order
that required court approval to move the children outside of Australia); Cole, 729 P.2d at 1280-
81 (approving district court's refusal to impose such a restriction, but stating that such a
restriction would be constitutional if in the best interests of the child); Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at
305-07 (agreeing that the parent's right to travel may be infringed if in the best interests of the
child, but finding sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that the move was in
the child's best interests). See generally Anne L. Spitzer, Moving and Storage of Postdivorce
Children: Relocation, the Constitution, and the Courts, 1985 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1, 18-31; Blair W.
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Although these are not criminal cases, they do involve the deprivation of the
parent's important, constitutionally protected interest in the child,519 an interest
that presumably approaches the liberty interest present in criminal cases.
Some of these cases have argued that such restrictions do not impair the
custodial parent's right to travel because "[s]he is free to travel as she pleases
without the children." 20 This argument simply misses the point:521 "[ii]t makes
no difference that the parent who wishes to relocate is not prohibited outright
from doing so; a legal rule that operates to chill the exercise of the right, absent
a sufficient state interest to do so, is as impermissible as one that bans exercise
of the right altogether. 522 And, "[ult is certainly an inhibition of the constitu-
tional right if one has to choose between its exercise and having custody of
one's child." 523
The better argument is that made by most of such cases-that the state
has a compelling interest in the welfare of the child, which warrants interfer-
ence with the constitutional right to travel.524 Where such a move would
deprive the other parent of reasonable visitation rights and thus deprive the
children of "the parental love, affection, support, guidance and companionship
to which they were entitled,"525 restrictions on travel are justified. 526
If a state's interest in protecting a minor child from psychological harm
is sufficient to justify restrictions on the right to travel, it seems unquestionable
that a state's interest in protecting an unborn fetus from injury would justify
such restrictions. The state arguably has a greater interest in protecting children
after birth than in protecting fetuses before birth, but this difference is dwarfed
by the offsetting difference in magnitude of the possible harms. In the custody
cases, no physical harm, certainly not death, is threatened; the injury is to the
child's psychological well-being and development. In the abortion cases, the
mother is threatening to destroy the fetus entirely. If Roe is overruled and the
state's interest in protecting the fetus is no longer offset by the mother's liberty
interest in the abortion, it would be difficult not to conclude that the state's
protective interest is compelling.
Further, the state in the abortion case has a much stronger argument that
it is not infringing on the mother's right to travel at all. Unlike the custody
cases, where the custodial parent would lose the children by choosing to move
to another state, the pregnant woman in the abortion case loses nothing if she
chooses to travel interstate. She pays no penalty for the travel itself; the only
question is what she may do when she goes elsewhere. Leaving the state is not
Hoffman, Note, Restrictions on a Parent's Right to Travel in Child Custody Cases: Possible
Constitutional Questions, 6 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 181, 189-93 (1973).
519. E.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1953).
520. Miller, 138"Cal. Rptr. at 130. Accord Clark, 489 N.E.2d at 100.
521. Spitzer, supra note 518 at 26, 28.
522. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 306.
523. Hoffman, supra note 518, at 191 n.67.
524. E.g., Ziegler, 691 P.2d at 780; Clark, 489 N.E.2d at 100; Carlson, 661 P.2d at 836;
Cole, 729 P.2d at 1280-81. See Spitzer, supra note 518, at 27 (arguing that this may be a
compelling state interest that could justify infringement of the right to travel if the evidence
supports the need for such an infringement and no less restrictive means are available);
Hoffman, supra note 518, at 191-92 (same).
525. Ziegler, 691 P.2d at 780-81.
526. Id.; Clark, 489 N.E.2d at 100; Cole, 729 P.2d at 1280-81; Alfieri, 733 P.2d at 8;
McRae, 404 N.W.2d at 509-10.
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itself a crime unless she thereafter has an abortion. In fact, if, as in the custody
cases, she wants to move to the other state, she faces no restriction at all on her
actions because the prohibition would only apply to extraterritorial abortions
by domiciliaries. Thus, it seems clear that, if the custody cases are correct, pe-
nalizing the pregnant woman for an extraterritorial abortion would not violate
her right to travel.
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic is not the Supreme Court's
only right-to-travel case involving abortion. In Doe v. Bolton,527 decided at the
same time as Roe, the Court considered a challenge to a Georgia statute that,
among other things, provided that abortions could be performed in Georgia
only on Georgia residents. The Court held, with little discussion, that this resi-
dency requirement was an unconstitutional violation of the right to travel,
because it denied to nonresidents the general medical care available to Georgia
residents. 28
One might argue that the holding in Doe supports its mirror image: If a
state cannot prevent non-residents from entering the state to obtain an abortion,
it also cannot prevent residents from exiting the state to obtain an abortion. On
closer examination, however, there are strong differences between the two
cases.529 In Doe, the state was discriminating against non-residents, prohibiting
them from obtaining a medical procedure available to Georgia residents. As
Bray recently indicated, the right to travel protects interstate travelers from
"'being treated differently' from intrastate travelers." 530 In the case of an ex-
traterritorial abortion statute, there is no discrimination. The state prohibits
both residents and non-residents from obtaining abortions within the state, and
prohibits its residents from obtaining abortions whether they travel intrastate or
interstate.
A second distinction focuses on the state's interest in regulation. When
Doe was decided, Roe had just held that states had no legitimate interest in gen-
erally prohibiting abortions, even abortions performed within the state. State
statutes prohibiting or regulating abortion can exist at all only to the extent that
the Court overrules or limits Roe and recognizes such a state interest. Once the
state interest in protecting the unborn fetus is recognized, the only issue is
whether that interest is sufficiently compelling to justify state infringement of
the right to travel. Doe never had to reach this issue because (1) Georgia could
hardly argue that it had a compelling state interest in protecting the fetuses of
non-resident pregnant women when it allowed its own residents to obtain abor-
tions and (2) in any event, Roe rejected as insufficient the only potentially com-
pelling state interest.
There is dictum in another Supreme Court case indicating that a state
may not regulate abortions extraterritorially. Bigelow v. Virginia5 31 was a First
Amendment challenge to a Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor to encour-
age or prompt, by the sale or circulation of any publication, the procuring of
an abortion. At issue was an advertisement in a Virginia newspaper for a New
527. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
528. Id at 200.
529. See Regan, supra note 14, at 1907 (recognizing that the two issues are "quite
different," without discussing that difference).
530. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 763 (1993).
531. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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York abortion placement service. 532 The Court held that the Virginia statute
violated the First Amendment and, in the course of its opinion, said the follow-
ing:
The Virginia Legislature could not have regulated the advertiser's
activity in New York, and obviously could not have proscribed the
activity in that State. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892).
Neither could Virginia prevent its residents from traveling to New York
to obtain those services or, as the State conceded, Tr. of Oral Arg. 29,
prosecute them for going there. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757-759 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631
(1969); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 200.533
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, argued that the
majority's attempt "to impose a rigid and unthinking territorial limitation,
whose constitutional source is unspecified, on the power of the States to regu-
late conduct ... is plainly wrong."534 Justice Rehnquist argued that this territo-
riality was "quite at war with our prior cases."535 On this point, the Rehnquist
dissent clearly has the better argument; the majority's rigid territorial view is
not supported by either the prior case law or the cases decided since Bigelow.
There are several reasons to minimize the language in Bigelow. 536 It is,
of course, dictum, and, as indicated in the quote, the proposition stated appears
not to have been challenged by the state. Its value is weakened further by its
apparent inconsistency with many of the other Supreme Court cases discussed in
this article. 537 In addition, it is dictum from a Court that no longer exists. Of
the justices remaining from the Bigelow Court, there is now a 2-1 majority in
favor of the dissenL538
However, there is an easy explanation for this dictum, an explanation that
makes it clearly correct, yet consistent with the rest of the Court's jurispru-
dence. The dictum in Bigelow relies on right-to-travel cases, which require a
"compelling governmental interest" to justify restrictions on the constitutional
right to travel. 539 Bigelow was decided after Roe, which generally denied to
states the right to prohibit abortions. Thus, when Bigelow was decided, a state
could not prosecute a resident for obtaining an abortion, whether the abortion
was performed within or without the state. The Court's dictum is, therefore,
literally true. In terms of the right-to-travel cases, there is no compelling gov-
ernmental interest in preventing residents from traveling elsewhere for abor-
tion services because, under Roe, there is no compelling governmental interest
in preventing abortions anywhere. If Roe is overruled, and a state has a gov-
ernmental interest in prohibiting or regulating abortions within the state, one
532. IdL at 811-12.
533. Id. at 822-24 (footnote omitted).
534. Id. at 834 n. 2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
535. Id. Justice Rehnquist cites several cases discussed earlier in this article, including
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911), Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912), and
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
536. See also Regan, supra note 14, at 1907-08. For an argument that the Bigelow view
on territoriality is consistent with constitutional history, see Kreimer, supra note 16, at 464-519.
537. See supra parts IV-V.
538. Of the majority in Bigelow, only the author of the opinion, Justice Blackmun,
remains on the Court. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Stewart, Powell, Douglas,
and Brennan have all resigned. Both of the dissenters, Justices Rehnquist and White, remain.
539. See supra text accompanying notes 482-89.
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must determine whether that interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the
restriction on the right to travel. This is a question that Bigelow did not need to
address.
The Bigelow majority probably would not have accepted this limitation
on its dictum, for the opinion goes on to broadly state that "[a] State does not
acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely
because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected when they
travel to that State."540 However, this language, if ever adopted as a holding,
would overrule a substantial body of Sixth Amendment, full faith and credit,
due process, and criminal jurisdiction precedent. The Bigelow dictum is trou-
blesome, but it is hard to believe that the modem Court would follow it.
Thus, if Roe is overruled, a state could constitutionally prohibit its own
residents from exiting the state to obtain abortions, as long as it equally prohib-
ited abortions within the state. If the Court is true to its right-to-travel hold-
ings, an extraterritorial abortion statute would probably pass constitutional
muster.
IX. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM
Even if an extraterritorial abortion statute does not violate any of the
specific constitutional prohibitions discussed above, it might nevertheless be
unconstitutional because of its inconsistency with our federal system. The
Supreme Court has at times been willing to strike down legislation based on its
violation of principles of federalism.
However, most of the cases resting expressly on principles of federalism
have involved the imposition of federal legislative power on the states and lim-
its on that federal power.541 Such cases find their constitutional source in the
Tenth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 542 The Tenth Amendment,
of course, is an unlikely source of limits on state power. Its express purpose is
to reserve power to the states unless the Constitution prohibits them from
exercising such powers. If anything, the Tenth Amendment supports an argu-
ment that, unless it violates one of the express constitutional provisions dis-
cussed earlier, a state is free to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.543
540. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975).
541. E.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See also Evans v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 1901-03 (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that principles of federalism justify a narrow construction of
the Federal Hobbs Act).
For a more general discussion of the limits our system of federalism places on the
national government, see Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Fowders' Design,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987); H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of
Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987); RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE
FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987). See also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988) (arguing that the
guarantee of a republican form of government in art. IV, § 4 of the Constitution imposes limits
on federal power).
542. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
543. Pielemeier, supra note 173, at 408.
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Some scholars have taken the position that the needs of our federal sys-
tem should constrain a state's application of its own law,5U4 including its crimi-
na law.545 At least some of the Justices on the Supreme Court have argued that
general principles of federalism constrain state choice of law in some instances.
In Nevada v. Hall,546 California residents were injured in a collision in
California with a vehicle owned by the University of Nevada. They sued the
state of Nevada in California state court, and the California courts refused to
apply a Nevada statute limiting to $25,000 any tort recovery against Nevada. 547
The majority decided that California's refusal to apply the Nevada immunity
rule did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause;548 it then had to deal with
Nevada's argument that a limitation on California's power was implicit in the
Constitution: "Even apart from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Nevada argues
that the Constitution implicitly establishes a Union in which the States are not
free to treat each other as unfriendly sovereigns." 549 Although the Court hinted
that the result might be different if the infringement on Nevada's sovereignty
was greater,550 the majority soundly rejected Nevada's argument. The Court
noted that it might be "wise policy" for California to grant Nevada immu-
nity,551 but argued that a holding requiring California to do so "would consti-
tute the real intrusion on the sovereignty of the States."552 The majority noted
specific limitations on state power in the Constitution, then added:
Each of these provisions places a specific limitation on the sovereignty
of the several States. Collectively they demonstrate that ours is not a
union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns. But these provisions do not
imply that any one State's immunity from suit in the courts of another
State is anything other than a matter of comity. Indeed, in view of the
Tenth Amendment's reminder that powers not delegated to the Federal
544. E.g., LEFLAR Er AL., supra note 54, at 292-93. These authors argue that
The great political interest of our states, apart from mere preference for local law
and local persons, is primarily in a need for systematization, for an orderliness
that will make our federal system work with reasonable efficiency. Deliberate
preference for local law and local persons, unaccompanied by independentjustification, is a disregard of this interest.
The free and unpenalized movement of people and goods from state to
state, and freedom in commercial intercourse, are necessary to the success of our
federal system, and it is part of the law's task to assure these advantages.
Deference to sister state law in situations in which the sister state's substantial
contacts with a problem give it a real interest in having its law applied, even
though the forum state also has an identifiable interest, will at times usefully
further this part of the law's total task.
Id (footnote omitted). However, they do not contend that deference beyond that required by
specific provisions of the Constitution is constitutionally required. They admit that such
considerations "are not (not yet, at least) hardened into constitutional limitations." Id. at 292.
545. Donald Regan argues that limits on the extraterritorial application of state law do not
fit within any of the express constitutional provisions, Regan, supra note 14, at 1888-95, but
are justified "by a structural inference from our system as a whole." Id. at 1895. However,
Professor Regan tentatively concludes that a state law preventing a woman from obtaining an
abortion in another state would not violate such territorial limits. Id. at 1912. The Supreme Court
cases upon which Professor Regan relies are expressly grounded in the Commerce Clause, and I
have therefore chosen to deal with them in that section of the article. See supra part VII.
546. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
547. California had waived its own sovereign immunity for tort actions. Id. at 424.
548. Id. at 421-24.
549. Id. at 424-25.
550. Id. at 424 n.24.
551. Id. at 426.
552. Id. at 426-27.
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Government nor prohibited to the States are reserved to the States or to
the people, the existence of express limitations on state sovereignty may
equally imply that caution should be exercised before concluding that
unstated limitations on state power were intended by the Framers.553
The three dissenters argued that Nevada's sovereign immunity was "a
guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism. ' '554 Justice
Blackmun pointed out that the "concept of sovereign immunity prevailed at the
time" the Constitution was drafted555 and argued that it was not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution only because "it was too obvious to deserve men-
tion."556 Justice Rehnquist similarly argued that sovereign immunity was one of
those "important concepts of sovereignty that do not find expression in the lit-
eral terms of those provisions, but which are of constitutional dimension
because their derogation would undermine the logic of the constitutional
scheme." 57 Even in the absence of an express textual limitation on state power,
Justice Rehnquist argued, the Court could rely upon "the implicit ordering of
relationships within the federal system necessary to make the Constitution a
workable governing charter and to give each provision within that document
the full effect intended by the Framers." 558
This argument has not been accepted by a majority of the Court, and,
given the structure of the Constitution, it is hard to see why it should be, at least
in this context. As shown above, the drafters of the Constitution placed numer-
ous textual limits on a state's application of its criminal law. Given the Tenth
Amendment's reservation of power to the states, it is hard to believe that those
who drafted these express limitations intended other limitations on state power
to arise amorphously from the penumbrous mists surrounding the system they
created. The Supreme Court may have misconstrued the specific restrictions the
founders imposed on the states, particularly the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
but that hardly justifies adding to the founders' handiwork.
X. TBE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LESSER RESTRICTIONS IF
ROE Is NOT OVERRULED
To this point, I have assumed that Roe v. WVade has been overruled and
that a state would be totally free to restrict, or regulate, abortion within the
state. But what if Roe is not overruled? Would regulation of the sort approved
in Casey be constitutional if it were applied extraterritorially? Would it be
constitutional for a state to provide, for example, that minors resident in the
state must obtain parental consent, or that resident women must wait twenty-
four hours, before obtaining an abortion outside the state of residence?
Although that is not the main focus of this article, much of what is said above
would apply to lesser restrictions as well.
The analysis of some of the constitutional limitations does not change at
all. The Sixth Amendment would locate the crime in the same jurisdictions
whether or not Roe was overruled. Nothing in the Supreme Court's Sixth
553. Id. at 425 (footnote omitted).
554. IM at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
555. Id at 431 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
556. Id.
557. Id at 439 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
558. Id. at 433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Amendment cases turns on the legitimacy of the state's policy interest in regu-
lating or whether there are other constitutional restrictions on that policy inter-
est. The same may be said with respect to any restrictions that might arise from
general principles of federalism. The state may either regulate extraterritorially
or it may not; whether the scope of that regulation is limited for other reasons
is irrelevant.
However, the continued acceptance of a woman's constitutional right to
an abortion might affect the analysis of those constitutional provisions with
respect to which the Supreme Court considers the state's policy interest. The
right-to-travel cases require the Court to balance a compelling governmental
interest against the burden on the right to travel.559 The Court's due process
and full faith and credit cases require that a state have significant contacts creat-
ing a policy interest. 560 The balancing portion of the Commerce Clause analysis
requires the Court to balance the benefits of the state regulation against the
burdens on interstate commerce. 561 It could be argued that the woman's offset-
ting constitutionally protected right to abortion weakens the state's policy inter-
est and thus changes the balance under these tests.
With respect to the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses, that
argument simply will not work. The Supreme Court's due process/full faith and
credit cases require only that the state have sufficient contacts to create a legit-
imate policy interest; that policy interest need not be strong enough to outweigh
anything else. There simply is no balancing. Thus, even if the state's interest in
protecting the fetus is somehow weakened by the offsetting right to abortion,
the due process/full faith and credit analysis would be unaffected. The state
would still have a legitimate policy interest in applying its law.
In fact, the state interest might even be stronger in the case of restrictiqns
on the rights of minors, such as parental notification or consent statutes. There,
the state not only has an interest in protecting the fetus, but could also assert an
interest in family unity and parental control and a parens patriae interest in
protecting minors from decisions the state deems them incompetent to make.
These additional interests make the state's argument in favor of restrictions on
extraterritorial abortions even more compelling.
The Court does balance the state interest against other concerns in both
the Commerce Clause and the right-to-travel cases, so, if the state interest is
weakened, the balance might swing the other way. However, it is not clear that
Casey's preservation of the woman's constitutional right to an abortion weakens
the state's interest in regulating abortion for Commerce Clause and right-to-
travel purposes. The burden on the pregnant woman is always there, whether
or not that burden is constitutionally recognized. Giving that burden constitu-
tional status does not make the state's interest any less compelling for
Commerce Clause and right-to-travel purposes. If, as Casey says, the state
interest in regulation is sufficiently compelling to overcome the woman's inter-
est in autonomy, could it not also be sufficiently compelling to overcome these
other constitutionally protected interests?
559. See supra part VIII.
560. See supra part IV.
561. See supra part VII.C.
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The only argument to the contrary would necessarily take an additive
view of constitutional rights, pogiting that state regulation is acceptable when it
interferes with one constitutional right or the other, but not when it interferes
with both. Only one Supreme Court case, Employment Division v. Smith,562 a
free exercise case involving the religious use of peyote, has ever expressly
taken this additive view of constitutional rights. In Smith, Justice Scalia's
majority opinion distinguished earlier free exercise cases by arguing that they
were "hybrid" cases, involving not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.563 Justice
Scalia's position apparently is that two or more inadequate constitutional claims
can cumulatively result in unconstitutionality. As Mark Tushnet explains this
additive process,
there may be some circumstances in which a claim based on the Free
Exercise Clause standing alone would not trigger the balancing process,
but a Free Exercise claim joined with another claim would. It is impor-
tant to understand that this model makes sense only on the assumption
that the second claim standing alone would also not trigger the balancing
process, for otherwise it is the second claim alone, and without any
contribution from the Free Exercise claim, that does the work.564
This additive model of constitutional interests so far has only been rec-
ognized by the Court in Smith itself, and it may be theoretically inconsistent
with the Court's views in other areas of constitutional law.565 It is not clear why
a claim that is insufficient when analyzed under each of two separate constitu-
tional provisions attains greater weight when the two provisions are considered
together. The Court itself offers no theoretical justification for this approach,
and some scholars have been skeptical.566 Michael McConnell suggests that the
hybrid, additive approach was created in Smith for the sole purpose of distin-
guishing earlier precedent. 567 My colleague, Richard Duncan, on the other
hand, argues that the additive approach might explain some of the Court's ear-
lier decisions. 568 It remains to be seen whether the Smith additive approach will
survive. If it does, and if it is extended beyond the free exercise cases, it might
support a holding that an extraterritorial abortion statute is unconstitutional.
The Court might decide that a state interest in protecting the fetus, although
sufficient to justify a restriction on the right to an abortion, and sufficient to
justify a restriction on the right to travel, and sufficient to justify a burden on
interstate commerce, is not sufficiently compelling to justify all three burdens
combined. Analysis of that outcome must await further development of the
Smith additive approach.
The case against requiring an out-of-state doctor to comply with restric-
tions such as those approved in Casey is stronger, but for a different reason.
562. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
563. Id at 881.
564. Mark Tushnet, Public and Private Education: Is There a Constitutional Difference?,
1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 71-72.
565. For example, Mark Tushnet argues that the additive approach is inconsistent with the
Court's rejection of Justice Marshall's equal protection analysis. Id. at 72.
566. Id. at 71-72; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109,1121 (1990).
567. McConnell, supra note 566, at 1121.
568. Richard F. Duncan, Religious Freedom in Education, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE
COURTS AND THE LAW 16 (The Rutherford Inst. ed., 1992).
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The Commerce Clause cases require that the state's interest be weighed against
the burden on interstate commerce, and, as I have already demonstrated, 569
lesser restrictions on abortion would burden interstate commerce more than an
absolute prohibition. However, no additional burden on commerce would be
imposed when the statute applies only to the woman, because the out-of-state
doctor would not need to concern himself with whether the patient had com-
plied with her home state's law.
XI. CONCLUSION
In summary, the intuitive reaction against the extraterritorial application
of abortion laws is not wholly justified by the case law. Whether or not Roe is
overruled, a state probably could not constitutionally apply its criminal abor-
tion law to a doctor performing abortions in another state, even if those abor-
tions involve the state's residents. The application of such a statute to the doctor
would probably violate the Commerce Clause and possibly the Sixth
Amendment as well. However, if Roe is overruled, a plausible case could be
made that the application of an abortion statute to a resident woman who goes
to another, more liberal jurisdiction to obtain an abortion would be constitu-
tional. Even if Roe is not overruled, and the Casey plurality's test remains the
law, extraterritoriality would not necessarily be unconstitutional. States then
could not, of course, prohibit abortion entirely, either within or without the
state, but a plausible argument could be made that at least some of the restric-
tions approved in Casey, and particularly parental notification or consent
requirements applicable to minors, could constitutionally be applied extraterri-
torially.
In both instances, I say a "plausible" case, because a definitive answer is
impossible given the vagaries of the Commerce Clause balancing test and the
"significant contacts" test applicable under the Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit Clauses. Additional uncertainty results from the fact that the Supreme
Court simply has not had to deal with many cases involving the extraterritorial
application of criminal law.
The difficulties presented by an extraterritorial abortion statute result
from two conflicting themes running through the cases. One theme, which
appears most prominently in some of the recent Commerce Clause cases, is the
principle of territoriality: a state should exercise legislative jurisdiction only
over events that occur within that state. My purpose in this article has not been
to argue the merits of territorialism; others have argued persuasively that there
should be territorial limits on state regulation. 570 My analysis does show, how-
ever, that in many areas-due process, full faith and credit, the Sixth
Amendment, and, until recently, the Commerce Clause-the Supreme Court has
strayed far from the territorial ideal.57'
569. See supra part VII.C.
570. E.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992); Aaron D.
Twerski, On Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and Constitutional Choice of Law, 10
HOFSTRA L. REV. 149 (1981).
571. Diversions from territorialism that seem relatively minor in civil choice-of-law cases
are magnified in cases such as the one examined in this article, where the interest at stake is
personal liberty rather than "mere" property. For adherents of territorialism, the language of the
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The second theme in these cases, which appears most prominently in the
due process and full faith and credit cases, is not fully consistent with the prin-
ciple of territorial autonomy. The second theme is the legitimate state interest
in protecting its citizens and property from what it perceives to be injury. A
state is not created to protect territory. A state is created to protect people, and
sovereignty in part includes the power of a state over its citizens. But, in a sys-
tem of strict territorialism, the state's interest in its citizens is easily circum-
vented by citizens crossing state lines.'An offender may thus visit upon the state
the effects the state was trying to prevent without actually acting within the
state. This is particularly true where, as in the case of abortion, the "victim" the
state is trying to protect has no choice but to accompany the offender outside
the state.
At some point, the Supreme Court must resolve the tension between these
two opposing themes and decide exactly how far a state may go in regulating
extraterritorially. Given the aggressive way in which some states are testing the
boundaries of constitutionality in the abortion area, an extraterritorial abortion
statute may soon be presented to the Court. Already, volunteers have organized
an "Overground Railroad" network, which offers housing, transportation, and
escorts to women, apparently including minors, seeking to travel out of states
with restrictive abortion laws to states where abortions are more freely avail-
able.572 It is probably only a matter of time before a zealous legislature tries to
prevent state law from being circumvented in this manner. If so, the question of
extraterritoriality will add yet one more issue to the abortion debate that has
consumed this country for the last twenty years.
recent Commerce Clause cases may represent a welcome change of direction that could
eventually reach into the Court's analysis of other parts of the Constitution.
572. Eloise Salholz et al., Abortion Angst, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1992, at 16; Mimi Hall,
Abortion "Railroad" Planned in Case Roe Overturned, USA TODAY, June 8, 1992, at 7A;
Sandy Banisky, Overground Railroad to Roll IfAbortions Are Reduced, BALTIMORE MORNING
SUN, June 2, 1992, at IA.
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